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ABSTRACT  
   
This study analyzes how current U.S. immigration enforcement policy has been 
carried out, specifically under the implementation of the Secure Communities (S-Comm) 
program. Paying special attention to the enforcement-only policy hysteria and 
immigration patchwork trend since the 2000s, this study has the following research 
questions: (1) whether S-Comm has faithfully implemented enforcement actions for 
removing "dangerous" criminal noncitizens; (2) how counties with different immigration 
perspectives have responded to such an immigration enforcement program; and (3) 
whether the implementation of S-Comm has really made local communities safer as in 
the program goal.  
For analysis, 541 counties were selected, and their noncitizen enforcement results 
under S-Comm were analyzed with 5 time points, covering a 13-month period (Dec. 2011 
- Jan. 2013) with longitudinal data analyses. In spite of the rosy advertisement of this 
program, analysis of S-Comm showed a very different picture. Unlike the federal 
immigration agency's promise of targeting dangerous criminal noncitizens, 1 in 4 
noncitizen removals were for noncriminal violations, and more than half of noncitizen 
deportations were for misdemeanor charges and immigration violations in the name of 
"criminal aliens." Based on latent class analysis, three distinct subgroups of counties 
having different immigration enforcement policy perspectives were extracted, and there 
have been huge local variations over time on two key intergovernmental enforcement 
actions under the implementation of S-Comm: immigration detainer issuances and 
noncitizen deportations. Finally, unlike the federal immigration agency's "immigrant-
crime nexus" assumption for legitimating the implementation of S-Comm, no significant 
  ii 
and meaningful associations between these two factors were found. With serious conflicts 
and debates among policy actors on the implementation of S-Comm, this program was 
finally terminated in November 2014; although, the essence of the policy continues under 
a different name.   
A series of results from this study indicate that the current enforcement-only 
policy approach has been wrongfully implemented, and fundamental reconsideration of 
immigration policy should be made. Enforcement-focused immigration policy could not 
solve fundamental immigration-related problems, including why noncitizens immigrate 
and how they should be dealt with as humans. More rational and humane approaches to 
dealing with immigration should be discussed at the national and local levels. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation critically and empirically examines current U.S. immigration 
policy, focusing specifically on internal immigration enforcement policy and 
implementation of a related administration program, the federal-local cooperative 
immigration enforcement program called Secure Communities. By using noncitizen 
enforcement-related data collected since the initiation of this program, this study analyzes 
how current U.S. immigration enforcement policy under the Obama administration has 
been implemented and whether it has faithfully followed the stated policy goal. 
Moreover, considering changing political and policy contexts on immigration at the 
intergovernmental level since the 2000s, this study also analyzes how localities having 
different perspectives on immigration have followed various noncitizen enforcement 
trajectories over time and whether there are local variations in the process of 
implementation of federal immigration enforcement policy. Latent variable analyses - 
including longitudinal growth curve modeling and latent class analysis - and multinomial 
logistic regression are used for analyses.   
 
1.1. Background of Research 
As a wicked policy issue, immigration in the Unites States has been debated in 
terms of who can and cannot immigrate and naturalize, and what categories of 
noncitizens should not be allowed to assimilate and should finally be removed. 
Historically, such dividing lines for noncitizen integration and punishment (expulsion) 
2 
have been changed depending on geopolitical and socioeconomic contexts and 
ideological factors (Constable, 2013; Jimenez, 2012; Plascencia, 2013; Rosenblum, 
Meissner, & Hipsman, 2014; Schrag, 2010; Walker & Leitner, 2011). The social 
construction of noncitizens
1
 has also varied over time in its framing by policymakers and 
the public, from noncitizens as social and economic “contributors” complementing 
inadequate labor forces and diversifying America’s society and economic system to 
unnecessary socio-economic “burdens” or “threats” taking American jobs and depending 
on public services to, most extremely, “terrorists” or “risky enemies” negatively 
influencing public safety and national security (Chavez, 2013; Chiswick, 2008; Ingram & 
Schneider, 2005; Menjivar & Kanstroom, 2014; Moloney, 2012; Newton, 2008; 
Tichenor, 2002, 2012). The negative social and political construction of noncitizens has 
been expanded since the 1990s in response to an uncontrollable inflow of the 
undocumented, and the 9/11 terrorist attack laid the foundation for the federal 
government to reframe noncitizens as a “dangerous population” who should be removed 
in terms of the national security perspective (Á guila, 2013; Magana, 2013; Plascencia, 
2013; Podgorny, 2009; Winders, 2007). Since then, the main discourse and direction of 
U.S. immigration policy has been immersed in how noncitizens without legal documents 
(i.e., “unauthorized” noncitizens) or with criminal or immigration law violations (i.e., 
“criminal” noncitizens or those related to visa violations or Enter Without Inspections 
                                                 
1
 There are similar terms reflecting noncitizens living in the United States - such as “immigrants,” “aliens,” 
“noncitizens,” or “foreign-born” persons. Although these terms have been used interchangeably in 
government documents and social science scholarship, in this dissertation I will use the term “noncitizens” 
when referring to those having foreign nationality (“non-U.S. citizens”) while living in the United States 
without citizenship status for various reasons.      
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charges) should be effectively controlled and enforced, without more comprehensive and 
constructive alternatives or approaches to deal with immigration-related issues.  
Reflecting this series of socio-political contexts and environments, two striking 
trends on U.S. immigration policy have been made since the 2000s. The first trend is 
increasing local immigration activism in response to the federal inability to create a 
comprehensive immigration framework (Ackerman & Furman, 2013; Gilbert, 2009; Inda, 
2013; McDowell & Provine, 2013; Plascencia, 2013; Ramakrishnan & Gulasekaram, 
2013; Varsanyi, 2010, 2011; Varsanyi, Lewis, Provine, & Decker, 2012a, 2012b). 
Starting with California’s Proposition 187 (the Save Our State initiative) in 1994, a host 
of very punitive and restrictive local immigration ordinances and state laws have spread 
and transferred across localities, from Hazelton, Pennsylvania
2
 (2006), through Riverside, 
New Jersey
3
 (2006), Escondido, California
4
 (2006), Valley Park, Missouri
5
 (2007), 
Farmers’ Branch, Texas6 (2006), Fremont, Nebraska7 (2010), Arizona’s Senate Bill 10708 
(2010), to Alabama’s House Bill 569 (2011). Although some localities still orient toward 
an integrative and welcoming immigration policy stance, many local immigration 
ordinances or state laws did follow punitive and restrictive tones, through barring the 
undocumented from safely and legally living everyday life in their jurisdictions - such as 
restricting their ability to rent an apartment, drive a car, get a job, or access social or 
public services, and using English as the only valid language in everyday life (Becerra, 
                                                 
2
 City of Hazleton Ordinance 2006-18, The Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance. 
3
 City of Riverside Ordinance 2006-16,The Riverside Township Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance.  
4
 City of Escondido Ordinance No. 2006-38R, An Ordinance of the City of Escondido, California 
Establishing Penalties for the Harboring of Illegal Aliens in the City of Escondido.
  
5
 City of Valley Park Ordinance 2007-1722, The Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance. 
6
 City of Farmers’ Branch ordinance No. 2892.  
7
 City of Fremont Ordinance No. 5165. 
8
 The Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhood Act. 
9
 The Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act. 
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2012; Filindra & Kovács, 2012; Marquez & Schraufnagel, 2013; Olivas, 2007; Pedroza, 
2012; Reich & Barth, 2012; Sabia, 2010; Stuesse & Coleman, 2014). Expanding local 
roles and voices in the process of immigration policymaking since the 2000s, in 
connection with the blurring lines between criminal laws and federal immigration policy 
(sometimes called crimmigration trend) since the passage of the 1996 federal 
immigration laws - the Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) 
and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) - brought about serious 
debates in terms of what government can make and implement immigration policy, and 
how the federal government can establish the relationship between local counterparts in 
the process of implementing immigration policy at the comprehensive level (Arrocha, 
2012; Cimini, 2014; Filindra & Kovács, 2012; Leaman, 2012; Tichenor & Filindra, 2012; 
Ramakrishnan & Gulasekaram, 2013; Varsanyi, 2011).   
The second striking trend of U.S. immigration policy since the 2000s is the heavy 
reliance on “enforcement-focused” or “enforcement-only” policy and related 
administrative initiatives (Ewing, 2014; McDaniel, 2014; Hagan, Rodriguez, & Castro, 
2011; Holland, 2014; Meissner, Kerwin, Chishti, & Bergeron, 2013; Menjivar & 
Kanstroom, 2014; Palasz & Fennelly, 2013; Sanchez, 2009; Stumpf, 2014a; Suro, 2015). 
In U.S. immigration history, target noncitizen groups (categories) for admission 
restriction and punishment have fluctuated repeatedly, but since the passage of the 1996 
federal immigration legislation, such scopes and categories for punishment have radically 
increased, and noncitizens in these categories have been criminalized under the label 
“criminal aliens” (Brock, Glasbeek, Murdocca, 2014; Eagly, 2013). External and internal 
shocks, such as the 9/11 terrorist attack and the economic decline at the end of the 2000s, 
5 
also gave rise to the strengthening of such a punitive/restrictive immigration-control 
policy direction. With such a series of punitive turns on immigration issues, noncitizens 
have been considered as the subjects of “control” and “enforcement” in the name of 
public safety and national security. Such construction is rooted in the perspective that 
noncitizens cannot be integrated into U.S. society and culture, and “we [Americans] can 
punish you [noncitizens]” if you violate the law (National Public Radio, 2009) based on 
the “us versus them” approach (Natalie, 2013; Neilson, 2014; Poo, 2012). 
The approach for controlling and enforcing noncitizens under an enforcement-
only policy follows two tracks: (1) border control and management and (2) interior 
enforcement actions. The former focuses on efforts to deter the illegal inflow of 
noncitizens - frequently called a “prevention through deterrence” strategy (Barry, 2011; 
Nowrasteh, 2014; Rodriguez & Parades, 2014) - via militarization of the border, while 
the latter is related to catching, detaining, and finally removing noncitizens who are 
already in U.S. jurisdictions without documentation or with law violations under the 
criminal and immigration system; these internal enforcement efforts mainly consist of 
workplace or home raids, employer sanctions, and policing with cooperation of local law 
enforcement agencies on the street (American Immigration Council, 2013; Immigration 
Policy Center, 2014a; Stuesse & Coleman, 2014). These two different enforcement tracks 
have different working mechanisms, availability of budgets and forces, and primary 
public agencies, but under current legal and administrative operating procedure, they 
commonly target noncitizens who have violated laws - including criminal and 
immigration laws - and enforce their authority and discretion to catch, detain, and finally 
remove noncitizens. Under the enforcement-first policy stance, management and 
6 
operation of detention facilities and processing removal proceedings have been 
considered as key components for effective immigration policy (Menjivar & Kanstroom, 
2014). Based on this enforcement system, in the first five years of the Obama 
administration, about 34,000 noncitizen detainees have been in federal and local 
detention facilities or jails per day, and about 1,010 noncitizens have been deported per 
day, with a total of more than 2 million noncitizens having been deported through March 
2014 (Bender, 2013; Department of Homeland Security, 2014a; Lind, 2014). This is 
considered record-breaking enforcement performance relative to the performance under 
the previous administrations at the same point in their terms
10
 (Democracy Now, 2014; 
Ewing, 2014; Immigration Policy Center, 2014b).  
One interesting point on recent noncitizen enforcement policy is that the focal 
point for enforcement actions has been oriented more toward internal enforcement 
actions and related administrative programs (Meissner, Kerwin, Chishti, & Bergeron, 
2013), in spite of some conflicting perspectives and arguments.
11
 With legal support of 
the 1996 federal immigration law, since the 2000s the federal immigration policy began 
to design and implement federal-local cooperation or partnership programs for carrying 
out enforcement policy, such as 287(g) agreements of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act, the Criminal Alien Program (CAP), and Secure Communities. The programs were 
                                                 
10
 According to ICE’s FY 2014 ICE Immigration Removals, deportation numbers include all interior 
removals associated with criminal and immigration violations. The latter refers to noncitizens charged with 
EWI(Enter Without Inspection), visa violators and overstays, ICE fugitives, and prior removals and returns 
(having a previous removal case or confirming return entered in DHS systems).     
   
11
 Noncitizen enforcement performance by the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement was at its peak in fiscal year 2012, with more than 400,000 noncitizen removals. 
However, removal performance in fiscal year 2013 dropped to less than 370,000 (about a 10% decline 
relative to that of the previous year), and critics have sharply criticized the current direction of deportation 
policy under the Obama administration, which means most deportation performance was due to border 
apprehensions and removals, and deportation was less likely for internal noncitizens who had already 
spread extensively across U.S. jurisdictions (Bennett, 2014; Goodman, 2014; Stiles, 2014; Vaughan, 2013).   
7 
intended to target risky noncitizens who pose threats to public safety and national 
security, but also often enforce noncitizens without legal documentation or fugitives who 
fail to appear in immigration courts for enforcement processes. However, in spite of clear 
program goals of targeting and removing “dangerous” criminal noncitizens from local 
communities, there has been debate and conflict in the process of implementing these 
programs because they brought about unexpected results such as racial or ethnic profiling 
by targeting the Latino population and removing too many noncitizens without criminal 
violations or with merely misdemeanors (Chand & Schreckhise, 2014; Cox & Miles, 
2013; Ewing, 2014; Kanstroom, 2012; Menjivar & Kanstroom, 2014; Sweeney, 2014; 
TRAC, 2014a). With the complex horizontal (within federal agencies) and vertical 
(between federal immigration-related agencies and local law enforcement agencies) 
cooperation mechanism, internal enforcement programs have been rapidly expanded in 
terms of budgets spent, personnel, scope and numbers of noncitizens deported, and ripple 
effects at the local level. As Ewing (2014) points out, current enforcement policy for 
targeting and punishing noncitizens has become increasingly systematic and automatic, 
and under such a “deportation” or “enforcement machine” system with enforcement 
quotas set by Congress, large numbers of noncitizens might fall into the trap of removal 
regardless of the level of their legality or criminality
12
.               
 
 
                                                 
12
 Since the passage of the 1996 federal immigration laws - IIRIRA and AEDPA - even legal noncitizens, 
such as legal permanent residents (LPRs) and green card-holders, fall into the trap of deportation when they 
commit any level of crime or have committed crimes in the past. Many legal noncitizens who lived in the 
United States for decades were deported due to retroactive applications of law violations or misdemeanor 
charges (Brotherton & Barrios, 2013; Immigration Policy Center, 2010; Kanstroom, 2012).    
8 
1.2. Purpose of the Research 
Based on the contextual background on the current directions and practices of 
U.S. immigration policy, this dissertation pays special attention to two key trends and 
logics currently driving U.S. immigration policy: (1) local immigration activism under 
immigration federalism and (2) internal enforcement policy for targeting and enforcing 
noncitizens under the broad federal-local cooperative framework. These two logics play 
an important role in answering how current U.S. immigration policy works and how 
certain localities support noncitizen enforcement policy while others do not in the 
intergovernmental policy implementation perspective.  
Through “rescaling” of immigration policy and politics at the local level 
(Varsanyi, 2010), localities have been the heartland for debating who noncitizens are, 
how they are socially, economically, and legally constructed in their jurisdictions, and 
how their presence in these localities influences American residents’ everyday life. In 
spite of a traditionally recognized “federal preemptive authority” principle, which means 
immigration is the responsibility of the federal government, the federal government failed 
to create a comprehensive immigration framework since the 1990s that reflects the 
changing socioeconomic and political atmosphere. Under such a federal void on 
immigration policy, localities have responded differently to immigration issues, reflecting 
their respective demographic and political changes through local versions of immigration 
laws and implementations. Many states and localities - specifically border and southern 
states and localities - passed local immigration ordinances to reflect their political voices.  
Their common argument is that immigration is a local issue influencing their everyday 
political and socioeconomic realities (Walker & Leitner, 2011). 
9 
However, in contrast to these local political voices, the federal government’s 
counterargument is that immigration is inherently a national issue regarding foreign 
relations, so legally states and localities cannot be involved in immigration policy. 
However, ironically but interestingly, the federal government has encouraged localities to 
“administratively” be involved in get-tough immigration enforcement policy via an 
intergovernmental cooperative framework since the mid-2000s (Jung, 2014, 2015a; 
Palasz & Fennelly, 2013). This framework reflected shared responsibilities on the 
immigration issue (Suro, 2015), but such ironic intergovernmental relations on 
immigration brought about the blurring of roles between traditional federal immigration 
agencies and local law enforcement agencies (Palasz & Fennelly, 2013). 
Regarding internal noncitizen enforcement policy, DHS/ICE created and 
implemented multiple administrative programs under the Bush administration. These 
federal-local cooperation or partnership programs, including 287(g) partnerships, the 
Criminal Alien Program, Secure Communities, Fugitive Operations, the Joint Terrorism 
Task Force, and the Criminal Alien Removal Initiative, have been expanding in scope. Of 
these federal-local cooperative programs, Secure Communities (S-Comm) has 
specifically been a key immigration enforcement program under vertical (federal-
localities) and horizontal (ICE/DHS - FBI) cooperation through an information-sharing 
process on noncitizen enforcement actions. It has been rapidly expanded under the 
Obama administration in an attempt to effectively catch and remove risky and criminal 
noncitizens. 
In spite of the clear and straightforward program goal of S-Comm, “making local 
communities safer” by catching and removing dangerous criminal noncitizens, this 
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program has been at the center of conflicts and criticism among policy actors and 
stakeholders because of its unanticipated policy malfunctions. Unlike the promise that S-
Comm focuses on the removal of dangerous noncitizens who have committed violent 
crimes, almost half of noncitizens deported during the first 6 years of implementation 
either had no criminal violations or had only misdemeanor charges, such as traffic 
violations or drug possession. Several localities criticized such enforcement outcomes 
since 2010, and requested revisions of the program implementations. Some localities - 
including New York City; Cook County, IL; the state of Massachusetts; and the District 
of Columbia - requested to opt out of this program in 2011, but DHS/ICE institutionally 
made it impossible to do so by declaring S-Comm a mandatory program. Such 
unintended deportation outcomes from localities brought about serious collateral 
damages in immigrant communities - damages such as tearing families apart and putting 
many U.S.-born children with undocumented, deported parents into the foster care system 
- and local communities became so fearful that immigrants were reluctant to contact local 
police due to concerns that their families or friends might fall into the trap of deportation 
through police interactions (Jung, 2015b). These enforcement results from S-Comm 
ironically made communities more insecure (Kubrin, 2014; Theodore, 2012; Tramonte, 
2011). With this political and policy context on immigration enforcement policy in mind, 
this research critically and empirically analyzes how current U.S. immigration 
enforcement policy under the S-Comm framework has been implemented, whether this 
program has faithfully followed the key policy goal of targeting and removing the real 
“dangerous” noncitizens, and whether activation of  S-Comm has made local 
communities safer.   
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Under strong enforcement-only immigration policy environments, local responses 
have not been consistent. While some localities - Maricopa County, AZ; Los Angeles 
County, CA; and Harris County, TX - have actively participated in enforcement policy, 
others - San Francisco County, CA and New York City - have still oriented toward an 
integrative immigration policy and limited the level of noncitizen enforcement actions. 
Still others have done nothing on immigration-related issues because they view 
immigration as the responsibility of the federal government, not of localities. Under this 
“multilayered jurisdictional patchwork” trend on immigration issues (Varsanyi, Lewis, 
Provine, & Decker, 2012a, 2012b), localities tend to have different perspectives on S-
Comm as a mandatory noncitizen enforcement program. Therefore, this dissertation also 
analyzes how localities (counties) have responded to noncitizen enforcement policy under 
the S-Comm framework. That is, I analyze how each county has followed different (or 
similar) noncitizen enforcement trajectories over time, and what factors account for these 
local variations in the process of immigration enforcement policy. 
 
1.3. Research Questions 
This dissertation focuses on how S-Comm has been implemented at the local 
level, and whether this program has faithfully followed its stated goal of removing 
dangerous noncitizens with criminal convictions and consequently making communities 
safer. With regard to the first question (the working mechanism of immigration control 
policy), I analyze how different levels of government interact with each other to 
implement noncitizen enforcement actions under S-Comm, and how (in)actively 
localities participated in this enforcement system. Regarding the second question, I 
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analyze deportation outcomes under S-Comm at the community level during the first 5 
years of implementation, and determine which noncitizen groups have actually been 
targeted for deportation using policy (enforcement) factors of this program. To account 
for the current U.S. immigration enforcement policy process with a more comprehensive 
perspective, I add contextual factors representing local political, economic, geographic, 
and demographic changes, and analyze how these factors create local variations on the 
extent of immigration enforcement policy participation. Finally, with deportation 
outcomes from S-Comm implementation, I analyze whether local immigration 
enforcement actions based on the intergovernmental cooperation framework fulfill the 
key goal of this program, to improve public safety. In summary, the following research 
questions for this dissertation are analyzed: 
 
Question 1: Analysis of S-Comm implementation in terms of the stated program goal  
- Has S-Comm faithfully followed its program goal of targeting and removing 
the “worst of the worst” noncitizens at the national, state, and local levels 
since the initiation of this program? That is, how many noncitizens with Level 
1 offenses (serious crimes which ICE targets for noncitizen enforcement 
policy) have been caught and removed per locality? How many noncitizens 
with Level 3 (less serious crimes or misdemeanors) and non-criminal offenses 
have been caught and removed per locality?  
- Are there any local differences (or similarities) on local immigration 
enforcement policy under the S-Comm framework? That is, which counties 
have “relevantly” implemented this program, targeting noncitizens with Level 
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1 offenses? On the other hand, which counties have “misleadingly” 
implemented this program, removing noncitizens with Level 3 or non-criminal 
offenses? What factors create this enforcement variation among counties? 
Activation orders of S-Comm or intensity of immigration enforcement by 
county can be considered for local variation, based on previous studies (Cox 
& Miles, 2013; Miles & Cox, 2014; Treyger, Chalfin, Loeffler, 2014). 
Question 2: Analyzing inter- and intra-locality noncitizen enforcement outcome changes 
over time, especially focusing on three contextual variables (local classifications on the 
extent of immigration enforcement policy participation and two key intergovernmental 
interactions on noncitizen enforcement actions) 
- Are there any empirical subgroups or classes on the extent of local 
immigration enforcement policy participation, considering contextually a 
strong “multilayered jurisdictional patchwork” trend on immigration issues? 
- How have immigration enforcement actions been implemented under the 
current enforcement machine? Narrowly focusing on the implementation of S-
Comm, how have two key federal-local interactions (immigration detainer 
issuances and deportation outcomes) been carried out, and how are they 
interrelated? Adding local variations on immigration enforcement policy 
participation, how are these three contextual factors interrelated with each 
other? Do we find any patterns, characteristics, or directions of local 
immigration enforcement policy implementation under the S-Comm 
framework? 
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Question 3: Finding factors influencing the shape of local immigration enforcement 
policy and analyzing the program outcome under S-Comm: Did the implementation of S-
Comm really make local communities safer?  
- Considering local patterns or directions on immigration enforcement policy 
under the S-Comm framework (question 2), what contextual factors influence 
the shaping or reshaping of the direction of local immigration enforcement 
policy?  
- Based on noncitizen removal outcomes under S-Comm in terms of 
longitudinal perspectives, have local crime rates representing the level of 
public safety really been improved after the implementation of this program?   
 
1.4. Organization 
This dissertation consists of seven chapters. Chapter 2 briefly reviews historical 
U.S. immigration policymaking in terms of the main policy goals and directions taken by 
policy actors and stakeholders. How noncitizens have been socially framed and 
constructed under changing policy goals and directions is also reviewed. Focusing on the 
theoretical and contextual background on U.S. immigration policy, Chapter 3 discusses 
how immigration enforcement policy has been implemented in terms of the cooperative 
federalism perspective, and considering local immigration activism and the immigration 
patchwork trend since the 2000s, I also theoretically touch on what factors influence local 
participation in immigration enforcement policy. Moreover, as a key administrative 
enforcement program for this dissertation, S-Comm is also reviewed, in terms of what S-
Comm is, how this program has been implemented and how localities have participated, 
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and what its enforcement outcome has been relative to the stated program goals. Chapter 
4 empirically analyzes whether S-Comm has really followed the stated program goal of 
catching and removing risky and criminal noncitizens at the national, state, and local 
level. For analysis, I use monthly noncitizen deportation data (“IDENT/IAFIS 
interoperability” statistics) from S-Comm. I selected 541 localities that have activated S-
Comm, and 5 time points (Dec. 2011 - Jan. 2013) are used for analysis, covering a 13- 
month period out of more than 6 years of implementation (Oct. 2008 - present). With 
descriptive and graphical analyses, I follow deportation outcomes over time graphically 
at the different enforcement levels and find implications. Considering local variations on 
the direction of immigration policy, Chapter 5 first classifies all 541 localities (counties) 
into statistically reliable numbers of subgroups based on items regarding the extent of 
local immigration enforcement policy participation - such as 287(g) partnerships and 
activation orders of S-Comm - by using latent class analysis. After that, I use longitudinal 
growth curve modeling to analyze how two repeatedly measured enforcement actions - 
monthly immigration detainer issuances and noncitizen deportations under S-Comm 
implementation - are interrelated with each other under the enforcement machine system 
over time. Finally, combining all three abovementioned contextual factors, longitudinal 
mediation analysis is also used to grasp how each group has similar (or different) 
enforcement performance over time. To account for the comprehensive working logic of 
the immigration enforcement machine, in Chapter 6 I add some local political, economic, 
geographic, and demographic factors and, via multinomial logistic regression analysis, 
analyze how they influence local differences on the extent of immigration enforcement 
policy participation. Moreover, whether the implementation of S-Comm during a 13-
16 
month period really reduced crime rates and increased public safety in localities is also 
discussed by using longitudinal data analysis. Finally, chapter 7 summarizes results of the 
three research questions of chapters 4 through 6, and discusses policy implications, 
limitations of this research and suggestions for future research.         
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CHAPTER 2 
U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY CHANGE: SHIFTING POLICY GOALS  
AND DIRECTIONS 
 
This chapter follows historical U.S. immigration policy and its changes in terms 
of policy goals and priorities. Policymakers have varied their policy goals and 
preferences on immigration-related issues with changing socioeconomic and political 
contexts, and the social, economic and legal construction of noncitizens has been shaped 
and reshaped under the repeatedly changing immigration pendulum - from a construction 
of “deserving” noncitizens who help America grow and prosper, to “undeserving” 
noncitizens who threaten national and economic security. Internal or external 
perturbations or shocks - such as the 9/11 terrorist attack or serious economic decline - in 
U.S. history made swift changes in the direction of immigration policy, and immigration 
policy at the national level since the 2000s has been mainly oriented toward an 
“enforcement-first” stance connecting noncitizens with a national security and public 
safety agenda. Such a punitive turn on U.S. immigration policy made it possible for 
immigration policymakers to successfully frame noncitizens as a “dangerous class” 
(Plascencia, 2013) and to create and implement multiple stepped-up immigration 
enforcement programs, such as S-Comm, under the guise of removing criminal aliens and 
making communities safer.       
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2.1. Social Construction and Policy Responses to Noncitizens 
Historically, perspectives on noncitizens in American society have repeatedly 
oscillated from welcoming to unwelcoming under changing socio-economic, political, 
and cultural contexts and environments (Dingeman & Rambaut, 2010). According to 
Newton (2005) and Rivera (2014), the direction of public perspectives on noncitizens has 
mainly depended on the following two discourses:  (1) whether noncitizens are “good” 
persons contributing to American society and the economy, or are “problematic” persons 
putting a socioeconomic burden on the nation; and (2) of all noncitizens in the society, 
which categories or subgroups can be assimilated and which are incapable of integration 
in the nation. Through such discourses on noncitizens, social construction
13
 of 
noncitizens in American society has been described, defined, and framed by policy actors 
and stakeholders (Johnson, 1996-97; Magaña & Short, 2002; Newton, 2005; Rivera, 
2014). Politicians and policymakers sometimes positively construct a certain category of 
noncitizens
14
 - such as legal noncitizens (frequently called “lawful permanent residents”) 
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 Social construction framework in policy studies refers to the ways in which social realities, target groups, 
words, or symbols are shaped and perceived (Magaña & Short, 2002; Pierce, Siddiki, Jones, Schumacher, 
Pattison & Peterson, 2014; Schneider & Ingram, 1993). This framework nicely shows how certain target 
groups or populations can be framed and named by policy actors and stakeholders, and based on this 
construction, how government sets and designs a certain direction and type of public policy to treat these 
target populations. In the field of public policy, Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram’s social construction 
framework has been widely discussed and applied to various substantive policy arenas. For studies on 
social construction of noncitizens or immigration in American context, see Eagly (2013); DiAlto (2005); 
Johnson (1996-97, 2013); Magaña (2013); Magaña and Short (2002); Newton (2005, 2012).    
14
 It is not clear how many categories of noncitizens can be officially made and considered by politicians 
and policymakers under the U.S. immigration policy system and discourse. Under immigration law, 
noncitizens are simply dichotomized into the categories “legal” (or “documented” or “authorized”) and 
“illegal” (or “undocumented” or “unauthorized”), and policy discourse on noncitizens has traditionally 
followed this dividing line (DiAlto, 2005). However, noncitizens in these two categories can also consist of 
multiple subgroups having different legal, political, and social influences and constructions (Eagly, 2013). 
Therefore, noncitizens can be considered as various social groups across a spectrum, rather than a clear and 
simple dichotomy. By using the “alien spectrum,” Eagly (2013, p. 1138) divides noncitizens in the United 
States into multiple groups: “repeat [law] violator,” “recent entrant,” “long-term undocumented resident,” 
“deferred action recipient applicant,” “visa holder,” “asylee,” “conditional resident,” “lawful permanent 
resident,” and “long-term lawful permanent resident.” 
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or temporary or seasonal workers complementing the labor force, while most frequently 
noncitizens, especially the undocumented crossing the border and noncitizens with 
criminal charges, have been constructed based on negative meanings, rhetoric, and 
narratives, such as job stealers, welfare queens, anchor babies, human and drug 
traffickers, and criminals (Chomsky, 2014; Cox & Miles, 2013, p. 90; Golash-Boza, 
2014a, 2014b; Holland, 2014; Leitner, 2012; Newton, 2005; Provine, 2013; Suro, 2015).  
Under this context, two disparate policy responses on social construction of 
various categories of noncitizens have also been created and widely used by government: 
a “welcoming” and a “warning” message. The former is related to defining noncitizens 
who are positively considered as desirable and “potential citizens” or “model minority” 
(DiAlto, 2005), while the latter construct negatively defines noncitizens as “unassimilable 
aliens” (Newton, 2005, p. 140), “social deviants,” “undesirable minorities,” or “cultural 
problems” (Rivera, 2014, pp. 46-50). With such different responses, noncitizen groups 
receiving a welcoming response have become the objects of integration to American 
society, while those subject to a warning message have become the objects of control, 
regulation, and punishment (Plascencia, 2013). That is, U.S. immigration policy history 
has been a series of selection processes of “admissible” and “inadmissible” noncitizens, 
and from an enforcement angle, it has been the selection of the scope and boundary of 
“deportable” or “removable” categories of noncitizens who were negatively framed and 
constructed (Chomsky, 2014; Jung, 2015b; Newton, 2005, 2008). Policymakers and 
politicians have considered several factors - such as ideology, race, ethnicity, religion, 
health, economic vitality, and education attainment - in selecting who can or cannot be 
legally admitted and live here; some factors have been repeatedly and consistently 
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considered important while others have been ignored or underemphasized according to 
the shift of political and socioeconomic contexts. Policy tools or programs for 
legitimating these factors, such as setting national or geographical quotas, 
deporting/punishing certain nationals or categories of noncitizens (i.e., Asian Americans 
at the end of the 1880s and Mexicans since the mid 1990s), or implementing seasonal and 
temporary worker programs in certain regional areas, have been implemented and 
frequently changed with other policy programs or tools according to the direction of 
national immigration policy.      
Based on such historical distinction or selection processes for noncitizen and 
immigration management at the national level, only limited categories or groups of 
noncitizens, especially White Europeans, were relatively easily welcomed and legally 
allowed to migrate, stay, and finally become  U.S. citizens (FitzGerald & Cook-Martin, 
2014; Rivera, 2014; Wong, 2014a). Others not included in these groups were negatively 
considered and targeted by the government for punishment and control. However, one 
interesting aspect of negative noncitizen construction is that the main groups targeted for 
punishment have historically and contextually been changed, from Asian Americans to 
(eastern) Europeans to Latin Americans, especially Mexicans, with different policy tools 
and programs. According to Cuéllar (2012, p.88), such immigration system and selection 
processes also had many “self-defeating” features in the process of incorporating these 
ideologies and policy responses.  
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2.2. Shifting Policy Goals and Directions: Historical Trends 
To fully understand historical U.S. immigration policy changes and directions and 
how noncitizens under national immigration discourse have been constructed and framed 
by politicians and administered by policy programs, we need to review how policy goals 
and directions/priorities on immigration have shifted under U.S. political and economic 
systems. Moreover, what categories or groups of noncitizens have become targeted by 
politicians and policy elites in the process of immigration policy, and why they became 
the target for shaping of immigration policy in historical contexts should also be 
analyzed.  
 
2.2.1. Removals and Exclusion (1880s - 1920s) 
There was no clear national immigration law and system in the United States until 
the 1890s, and until then individual states had their own migrant-related legislation or 
administrative actions for managing and controlling the inflow of immigrants (Chomsky, 
2014; Koven & Götzke, 2010; Vecchio, 2013). However, changing political and 
economic climates since the 1830s in the United States - such as the Gold Rush and post-
Civil War railroad construction - brought about increasing waves of immigrants from 
European and Asian countries (especially China),
15
 and labor unions and conservative 
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 European immigration until the 1880s was dominated by northern and western Europe - such as the 
United Kingdom, Ireland, and Germany - but after the 1880s, the numbers of southern and eastern 
European immigrants from Russia, Greece, Italy, and Hungary explosively increased, accounting for more 
than half of total European immigrants in the 1890s (Vecchio, 2013). In the case of Asian immigration at 
that time, Chinese and Japanese made up a large percentage of immigrants. As a key target population for 
immigration control, about 110,000 to 300,000 Chinese entered the United States between 1850 and 1882, 
and most of them resided in California as cheap labor in the areas of farming, mining, laundries, and 
domestic services. Japanese had been allowed full-fledged immigration to the United States since the 1880s 
based on the 1868 Meiji Restoration, and between 1880 and 1894, around 30,000 Japanese contract 
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businessmen strongly criticized this influx of noncitizens, arguing that noncitizen 
laborers took American workers’ jobs and caused a decrease in the average wage level 
(Escudero, 2014). Through lobbying efforts to politicians for controlling the inflow of 
immigrants, the first comprehensive immigration law and policy in the United States 
began between 1875 and 1891, including three pieces of back-to-back federal 
immigration legislation: the Page Law of 1875, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, and 
the Immigration Act of 1891 (Moloney, 2012; Vecchio, 2013). An official public 
institution for managing immigration-related public affairs, the Bureau of Immigration 
under the Treasury Department, was first created under the 1891 Immigration Act, and 
this function was transferred to the newly created Department of Commerce and Labor in 
1903. Such organizational responsibility on immigration in this period shows that 
noncitizens were mainly considered as economic goods to complement a labor force 
needed to fill labor-intensive and dirty jobs. In 1906, the government functions of 
immigration and naturalization were merged, and the Bureau of Immigration and 
Naturalization was created.   
Immigration laws in this period commonly included strong restrictive messages 
and provisions on exclusion and inadmissibility of noncitizens of certain national origins, 
especially those of Asian origin. The immigration policy focused on controlling the entry 
of noncitizens who were “undesirably constructed” in socioeconomic, political, cultural, 
and moral contexts - such as idiots, lunatics, those convicted of felonies or misdemeanors 
(regarding moral turpitude), polygamists, communists, the poor and uneducated, those 
with non-Christian traditions, and non-whites (Bausum, 2009; FitzGerald & Cook-
                                                                                                                                                 
workers began to work in Hawaii. According to FitzGerald and Cook-Martin ( 2014), the number of 
Japanese workers in California drastically increased between 1890 and 1910, from 1,000 to 41,000.    
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Martin, 2104; Moloney, 2012; Vecchio, 2013). Through immigration laws, various 
criteria were set to decide which noncitizens were inadmissible and undeserving and to 
control their ability to enter the United States. Such criteria included public health 
(noncitizens with contagious diseases or mental health disorders were inadmissible under 
the 1891, 1907, and 1917 Immigration Acts), knowledge level (the literacy test in the 
1917 Immigration Act), poverty (level of dependence on social welfare programs and 
imposing a head tax under the 1882 and 1907 Immigration Acts), aging, religion (those 
based on non-Christian traditions),
16
 political ideologies (prohibiting the entry of 
anarchists or anti-U.S. government adherents in the 1903 Immigration Act), and 
race/ethnicity (favoring whiteness and controlling nonwhites under the 1882 Chinese 
Exclusion Act and, the 1902, 1904, 1907, and 1917 Immigration Acts).  
Under such regulation mechanisms, Asian noncitizens, especially Chinese, were 
the key group targeted with restrictive immigration policies in this period (FitzGerald & 
Cook-Martin, 2014; Koven & Götzke, 2010; Moloney, 2012; Railton, 2013; Vecchio, 
2013). Although European noncitizens made up the largest share of immigrants during 
the 19th and early 20th centuries, the Chinese became the main target of punishment and 
were considered as a negative social force in the U.S. social and economic system.
17
 
Politicians and policymakers negatively framed Chinese immigrants as “coolies,” 
unskilled cheap laborers, “strikebreakers,” and an “inferior race” (Escudero, 2014; 
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 Although few federal immigration laws directly touched on aging and religion for controlling the inflow 
of undesirable and excludable noncitizens, these attributes were widely used for immigration regulation in 
U.S. immigration history. As Jews were negatively constructed and considered one of the “racial” groups 
subject to deportation at the beginning of the 20th century, and older immigrants were also defined as 
having “poor physique” or “senility,” so many older immigrants were excluded in the process of entry to 
Ellis Island in the 1900s (Moloney, 2012, pp. 126-130). 
17
 According to Vecchio (2013), a total of 138,941 Chinese entered the United States as immigrants 
between 1870 and 1880, making up about 4.3 percent of the total number of immigrants in that period. 
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FitzGerald & Cook-Martin, 2014, pp. 91-93; Vecchio, 2013), and such negative 
responses and anti-Chinese sentiment brought about back-to-back anti-Chinese laws, 
including the Page Law of 1875 and the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. Follow-up 
legislation after the 1882 act strengthened admission restrictions on all Chinese and 
placed stringent enforcement on Chinese already residing in the country through 
requiring possession of “certificates of residence” and “certificates of identities” as proof 
of legal identification (Vecchio, 2013, p. 1486). Negative framing and construction of 
noncitizens in this period did not end with the Chinese; it had spread and been 
institutionalized to almost all Asian noncitizens through the Immigration Act of 1917. 
Through setting the “Asiatic Barred Zone” (FitzGerald & Cook-Martin, 2014; Moloney, 
2012; Vecchio, 2013), then-U.S. immigration policy laid the foundation to legally and 
systematically restrict and prohibit Asian immigrants as labor forces and deport them if 
they illegally entered or were smuggled into the society. That is, the direction and priority 
of immigration admission and integration was basically determined by race, with the 
consideration that, for the protection of racial purity and public safety, nonwhites could 
or should not become U.S. citizens. Using “scientific” or “biological racism” including 
eugenics theories (FitzGerald & Cook-Martin, 2014; Moloney, 2012), politicians and 
policymakers legitimated the idea that Asians could not integrate and the inflow of Asian 
noncitizens negatively influenced U.S. society and economy. Therefore, under such 
racialized immigration policy in this period, it was thought that the “Oriental invasion” 
(FitzGerald & Cook-Martin, 2014, p. 97) or “yellow peril” (Bausum, 2009; FitzGerald & 
Cook-Martin, 2014) brought by increasing numbers of Asian noncitizens should be 
thoroughly restricted and regulated.  
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Unlike Asian noncitizens who were severely targeted by politicians and 
policymakers, noncitizens of other races were not the main target for enforcement and 
immigration regulation in this period. For example, Europeans, in spite of some controls 
on and inadmissibility of European noncitizens, especially from eastern and southern 
areas, were allowed almost open immigration between 1880 and World War I (FitzGerald 
& Cook-Martin, 2014; Vecchio, 2013). Mexicans were also relatively welcomed and 
constructed as “constructive friends” in this period due to the common consideration that 
Mexicans, unlike Asian noncitizens, were “temporary migrants” (Moloney, 2012, p. 117) 
or “transient laborers” (Chomsky, 2014, p. 50). Therefore, Mexicans under the 1917 law 
were exempted from the literacy test and paying the head tax and were actually free to 
cross the border until 1919 (Chomsky, 2014). 
 
2.2.2. “Selective” Integration/Enforcement Based on National Quotas (1920s - 1960s) 
As in the previous stage, the basic direction of national immigration policy in this 
period was still oriented toward a restrictive tendency. With a mix of economic, eugenics, 
and political perspectives and administrative support from the 1911 Dillingham 
Commission and its recommendations, racialized and racist immigration policy was 
openly legitimated and institutionalized (Koven & Götzke, 2010). Interestingly, one key 
mechanism that differentiated immigration regulation and management in this period 
from the previous period is that “nationality” was heavily considered for deciding who 
and how many noncitizens could or could not immigrate into the United States 
(Chomsky, 2014; Moloney, 2012; Tichenor, 2013). With the passage of the Quarter Act 
of 1921 and the Immigration Act of 1924, the national quota system became a key 
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mechanism for filtering “undeserving” and “unworthy” noncitizens. Under this system, 
noncitizens targeted for immigration control were eastern and southern European - 
especially Germans and Jews - and Asians. Setting the quota for each country at 3% of 
the total foreign population from that country already in the U.S. permitted a fixed 
number of noncitizens to enter the United States. However, because the quota was based 
on immigrant populations allowed into the country under the previous noncitizen 
admission policy favoring white western Europeans, only “deserving” western European 
noncitizens were allowed to legally enter and live in the United States, and others were 
still denied under this system (Chomsky, 2014; FitzGerald & Cook-Martin, 2014; 
Moloney, 2012). However, nationals of the Western Hemisphere
18
 were exempted from 
such national quotas, so there was room for politicians and policymakers to allow 
noncitizens from Western Hemisphere countries to immigrate depending on political and 
economic climate changes or on demands. Follow-up legislation on federal immigration 
policy in this period gradually expanded the scope of racial exclusion and inadmissibility 
of noncitizens through the Immigration Act of 1924 and the Registration Act of 1929. 
Negative construction of Asians was reconfirmed under the national quota system. In 
terms of government function, immigration issues were transferred from the Department 
of Labor to the Department of Justice in the 1940s, meaning that immigration began to be 
differently considered by politicians and policymakers as a public safety or legality issue 
rather than as a labor issue. 
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 Western Hemisphere countries exempted from the national quota system in this period included “the 
Dominion of Canada, Newfoundland, the Republic of Mexico, the Republic of Cuba, the Republic of Haiti, 
the Dominican Republic, the Canal Zone, or an independent country of Central or South America” 
(FitzGerald & Cook-Martin, 2014, p. 105).   
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The policy response to Mexican immigration in this period is interesting. 
Mexicans were considered positively and were the most preferred noncitizens as 
temporary or seasonal workers, especially during the agricultural crisis in the 1920s, and 
they were actually exempted from the national quota system and allowed to openly cross 
the border
19
. However, public perspectives on Mexicans swiftly changed by the 1930s. 
Economic collapse in the 1930s during the Great Depression strengthened anti-Mexican 
sentiment, which considered them as opportunists taking American jobs, and the federal 
government, influenced by strong lobbying from the American Federation of Labor 
(AFL) and patriotic societies, pressed Mexicans to voluntarily return to their country or 
they would be deported (Chomsky, 2014; FitzGerald & Cook-Martin, 2014; Tichenor, 
2013; Vecchio, 2013). However, shortages in the domestic labor force throughout two 
world wars led to changes in the external and political atmosphere, and the federal 
government officially allowed Mexicans to cross the border and work as “cheap” or 
“emergency” labor forces through Public Laws 45 and 78. As a by-product of this 
agreement, the Bracero program was initiated and renewed over two decades (1942-
1964). However, institutionalization of this program “deepened the structures and culture 
of migration, including extralegal migration” (Chomsky, 2014, p. 57), and brought about 
the increase of illegal immigration, detouring this program for using cheap labor. Such 
extralegal migration of Mexicans was possible through a “cozy triangle” coalition among 
related interests, including agribusinesses, politicians, and a lax immigration bureaucracy 
(Tichenor, 2013). The increasing number of illegal Mexicans was considered as a social 
concern by politicians and policymakers, and the response was a strong immigration 
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 According to Tichenor (2013), almost 75,000 Mexicans migrated to the United States between 1917 and 
1921 as labor contract workers under the waiver plan of the 1917 immigration law.   
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enforcement action under the Eisenhower administration through Operation Wetback. 
Consequently, the social construction of Mexicans as “braceros” or “wetbacks” in this 
period was swiftly flipped from a positive to a negative one in the process of shaping 
U.S. immigration policy.   
The outbreak of World War II changed the policy response to Japanese 
Americans residing in the United States. As nationals of countries belonging to Axis 
powers, German, Italian, and Japanese noncitizens who resided in the United States were 
negatively constructed as “potential traitors” or “enemy aliens” (FitzGerald & Cook-
Martin, 2014, p. 109) in terms of a national security perspective, and they were forcefully 
arrested and interned. Especially strong internment actions were made against Japanese 
Americans, so all West Coast Japanese residents and Japanese Americans were sent to 
relocation camps and lost their personal liberties and properties (Vecchio, 2013). 
Ironically but interestingly, Chinese immigrants who were severely punished and 
negatively constructed under the Chinese Exclusion Act, were now reconsidered as “good 
Asians” (Vecchio, 2013, p. 1493) or “allied friends” (FitzGerald & Cook-Martin, 2014, p. 
97) after China became an ally during World War II. This was connected with the 
passage of the 1943 Magnuson Act which repealed the previous Chinese-related 
exclusion and harsh enforcement actions.   
The post-World War II atmosphere and the advent of the Cold War since the 
1950s brought about a power struggle between communist and liberal democratic blocks. 
Based on such power conflict and changing foreign policy climate, how the federal 
government dealt with increasing numbers of political and economic refugees from 
Eastern Europe (i.e., Hungary and Yugoslavia) and Cuba was considered a key U.S. 
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immigration policy issue. Mixing a humanitarian perspective and political calculation, the 
previous national quota system for noncitizen admission and exclusion based on national 
origin was slightly moderated; quotas for Asians and eastern and southern Europeans 
were limitedly and symbolically set under the 1952 Immigration and Naturalization Act. 
In spite of situational changes on immigration policy, the racialized immigration 
policymaking and trend remained consistent (FitzGerald & Cook-Martin, 2014). 
 
2.2.3. Family Reunification and Getting Skillful Labor Forces (1960s - 1980s) 
Changing domestic politics (increasing civil rights movement) and foreign policy 
environment (boat people from Cuba and Haiti, and the outbreak of the Vietnam War) 
between the 1960s and the 1980s pressed Congress and administrations to revise the 
previous racialized noncitizen admission and regulation policy to reflect the changing 
sociopolitical atmosphere. Moreover, increasing demand for high-skilled labor from other 
countries to fill “a domestic shortage of nurses, physicians, and engineers” (Moloney, 
2012, p. 218) required revision of the previous national quota system. Passage of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965 ended the discriminatory national quota 
system for immigration control that had lasted for four decades (1920s - 1960s).  
The first impact of the1965 law was a change in the racial composition since the 
1960s in the United States (Chomsky, 2014; Johnson, 2013; Koven & Götzke, 2010). 
Through the repeal of national quotas and setting of “hemispheric limits” for issuing 
visas
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 (Vecchio, 2013, p. 1498), the nonwhite groups targeted in the previous stages, 
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 Such hemispheric limits allowed noncitizens in Eastern Hemisphere countries, including eastern and 
southern Europe, Asia, and Africa, who were negatively constructed for immigration regulation and 
30 
especially Asians, Africans, and Latin Americans, gained considerable opportunities and 
expansion of immigration. However, western Europeans, the previous beneficiaries under 
the national quota system, lost their standing as the favored noncitizens.  
The key immigration policy goals and priorities for noncitizen admission in this 
period were family reunification and preference for skilled and professional workers, 
which meant complicated consideration in a changing foreign policy environment under 
the Cold War, a healthy economy and lessening racial discrimination and prejudice 
(Johnson, 2013; Koven & Götzke, 2010; Vecchio, 2013). Increasing civil rights 
movements and their egalitarian viewpoint on sociopolitical opportunities in this period 
also influenced such changes of policy priorities on immigration. Following such policy 
preferences, many noncitizens who were previously not allowed to immigrate to the 
United States had the opportunity to legally enter the country and be granted citizenship. 
With the family reunification principle, family members, including spouses and children, 
and relatives of citizens regardless of race or ethnicity obtained benefits through a pattern 
of “chain migration” (Koven & Götzke, 2010, p. 139). In addition, Asians, especially 
Filipinos, Indians, and Koreans, entered the United States for occupational preferences 
for professionals under this 1965 law, and almost 250,000 noncitizens filled jobs in 
nursing, engineering, and medicine during the first 20 years (Moloney, 2012; Vecchio, 
2013).  A series of policy directions and preferences in this period gave rise to an 
enormous increase in immigration. According to Vecchio (2013, pp. 1498-99), the 
number of immigrants “doubled between 1965 and 1970 and doubled again between 
1970 and 1990,” so more than 15 million noncitizens were allowed to enter the United 
                                                                                                                                                 
control, to be granted opportunities for naturalization and citizenship. Under the 1965 law, Eastern 
Hemisphere countries (20,000 per country) got 170,000 visa slots for immigration (Vecchio, 2013).    
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States under the 1965 immigration policy direction and preferences. The Refugee Act of 
1980 also contributed to an increasing flow of refugees from nonwhite countries 
including Vietnam, Cuba, Laos, and Cambodia.  
The interesting noncitizen group facing ironic changes in this period was Latinos, 
especially Mexicans. Although the 1965 law did not explicitly target Mexicans for 
immigration control or regulation, one of the core provisions of that law included setting 
hemispheric limits for visa issuance. So, based on this principle, countries of the Western 
Hemisphere that had been exempted from immigration control and regulation policy 
under the national quota system now had their first numerical restrictions for visa 
issuance, a maximum of 120,000. This fundamentally changed the social, legal, and 
political construction of Mexicans on immigration policy by categorizing them as 
“immigrants,” unlike the traditional social construction of Mexicans as “temporary 
migrants” and “seasonal workers” complementing American labor forces. The visa cap 
for Mexicans under the 1965 law was below the actual demand for cheap labor in the 
Southwest farming areas, and the end of the Bracero Program instigated illegal border 
crossing of many Mexicans and other Central Americans (Chomsky, 2014; Johnson, 
2013;  Tichenor, 2013). 
The increase of Mexican unauthorized immigrants was raised as a serious social 
concern and problem by politicians and policymakers beginning in the 1970s, so how the 
federal government could effectively manage and control such increasing numbers of 
undocumented noncitizens from Latin America was the key immigration agenda 
(Chomsky, 2014; Newton, 2005). Based on recommendations from the Select 
Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy (SCIRP), Congress passed the 
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Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) under the Reagan administration, 
which combined an “amnesty and enforcement approach” (Gerken, 2013, p. 1593). That 
is, IRCA oriented toward two tracks: (1) legalization of the undocumented who already 
resided in the United States and (2) prohibiting employers from hiring undocumented 
noncitizens as cheap labor (Newton, 2005). Therefore, the main target for immigration 
regulation under the IRCA was not immigrants per se but employers.  
In spite of serious debate on the relevancy of amnesty, about three million 
undocumented noncitizens were legalized by the IRCA. However, employment sanctions 
were not successful due to the lack of a national identification system for “verifying 
employment eligibility” (Tichenor, 2013); rather, an industry manufacturing false 
documents for undocumented workers was in full swing, and it gave room for employers 
to exploit noncitizen workers. Eventually, immigration policy for controlling the 
undocumented in this period failed. Legalized Mexicans who had been granted amnesty 
under the IRCA moved into “the more marginalized sectors of the labor market” 
(Chomsky, 2014, p. 62), but labor-intensive sectors like agriculture still demanded a 
cheap immigrant labor force, which brought about a greater increase in the inflow of 
Mexican undocumented noncitizens. 
 
2.2.4. The Undocumented Problems and Criminalization of Noncitizens (1990s)  
The real policy result from IRCA was not welcomed. The number of the 
undocumented, especially Mexicans, was not reduced; rather it continued to soar after 
implementation of the IRCA and the resulting chain migration of the newly legalized. 
Few employers were sanctioned for knowingly hired the undocumented. Such a policy 
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failure in a previous stage was considered a lesson for policymakers and politicians, and 
those with strong anti-immigration sentiments came to consider stricter and stronger 
administrative and legal actions, as the only possible approach for preventing the 
repetition of such a policy failure. The typical arguments from anti-immigration groups in 
this period were similar to the current rhetoric from present-day anti-immigrant 
conservatives: the border is porous, the undocumented take Americans’ jobs, and they 
violate laws, so public safety in the United States is seriously challenged. Some border 
states, especially Southwest states sharing the border with Mexico, expressed strong 
complaints to the federal government about the inability to control illegal border crossing 
by Mexican noncitizens, and began to pass local-level restrictive immigration policy. 
Starting with California’s Proposition 187 in 1994, such local punitive and restrictive 
immigration policy voices got considerable attention from the public and media. 
Washington politicians and immigration policymakers swiftly followed in California’s 
policy footsteps by passing back-to-back federal-level immigration legislation and 
administrative actions, including the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act 
(PRWOA), and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) in 1996 
(Gerken, 2013; Koven & Götzke, 2010; Newton, 2005; Tichenor, 2013).  
Under this series of federal immigration laws and systems, noncitizens were not 
considered deserving of socioeconomic development; rather, according to immigration 
policymakers in this period, immigrants, especially the undocumented, are “undesirable” 
in society (Gerken, 2013); the level of legal immigration, including naturalization and 
granting citizenship, should be strictly controlled (Newton, 2005); stricter enforcement-
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oriented policy is the only solution to solve the current undocumented immigration 
conundrum; free public services are the key incentive for the undocumented to cross the 
border, and therefore the use of public programs or services by noncitizens should be 
banned (Tichenor, 2013). Based on this perspective on immigration, enforcement-
oriented policy was the main direction of immigration policymaking at that time, through 
strict border control, increasing internal enforcement for punishment of noncitizens, strict 
control/reduction of the level of legal immigration through limiting the scope of possible 
family reunification-based visa issuances, stronger employment sanctions than the IRCA 
approach, and restriction of public services to noncitizens, especially the undocumented.  
The main target groups under the 1996 immigration-related laws were Mexican 
and Latin American noncitizens who made up most of the undocumented. They were 
frequently named by politicians and policymakers as “law violators,” “inherent 
criminals,” or “felons” who intentionally and arbitrarily challenged the American legal 
system (Newton, 2005). Moreover, they were also described as “freeloaders” or “welfare 
queens” depending on public services with no sense of self-reliance. In response to the 
1994 World Trade Center bombing and the 9/11 terrorist attack, noncitizens were even 
constructed and identified as “terrorists” or “extremists” (Gerken, 2013; Tichenor, 2013). 
The 1996 laws did not limit the target population to only the Mexican undocumented; 
under the IIRIRA and AEDPA, legal immigrants including permanent residents with 
green cards, refugees, and asylum seekers were also considered as criminals or dangerous 
classes if they committed any type of criminal act (including misdemeanors) or had 
evidence of past criminal or immigration violations. With extreme expansion of the scope 
of categories of enforcement and deportation (removal) of noncitizens, noncitizens 
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regardless of their legality became targets for punishment and enforcement under the 
“criminal aliens” rhetoric (Eagly, 2013). 
 
2.3. Current Immigration Policy: Strengthening an “Enforcement-Only” Policy 
Regime and Direction Since the 2000s 
Since the end of the 1990s, and specifically since the passage of the 1996 federal 
immigration laws under a Republican-controlled Congress, the direction of immigration 
policy has been dominated by a more punitive and restrictive turn. Few integrative 
immigration policy voices caught public attention, in spite of efforts of some policy 
entrepreneurs - such as former senator Edward Kennedy or President Bush - for 
expanding legal visa issuances or a guest worker program during comprehensive 
immigration reform efforts in 2006 and 2007. Therefore, immigration policy direction 
since the 2000s was full of an enforcement-focused policy stance institutionalizing mass 
detention and deportation of noncitizens who violated immigration and criminal laws 
(Ewing, 2014; Immigration Policy Center, 2013b).   
 
2.3.1. Key Goals under Enforcement-Only Immigration Policy: Removal of Dangerous 
“Criminal” Noncitizens    
Discourse on the “immigrant threat” or “problem” rapidly expanded in the United 
States with uncontrollable border crossings and related undocumented noncitizen issues, 
and immigration was finally connected with a national security perspective after the 9/11 
terrorist attack (Holland, 2014; Messias, McEwen, & Boyle, 2015; Nicholls, 2014). 
National security concerns were connected with distrust of noncitizens and the spread of 
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nativism since the 1990s, and images of noncitizens in conservative media were 
repeatedly constructed and “demonized” as dangerous enemies crossing the border, 
trafficking migrants, arms, and drugs, or acting as criminals and terrorists (FitzGerald, 
2014; Warner, 2005-06). Administratively, and with 9/11 as the momentum, 
organizational responsibility on immigration was transferred from the Department of 
Justice to the Department of Homeland Security. Deportation of noncitizens was rapidly 
and racially motivated and implemented against Mexicans and Central American 
immigrants, and Middle Eastern noncitizens became another target for enforcement in the 
aftermath of 9/11 (Moloney, 2012; Rivera, 2014). In this atmosphere, Congress passed 
back-to-back enforcement-focused immigration laws since the 2000s, from the PATRIOT 
Act of 2001, to the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act 
of 2005, the Real ID Act of 2005, and the Secure Border Fence Act of 2006. These laws 
commonly include strengthening border security, strengthening internal enforcement of 
noncitizens who commit any type of criminal or immigration violation, limiting 
incarcerated noncitizens’ opportunities for judicial review and legal protection, and 
broadening the scope of noncitizen criminality (Gerken, 2013; Gonzales, 2011; Newton, 
2005, 2008;  Tichenor, 2013).  
With the legal foundation of restrictive and punitive 1996 laws, Washington 
politicians and policymakers also began to frame immigration as a criminal justice issue, 
heavily focusing on criminal punishment and administrative removal of noncitizens who 
violate immigration and criminal laws. This means that an intermingling trend between 
immigration law and criminal law was strengthened since the 1996 laws, and the 
consequent mixture of criminal law and the immigration enforcement system gave rise to 
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the criminalization of immigrants (Stumps, 2014a). That is, the system in which any 
noncitizens with immigration or criminal violations can be named as “criminals” was 
created, leading to a policy environment that could produce mass-deportation of 
noncitizens and “streamlining” of such removal processes (Anderson, Gibney, & Paoletti, 
2011; Eagly, 2013; Stumpf, 2014a). Under such a crimmigration policy trend, the main 
target for noncitizen enforcement was not limited to the undocumented who were mainly 
considered the first and foremost subjects for punishment. Almost all noncitizens under 
the current crimmigration and enforcement-only policy trend can become a target in the 
name of “criminal aliens” or “immigrant criminality” (Palasz & Fennelly, 2013; Simers 
& Waters, 2013; Stumpf, 2014a). Enforcement-only policy in this period was mainly 
made with two key tracks: border enforcement and internal enforcement actions. 
 
2.3.2. Border Security: Increasing Militarization of the Border and Mass Production of 
Criminal Noncitizens through Shift of Border Control Strategy (“Catch-and-Detain” 
Principle) 
Since the 1990s, enhanced border control has been one of the key policy goals for 
immigration enforcement policy. An increasing inflow of undocumented noncitizens 
from the southwest border and federal inability to effectively control such noncitizens 
encouraged the federal government to set up tougher and more aggressive border control 
strategies and tactics beginning in the Clinton administration. Focusing on preventive 
enforcement actions against illegal border crossers through the “deterrence through 
prevention” tactic (Meissner, Kerwin, Chishti, & Bergeron, 2013), several operations 
such as Operation Gatekeeper (San Diego area) and Operation Hold the Line (El Paso 
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area) were implemented in the Southwest border regions in the 1990s (FitzGerald & 
Cook-Martín, 2014; National Immigration Forum, 2010). Such aggressive border control 
strategies led to enormous growth in enforcement resources, personnel, and technologies 
in the Southwest border area, which brought about the militarization of the border.  
 
 
Source: U.S. Border Patrol and Protection statistics 
(http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/media-resources/stats) 
Figure 2.1 U.S. Border Patrol Annual Budget and Agent Staffing Changes (FY 1990-
2013) 
 
As shown in Figure 2.1, the annual budget for U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) has increased considerably since the mid-1990s, doubling between 
fiscal years 2003 and 2013, from $5.9 billion to $11.9 billion. The number of border 
patrol agents working in border policy enforcement has also rapidly increased, from 
about 6,000 agents during the Clinton administration to more than 13,000 agents during 
the Bush administration, an increase of more than 200%. This trend has been maintained 
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during the Obama administration, with the number of agents exceeding 21,000 in fiscal 
year 2011, an increase of more than 60% compared to numbers under the Bush 
administration (Immigration Policy Center, 2014b). Physical and virtual fencing in the 
southwest border area has been installed, with more than 357 miles of fencing in place by 
the end of 2008. Moreover, various technologies for “systematic surveillance” of illegal 
border crossing, such as “the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, ground-based sensors, 
satellites, radar coverage, and cameras,” have also been used for enforcement (Meissner, 
Kerwin, Chishti, & Bergeron, 2013, p. 30).  
In addition to border militarization deterring the inflow of illegal border crossing 
in the southwest border areas, another key change in border enforcement policy since the 
2000s is enforcement tactics. Until the Clinton administration, border enforcement action 
was based on “catch-and-release” tactics, in which illegal border crossers caught along 
the U.S.-Mexico border were dealt with in a simple enforcement process, including 
apprehension, the signing of voluntary return agreements, and immediate return across 
the border without formal removal proceedings (National Immigration Forum, 2010). 
However, in 2005, the Bush administration initiated a new and stepped-up border 
enforcement program called “Operation Streamline,” legally constructing illegal border 
crossers in the southwest border areas as criminals and putting them first into the federal 
criminal justice system through mandatory detention and finally initiating deportation 
proceedings against them (Burridge, 2009; Meissner, Kerwin, Chishti, & Bergeron, 2013; 
National Immigration Forum, 2010; Robertson, Beaty, Atkinson, & Libal, 2012). With 
the “zero-tolerance” perspective toward illegal border crossers from Mexico and Latin 
America (National Immigration Forum, 2010, p. 8), border control policy since the Bush 
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administration shifted from “catch-and-release” to “catch-and-detain” tactics. With the 
government legally and administratively processing all illegal border crossers from the 
southwest border - including “illegal entry” and “illegal reentry” charges - as criminal 
violators, those who crossed illegally were put first in local immigration detention 
facilities or prisons, and then finally removed either through deportation proceedings in 
the immigration courts or administratively through non-judicial removal procedures such 
as expedited removal
21
. Under such a border enforcement scheme, a relatively small 
percentage of noncitizens were given the opportunity to sign voluntary return agreements, 
and the majority of noncitizen border crossers were removed through criminal 
prosecutions and convictions, as shown in Figure 2.2. Mass incarceration and 
criminalization of illegal border crossers brought about a large increase in federal 
criminal prosecutions for immigration offenses, exceeding more than half of total federal 
criminal prosecutions since the mid-2000s (National Immigration Forum, 2010; TRAC, 
2013a). 
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 Expedited removals have a legal basis through the IIRIRA of 1996, and the Department of Homeland 
Security (and formerly the Immigration and Naturalization Service) administratively processes this removal 
procedure. According to Rosenblum, Meissner, Bergeron, and Hipsman (2014), expedited removals have 
risen from 110,000 in FY2006 to 163,000 in FY2012, making up 39% of all removals.   
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Source: Internal ICE data (2013) obtained from the Freedom of Information Act request 
for Crane v. Napolitano. 
Figure 2.2 Recent Monthly Formal Removals and Voluntary Departures/Returns
22
   
 
This border enforcement policy change also strengthened federal-local 
cooperation on immigration enforcement policy and laid the foundation for the private 
sector, especially private prison businesses, to be deeply involved in the management and 
operation of such noncitizen detention facilities (Culp, 2011; Gilna, 2013; Greene & 
Mazón, 2012; Robertson, Beaty, Atkinson, & Libal, 2012; Rosenau, 2000). Militarization 
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 Under U.S. immigration law and policy, voluntary return and voluntary departures have slightly different 
processes and consequences, although they have been similarly used and identified. According to Gutierrez 
(2013), one big difference between these two terms is where such nonjudicial actions are made, and what 
public agencies can grant these actions. Voluntary returns take place at the border, and therefore only U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection which is responsible for border enforcement policy, has the right to process 
them. On the other hand, voluntary departures take place in any U.S. jurisdiction, and both federal 
immigration agencies, CBP and ICE, have the right to grant them. Compared to formal removal decisions, 
neither a voluntary return nor voluntary departure creates any legal harm or restrictions when noncitizens 
apply for a visa or green card in the future. Therefore, many noncitizens sentenced for immigration or 
criminal convictions tend to select these options to keep the opportunity of future reentry into the country, 
if possible.     
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of the border and criminalization of noncitizen border crossers, especially in the 
southwest area, led noncitizens to look at the more dangerous but isolated and less-
controlled Arizona and eastern California border for crossing and brought about frequent 
migrant deaths during border crossing.
23
 Moreover, the brutality of some border patrol 
agents caused serious social and human rights violations toward migrants (González, 
Ortega, & O’Dell, 2013; Ortega, 2013; Rodriguez & Paredes, 2014).   
 
2.3.3. Strengthening Internal Enforcement Efforts as Another Enforcement Machine 
The militarization of the border and criminalization of noncitizens crossing the 
border since the 1990s - based on enormous enforcement resources (including increasing 
budgets and personnel levels, as well as the rise of organizational status for DHS, ICE, 
and CBP) - led to declining border apprehensions. However, for organizational survival, 
federal immigration agencies need to maintain their level of enforcement performance so 
they do not lose public monies set by Congress for annual deportation and detention 
quotas (Selway & Newkirk, 2013). Under such a political and administrative context, 
declining border apprehensions caused federal immigration bureaucracies to turn their 
eyes to internal enforcement actions targeting noncitizens who already resided in the 
country. 
With legal support from the IIRIRA of 1996, Congress paved the way for the 
federal internal immigration arm, ICE, to cooperate with local law enforcement agencies 
on immigration enforcement policy implementation (Davidson, 2007; Kirk, Papachristos, 
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 During a recent five-year period (2005-09), on average 430 noncitizen border crossers died per year in 
the process of crossing the Southwest border (Rosenblum, 2013).  
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Fagan, & Tyler, 2012; Provine & Lewis, 2014; Rosenblum, Meissner, Bergeron, & 
Hipsman, 2014; Stuesse & Coleman, 2014; Varsanyi, Lewis, Provine, & Decker, 2012a). 
Some localities, especially those in southwest border states, with increasing nativism and 
anti-immigration sentiments and an increasing inflow of the undocumented, have actively 
and willingly participated in such federal-local noncitizen enforcement policies and 
related administrative programs since the 2000s. Beginning at that time, several federal-
local cooperative enforcement programs were created and implemented, from the 
Criminal Alien Program (CAP) to 287(g) partnerships, Secure Communities (S-Comm) 
program, and Fugitive Operations. Targeting “dangerous” noncitizens with criminal 
convictions at the community level based on enforcement priorities, these administrative 
programs screen noncitizens who have potential or reasonable law violation histories or 
prosecutions, and then such noncitizens are sent to ICE for enforcement actions including 
mandatory detention and final removal proceedings. One conflicting point with such 
internal noncitizen enforcement actions is that many targeted noncitizens very often have 
already resided in the United States for a considerable time and, unlike illegal border 
crossers, they have strong human and business ties (Buckinx & Filindra, 2015; Cardoso, 
Hamilton, Rodriguez, Eschbach, & Hagan, 2014; Coutin, 2015; Immigration Policy 
Center, 2013b; Kanstroom, 2012; Kubrin, 2014; Meissner, Kerwin, Chishti, & Bergeron, 
2013; Stumpf, 2014a). The “human costs” of internal enforcement policy actions are 
often not considered; many noncitizens deported through internal enforcement policy do 
not adapt to their home country after deportation, and desperately cross the border again 
to return to their families and homes (Hagen, Rodriguez, & Castro, 2011; Kanstroom, 
2012; Laredo, 2014). This means that current noncitizen enforcement policies do not 
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meet the policy goal of deterring the inflow of new undocumented and criminal 
noncitizens.   
 
2.4. Summary 
Through analyzing historical trends in the direction of U.S. immigration policy 
and transition of the social, legal, and political construction of noncitizens in terms of 
what noncitizen groups have mainly been targeted for punishment and differently 
constructed under immigration politics dynamics, I found that the federal government’s 
immigration policy response has continuously crossed between borderline positive 
(integrative) and negative (restrictive or punitive) directions. Target noncitizen groups 
have also racially shifted from Chinese, to eastern and southern European, Asians, and 
Mexicans and Latin Americans, and their legal and social constructions have also re-
shifted from risky and dangerous enemies to model minorities (i.e., Asians) or vice versa 
(i.e., Mexican noncitizens), through political and socioeconomic changes. One interesting 
point on U.S. immigration policy is that a racialized and racist policy trend in the process 
of immigration policy implementation has been maintained throughout history 
(FitzGerald & Cook-Martin, 2014; Oliviero, 2013).  
Another key working mechanism for targeting noncitizens for punishment - 
including exclusion, repatriation, enforcement, and deportation - has historically been 
related to how “illegality” and “criminality” are identified, interpreted, and implemented 
by policymakers and political elites in immigration politics. As Chomsky (2014), 
Menjívar and Kanstroom (2014), and Warner (2005-06) have argued, the meanings of 
these terms have been differently constructed socially and legally and have repeatedly 
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been changed in terms of what racial or ethnic groups can be included or excluded in 
shaping the “illegal” and “criminal aliens” discourse. For controlling and managing 
noncitizens of undesirable national origins, policymakers used a national quota system 
through the 1960s, but with changes in the domestic and foreign policy environment, 
such as the advent of the civil rights movement and the increasing numbers of refugees 
during the Cold War, family reunification became the key policy goal for immigration 
admission and regulation during the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s. Since the 
1980s, the main discourse for shaping immigration policy has been how the 
undocumented, especially those from Mexico and Latin America, should be dealt with 
and under what working mechanisms. However, the failure of the IRCA of 1986, 
increasing the undocumented from the southwest border areas and providing ineffective 
employer sanction measures, created more punitive and restrictive immigration policy 
with the mix of the 9/11 attack as a national security concern and serious economic 
downturn since the 1990s. By radically expanding the scope of becoming “criminal 
aliens” through the 1996 laws and back-to-back immigration laws that followed, 
immigration policy since the 2000s has focused heavily on an enforcement-only stance 
with the combination of border militarization and various internal enforcement actions. 
Focusing on immigrant illegality and criminality, an enforcement-only policy 
direction on immigration has been carried out at the intergovernmental level since the 
2000s. However, complicated intergovernmental relations on immigration issues led 
localities to make different policy choices and brought about serious conflicts between 
levels of government in the implementation of S-Comm as one of the key immigration 
enforcement programs under the Obama administration. In the next chapter, I consider 
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what factors influence local immigration enforcement policy participation, and what S-
Comm is and how this program has been carried out with what working logic to 
accomplish the policy goal.          
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CHAPTER 3
24
 
IMMIGRATION POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN TERMS OF  
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 
 
The previous chapter examined changes in the goals and noncitizen targets of 
U.S. immigration policy from a historical perspective. Immigration policy since the 
2000s has been dominated by an enforcement-only approach focusing on controlling and 
punishing noncitizens who have been socially and legally framed as illegal and criminals. 
Paying special attention to current immigration enforcement-only policy contexts - such 
as complicated intergovernmental relations on immigration and state and local 
immigration activism - and the administrative working mechanisms of the enforcement 
machine for mass-detention and deportation, this chapter first discusses local government 
involvement in immigration policing under the immigration federalism perspective. I 
then explore theoretically and contextually what factors lead localities to actively 
participate in immigration enforcement and control policy. Then specifically focusing on 
the Secure Communities (S-Comm) program as the key enforcement program under the 
Obama administration, this chapter also discusses what S-Comm is, why this program 
was implemented with what policy goals, and how this program has actually been 
implemented with the intergovernmental cooperative enforcement framework. Special 
emphasis is placed on two key interaction points between different levels of government: 
immigration detainer issuances and noncitizen deportation. Finally, paying attention to 
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 A portion of this chapter was previously prepared for an application for the Transactional Records 
Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) Fellowship in August 2014. I appreciate Professors N. Joseph Cayer and 
Paul G. Lewis at Arizona State University and Professor Susan B. Long, a co-director of TRAC at Syracuse 
University for their detailed reviews and helpful comments.       
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the increasing prominence of the immigrant criminality framework, how immigration 
(immigrants) and public safety are theoretically related is discussed in policy contexts. 
This theoretical and contextual background on current immigration enforcement policy 
under the S-Comm framework is used for empirical analyses in the next three chapters 
(Chapters 4 - 6). 
 
3.1. Local Immigration Policy Involvement under Complicated Intergovernmental 
Relations   
With the repeated failures to create a comprehensive immigration framework 
under the Bush administration in the mid-2000s, localities began to express their policy 
voices in the process of implementing immigration-related public affairs. Vast federal-
local differences in perspective about which government can create and implement 
immigration issues arose, as I briefly mentioned in the first chapter, and they have 
brought about serious intergovernmental conflicts. These debates and conflicts 
specifically came to the surface after local or state-level immigration laws were passed in 
localities from Hazleton, PA, in 2006 to Arizona’s Senate Bill (SB) 1070 in 2010 and its 
copycat laws in 2011 and 2012. A series of unsolved conflicts eventually headed to the 
courts for legal battles, and most federal courts’ decisions upheld the federal 
government’s argument due to federal preemptive authority. However, the Supreme 
Court’s 2012 decision in Arizona v. United States upheld the involvement of local law 
enforcement agents in immigration through immigration status checks during lawful 
stops of suspected noncitizens - sometimes known as the “show me your paper” 
provision - so intergovernmental debates on immigration policy implementation are still 
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ongoing (Tichenor & Filindra, 2012). In spite of such serious legal conflicts, the federal 
government has at the same time administratively encouraged localities to be involved in 
federal immigration enforcement actions, such as 287(g) partnerships or S-Comm, as an 
“administrative” partner or “force-multiplier” (Kobach, 2006; Provine, Varsanyi, Lewis, 
& Decker, 2012). Therefore, such complicated intergovernmental relations on 
immigration issues leave room for considerable ambiguity and confusion in the 
implementation of immigration policy in the United States.   
 
3.1.1. Different Local Voices on Immigration Issues Under Immigration Policy Activism 
Under the abovementioned intergovernmental conflicts on immigration policy, 
localities’ policy voices on immigration vary geographically with stances that are very 
punitive and restrictive, immigrant-friendly, or noninterventionist. One interesting aspect 
of local immigration activism is that even localities within the same state sometimes have 
different policy stances on immigration on an issue-by-issue basis. For example, the city 
of Tucson, AZ, has followed an immigrant-friendly policy stance in spite of a 
longstanding punitive and restrictive state-level immigration stance.
25
 In addition to 
differences between localities, immigration stances and tones in a certain locality or state 
have sometimes shifted over time and crossed the line between welcoming and 
restrictive. For example, Suffolk County, NY, passed an anti-immigration ordinance in 
                                                 
25
 In addition to the city of Tucson, AZ, there are multiple examples intra-state variations on immigration 
policy. For example, the city of Escondido, CA, passed a strong anti-immigration law in 2006 while many 
other California localities have consistently had immigrant-friendly policies and passed related laws; the 
cities of Bellaire and Mason/Springboro in Ohio passed local anti-immigration ordinances in 2007 limiting 
public services to the undocumented in their jurisdictions, while the city of Dayton in the same state 
consistently followed a pro-immigration stance with a “Welcome Dayton Plan” oriented toward more 
humane and equal treatment of noncitizens living there regardless of their documentation status (Fair 
Immigration Reform Movement data; Kelley, 2011). 
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2006 targeting the undocumented, but shifted toward a more welcoming policy by 
passing Executive Order 10 in 2012, providing limited-English residents in their 
jurisdiction with translation and interpretation services when they access public services 
(Altschuler & Oshrio, 2012). Prince William County, VA, which was considered a 
sanctuary locality in the 2000s, passed a local ordinance in 2007 deputizing local Police 
to implement immigration enforcement policy targeting the undocumented in the 
jurisdiction (Toussaint, 2013). As demonstrated with the examples here, localities have 
different or similar policy voices within or across the state level, and some localities have 
shifted their policy responses on immigration over time depending on various political, 
economic, and geographical contexts, and external or internal changes (Chavez & 
Provine, 2009; Hopkins, 2010; Ramakrishnan & Wong, 2010; Walker & Leitner, 2011). 
 
3.1.2. Local Choices Under the Current Enforcement-only Policy Regime 
Under such complicated and confusing intergovernmental relations and 
environments for dealing with immigration-related issues, localities have no choice but to 
be involved in the national immigration policy process directly or indirectly. In terms of 
the legal perspective, some localities actively express their political and policy voices on 
immigration-related issues through local immigration ordinances, resolutions or 
executive orders, which reflect local thoughts and calculations on how such immigration 
phenomena influence their jurisdictions. However, others might strongly resist local 
involvement in current immigration enforcement policy regimes, either because they cite 
immigration as being a role of the federal government or because their local contexts or 
traditions include a welcoming or integrative immigration policy stance. These localities 
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also express their policy responses through local immigration-related laws, ordinances, or 
executive orders reflecting immigrant-friendly stances. Interestingly, however, 
administratively localities cannot reflect their local situations in the process of internal 
immigration enforcement policymaking.
26
 
 
3.1.3. Factors Influencing Local Immigration Enforcement Policy Participation
27
 
Previous studies - specifically in the fields of urban policy, sociology, geography, 
and political science - have analyzed contextual factors shaping local immigration policy 
activism at the individual or local government level. Several contextual factors, such as 
demographic, political, economic, and geographical contexts, have theoretically and 
empirically been discussed, but studies have found mixed and sometimes different 
influences among these factors. In this dissertation, I discuss how these contextual factors 
shape local immigration policy direction, specifically local immigration enforcement 
policy participation. 
Demographic factors have frequently been considered one of the key driving 
forces shaping local immigration enforcement policy. These factors include Hispanic or 
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 Under the current administrative system and programs for an enforcement-only policy frame, localities, 
regardless of their perspective on the legitimacy of the policy directions, are sometimes required to be 
involved in the internal immigration enforcement policy process because Congress has mandated a certain 
administrative program for noncitizen enforcement to be implemented across the country as a kind of 
mandatory program. Considering that ICE’s current main strategy for internal enforcement policy has been 
broadly based on a framework of federal-local cooperation, localities must comply with certain mandatory 
enforcement programs - such as S-Comm or the Criminal Alien Program - even though these programs do 
not match the local perspective on immigration issues. However, in the case of voluntary enforcement 
programs targeting noncitizens, such as 287(g) partnerships, localities with a tradition of an integrative 
policy stance have the option of minimal involvement for activation of such administrative program; for 
example, they might not activate the program or might not even make a decision on local participation in 
the program.   
27
 In addition to the political, economic, demographic, and geographical factors discussed here, previous 
studies have discussed multiple factors shaping local immigration policy direction. These include 
legislative professionalism (Monogan, 2013), and human capital (measured by the level of educational 
attainments, [Berg, 2015; Zamora-Kapoor, Kovincic, & Causey, 2013]).   
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foreign-born population shares at the local level (Chand & Schreckhise, 2014; Cox & 
Miles, 2013; Hopkins, 2010; Longazel, 2012; Marquez & Schraufnagel, 2013; Monogan, 
2013; Stuesse & Coleman, 2014; Treyger, Chalfin, & Loeffler, 2014; Walker & Leitner, 
2011) and recent changing noncitizen settlement rates or patterns at the local level 
(Williams, 2015). When a foreign-born population with a different race, ethnicity, 
language, and culture flows into a certain locality, the public tends to select one of two 
different signals: considering this population as an economic or national “threat/problem” 
or seeing opportunities for better dynamic nation-building, based on the “(inter-group) 
contact” hypothesis (Berg, 2015; Hawley, 2011). Using a threat hypothesis, Walker and 
Leitner (2011) and Hopkins (2010) have considered such “immigrant concentration,” 
“new destinations,” or “political place” dynamics as a factor increasing an anti-
immigration policy perspective. Some scholars, including Berg (2015), Esbenshade 
(2007), and Hopkins (2010), have paid special attention to the changing rate (pace) of 
demographics (foreign-born/Hispanic populations) and the time in which the nation or 
localities emphasize immigration as an important policy issue as the key factor shaping 
and reshaping local punitive immigration perspectives (Marquez & Schraufnagel, 2013; 
Monogan, 2013; Walker & Leitner, 2011). According to contact theory, interracial and -
ethnic conflicts decrease when interactions between different races and ethnicities 
increase and previous negative images and views of noncitizens tend to dissipate 
(Hawley, 2011). However, other studies found no relationship between local demography 
of noncitizens and increasing local restrictive and punitive immigration policy (Chavez & 
Provine, 2009; Ramakrishnan & Wong, 2010). Chavez and Provine (2009) found a rather 
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different relationship between these two factors: an increasing Hispanic population is 
associated with a more integrative immigration policy. 
Political factors also tend to be critically considered as the key factor shaping 
local punitive immigration policy direction. A strong immigration enforcement policy 
direction tends to be associated with party affiliations, especially in Republican-leaning 
localities (Chand & Schreckhise, 2014; Hawley, 2011; Marquez & Schraufnagel, 2013; 
Wong, 2014b; Ramakrishnan & Wong, 2010; Suro, 2015; Treyger, Chalfin, & Loeffler, 
2014). More conservative localities are more likely to select enforcement-focused 
immigration policy, a hypothesis that was supported by Lewis, Varsanyi, Provine, and 
Decker (2013b), Ramakrishnan and Wong (2010) and Chavez and Provine (2009). Using 
centennial data (1892-2010) on U.S. deportation at the national level, Wong (2014a) 
found that political partisanship (congressional representation with Republican majorities 
in both the House and the Senate) significantly influences an increase in enforcement 
outcome including deportations and returns of noncitizens, while economic and 
demographic contexts were not significantly related to immigration enforcement 
outcomes. Using data on state-level immigration legislation from a recent 5-year period 
(2008 - 2012), Marquez and Schraufnagel (2013) found that states with Democratic-
controlled governments are less likely to pass restrictive immigration laws within their 
states, but the influence was not significant. However, using 7 years of data (2005-2011) 
on state level immigration policy, Monogan (2013) had a different result, finding that 
partisanship is not a significant factor to account for shaping local punitive immigration 
policy. Using a national voting result, Hawley (2011) argued that political partisanship 
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can account for a more restrictive immigration policy turn only when it is associated with 
localities with a quickly increasing  rate of immigration or foreign-born population.  
Immigration policy responses by the public and policymakers may also be shaped 
by national or local economic situations - frequently measured by unemployment or 
poverty level - in immigrant-receiving states. Based on economic or labor market 
competition theory, scholars assume a relationship between economic decline and 
punitive immigration policy direction (Berg, 2015; Zamora-Kapoor, Kovincic, & Causey, 
2013). That is, when a state is having an economic boom, localities tend to have a more 
welcoming immigration policy to meet the increasing demand for labor. However, in 
times of economic decline or stagnation, when the job market seriously shrinks and there 
is stronger competition for jobs, the public, specifically those with low socioeconomic 
and education levels, considers noncitizens as unwelcome competitors for jobs (Palasz & 
Fennelly, 2013). During economic decline, politicians skillfully and strategically use 
noncitizens as scapegoats. As Wong (2014a) mentioned, immigration issues tend to 
appear on the surface only when economic conditions are in decline. Previous studies 
have considered the association between economic difficulties (i.e., rising unemployment 
or poverty level) and a restrictive and punitive immigration policy direction. In a state-
level immigration policy shift, Monogan (2013) found that an economic factor 
(operationalized by state wealth, which was measured by per capita gross state product) 
significantly accounted for a shift toward a welcoming policy. However, there are also 
several studies showing a reverse or negligible relationship between the two factors. 
Empirically testing the “economic competition/marginality” hypothesis, Walker and 
Leitner (2011) found that those localities with high unemployment are likely to have an 
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inclusive immigration policy. Hawley (2011) also found in a county-level data analysis 
regarding 2004 national voting that an economic factor (unemployment rate) was not a 
significant factor in accounting for more restrictive immigration policy. Through an 
analysis of local police participation in federal immigration enforcement policy, Lewis 
and his colleagues (2013b) found that crime rates, and demographic factors have been 
insignificantly related to localities’ punitive and restrictive immigration policy shifts. 
However, demographic factors (i.e., increasing shares of Hispanic population in small 
localities) were significantly related to decreasing immigration enforcement actions 
through increasing political power and capital from these immigrant groups.       
Geographical patterns on local immigration policy have been observed from 
some previous studies. Previous studies have assumed that southwestern border states or 
localities, as the main route of influx of undocumented immigrants, have a more punitive 
immigration policy (Chand & Schreckhise, 2014; Walker, 2014). Some studies have paid 
attention to the relationship between the southern location and anti-immigration policy, 
but as Walker and Leitner (2011) mentioned, other factors associated with the southern 
location of residents are more likely to be involved in shaping restrictive immigration 
policy. According to Walker and Leitner (2011), with regard to analysis of the Baltimore-
Washington region, suburban and rural areas tend to have more punitive and restrictive 
immigration perspectives, while central-city municipal areas with traditions of racial and 
economic diversity are likely to have a more inclusive immigration policy. Unlike 
Walker and Leitner’s research on intra-locality immigration variations, Monogan (2013) 
found that spatial or neighboring effects on immigration policy direction can be made at 
the state level.    
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As in the abovementioned previous studies, the factors behind state and local 
involvement in immigration control and enforcement policy are still unclear, and multiple 
factors (e.g., political, economic, demographic, geographical) or combinations of factors 
might influence a local punitive turn on immigration policy. Based on these contextual 
factors influencing local immigration enforcement policy participation, I create the first 
research hypothesis as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a relationship between contextual factors (demographic, political, 
economic, and geographical contexts) and local immigration enforcement policy 
participation or a local punitive turn.   
Hypothesis 1-1: Local immigration enforcement policy participation is shaped by a 
combination of contextual factors (e.g., demographic and political factors or geographical 
and economic factors).        
 
3.2. Implementation of the Secure Communities Program: Intergovernmental 
Cooperation for Effective Immigration Enforcement Policy  
Following the 9/11 attack and the consequent failure of effective communication 
and information sharing across public agencies for risk management, in 2002 Washington 
politicians required a strengthening of the coordination capacity between or among 
vertical (federal-local-private organizations) and horizontal (within federal or local 
agencies) governance through the creation of “fusion centers” (Reagan & Monahan, 
2014). Besides, with the strengthening crimmigration trend and enforcement-only policy 
regime that is the legacy of post-1996 immigration politics, immigration policymakers 
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made efforts to create a master framework of protecting the nation and communities 
based on close intergovernmental cooperation and communication. Continuous criticism 
of previous internal enforcement programs, such as 287(g) partnerships, including racial 
or ethnic profiling in the process of program implementation, also caused politicians and 
policymakers to think it necessary to create an alternative noncitizen enforcement 
program (Ramos, 2012). With such awareness of political reality, the Secure 
Communities program (S-Comm) was initiated in 2008 under the Bush administration as 
a pilot program in a few localities, and thereafter rapidly expanded to more than 3,000 
localities across the country under the Obama administration. 
 
3.2.1. Working Mechanism of S-Comm: Biometric (Fingerprint) Data Sharing between 
Different Levels of Government, and Setting Enforcement Priority for Maximizing 
Enforcement (Deportation) Numbers  
Orienting toward “smart[er] and effective immigration enforcement28” with limited 
government resources (Kanstroom, 2012; Kubrin, 2014; Lind, 2014), S-Comm has a 
policy goal of “making local communities safer” via effectively identifying, detaining, 
and finally removing dangerous noncitizens who have committed criminal violations. 
Although it was never clearly disclosed by ICE, the main program intention of federal 
                                                 
28
 “Smart” immigration enforcement policy discourse represents immigration control and enforcement  
actions under the current administration as focused on targeted noncitizen groups or categories - such as 
noncitizens with violent criminal convictions, frequently called “criminal aliens,” - rather than all 
problematic noncitizens whose status has been debated by policymakers, including undocumented 
immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. This policy is a by-product of a practical approach from 
Washington policymakers and politicians with the recognition that removal of all 11 or 12 million 
undocumented noncitizens is almost impossible with the current limited public resources and personnel. It 
represents a departure from the immigration enforcement policy direction of the Bush administration, 
which oriented toward the removal of all 12 million undocumented immigrants under the Operation 
Endgame strategy (Inda, 2013).         
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immigration bureaucrats from S-Comm implementation - DHS/ICE - is to “maximize” 
deportation numbers through comprehensive intergovernmental enforcement data sharing 
and close interactions in the process of implementation of this program
29
. Maximizing 
deportation numbers was not possible before the implementation of S-Comm, because 
nationwide implementation of an immigration enforcement program is not easy
30
. Based 
on such logic that dangerous noncitizens with serious criminal violations - including 
violent crimes such as murder, rape, and aggravated felony - should be proactively 
identified, detained, and removed from local communities, the basic working mechanism 
for implementing S-Comm is an information-sharing process between intergovernmental 
interactions and communications in the process of enforcement policy. Local law 
enforcement agents (LEAs) initiate such enforcement actions by catching suspected 
noncitizens on the local streets and then detaining them in local jails or detention 
facilities. Under the conventional criminal justice system, LEAs send suspected 
noncitizens’ fingerprints to the FBI for a criminal status check. However, under the S-
Comm framework, the FBI should automatically forward these noncitizen fingerprints to 
ICE for an immigration status check. Then, if ICE’s immigration database (called the 
“IDENT” database) has a match with these suspected noncitizens’ fingerprints, ICE may 
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 An internal ICE document sent from a high-ranking ICE director to ICE field officers, which was 
released as a result of litigation from the ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union), shows that (1) there 
have been “fixed” deportation goals within ICE in terms of criminal and noncriminal removals, and (2) 
considering the decreasing removal trends, ICE field agents should critically consider the “[a]gency goal of 
achieving 400,000 removals and returns overall without relaxing our [ICE’s] increased efforts” (U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2010).     
30
 As another intergovernmental immigration enforcement program, the Criminal Alien Program (CAP) has 
a working mechanism similar to that of S-Comm. Both are jail-status-check programs to identify and 
remove criminal noncitizens. However, unlike S-Comm, CAP does not have any concrete interaction 
between different levels of government. In spite of a longer implementation history compared to S-Comm, 
CAP has received little public attention and little information has been released in terms of how this 
program has been operated and managed, and how localities and the federal immigration agencies have 
communicated with each other (Immigration Policy Center, 2013a).     
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or may not issue an immigration detainer (Form I-247) to localities for transporting 
noncitizens to ICE facilities, and deportation proceedings are made for final removal 
(Conley, 2013; Gill, 2013; ICE, 2011b; Jung, 2015a; Shebaya, 2013; TRAC, 2014b, 
2014c, 2014d). Through mixing the previous criminal justice system and process with the 
immigration policing process, S-Comm makes it possible for federal immigration 
authorities to rapidly increase the possibility of identifying any noncitizens arrested and 
held in local jails or detention facilities through the sharing interoperability system, and 
to detain and finally remove them under the S-Comm framework (Cox & Miles, 2013; 
Miles & Cox, 2014). 
 
Table 3.1. Secure Communities Levels and Offenses Categories (based on NCIC code*) 
“Level 1” “Level 2” “Level 3” “Non-criminal” 
Most violent 
crimes/major drug 
Most property 
crimes/misdemeanors/ 
minor drug 
Less than three 
misdemeanors 
 
Homicide Arson Sovereignty ICE fugitives 
Kidnapping Burglary Military Prior removals and 
returns 
Sexual assault Larceny Immigration EWI (Enter without 
Inspection) 
Robbery Stolen vehicles Extortion Visa violators and 
Assaults Forgery Damage property overstay 
Threats Fraud Family offenses  
Extortion - threat to 
injure person 
Embezzlement Gambling 
Traffic offenses 
 
Sex offenses Stolen property Commercialized sex 
offenses 
 
Cruelty toward child, 
wife 
Damage property 
w/explosive 
Liquor  
Resisting an officer Traffic offenses Obstructing the police  
Weapon Smuggling  Bribery  
Hit and run Money laundering Health and safety  
Drugs (sentence > 1 
year) 
Drugs (sentence < 1 year) Civil rights  
National security & 
sovereignty  
 Invasion of privacy  
  Election laws  
  Conservation 
Public order crimes 
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Source: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Secure Communities Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOP), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/securecommunitiesops93009.pdf   
* National Crime Information Center of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
Note: “Sovereignty”-related violations, according to NCIC code (0101 - 0199), include treason (0101), 
treason misprision (0102), espionage (0103), sabotage (0104), sedition (0105), selective service (0106), and 
sovereignty (0199). Most charges on sovereignty are related to “Level 1” criminal charges except selective 
service, which is related to a “Level 3” charge. Therefore, ICE’s reports locate sovereignty-related 
violations in Level 1 or Level 3. “Traffic Offenses” in Level 3 convictions include driving under influence 
(DUI), stop sign violations, speeding violations, and driving without a valid driver’s license. For more 
concrete information on ICE’s decisions regarding criminality on noncitizens, see TRAC (2013e).      
 
ICE has officially and clearly argued that, under limited public monies, S-Comm 
concentrates its enforcement energy and resources on catching and removing dangerous 
criminal aliens who pose a serious threat to public safety and national security. Targeting 
such dangerous noncitizens who have committed criminal violations, ICE sets 
enforcement priorities based on the “the severity of [their] crime,” which consist of three 
levels of criminality or dangerousness (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, web 
site). When fingerprints of suspected noncitizens are forwarded from the FBI after being 
initially submitted by LEAs, the ICE Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC) identifies 
the noncitizens’ immigration status, and after that, when they are transferred to ICE 
facilities for removal proceedings, the LESC finally decides their deportability based on 
the severity of criminality from “level 1” (the most serious crimes) to “level 3” (mostly 
misdemeanor charges). In addition to removing those with criminal charges at these three 
levels, ICE also removes noncitizens in the “noncriminal” removal category, defined as 
those with immigration violations, such as prior removals or returns (noncitizens ordered 
for deportation but who still remain in U.S. territory), fugitives, border re-crossers and 
EWI (Enter Without Inspection), and visa overstays (ICE, 2009a). In 2009, in its internal 
data for a briefing to the state of New York, ICE clearly pointed out that, regarding 
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enforcement actions under S-Comm, “ICE will focus initially on identifying removable 
criminal aliens charged with or convicted of a Level 1 offense,” and the Level 1 offenses 
for removal orders included “threats to national security, homicide, kidnapping, sexual 
offenses, robbery, assault, [and] drug offenses [with more than a 1 year sentence].” 
Therefore, ICE’s enforcement actions under the S-Comm framework should focus on 
those noncitizens with Level 1 criminal convictions.
31
 Table 3.1 indicates deportable 
categories based on the level of crimes under the current S-Comm framework. 
        
3.2.2. Program Performance and Debates 
According to monthly deportation performance (including enforcement outcomes 
through July 2014), a total of 369,218 noncitizens were removed during a period of 69 
months by S-Comm implementation across the country. That means about 5,275 
noncitizens were removed monthly, and about 178 noncitizens were removed daily under 
S-Comm. Considering the fact that 1,120 noncitizens were removed on a daily basis 
through all ICE enforcement programs in FY2012, S-Comm accounts for about 15.9% of 
daily removal performance under the current federal immigration enforcement policy.  
Regarding noncitizen fingerprint submission, about 34 million fingerprints were 
submitted from local law enforcement agencies as of November 2013, and submissions 
have expanded, with more than 41 million as of July 2014. Figure 3.1 (top) graphically 
shows monthly fingerprint submissions and percentage of fingerprint matches to the 
IDENT database at the national level. Fingerprint submissions from LEAs have steeply 
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 However, ICE never clearly mentions when and under what conditions ICE field agents can decide 
noncitizen deportability and removability when suspected noncitizens have Levels 2 or 3 convictions. ICE 
explicitly acknowledges that, in these situations, there is no choice but to allow ICE field agents 
considerable discretion. 
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increased since the implementation of S-Comm, but this is reasonable because the 
number of counties that have activated this program has proportionately increased as of 
January 2013. Those submissions reached at 964,653 in Aug. 2012, and thereafter 
oscillated up and down over time. In May 2013, fingerprint submissions surpassed 1 
million per month for the first time from more than 3,000 counties, but thereafter the 
numbers slightly decreased, oscillating between 830,136 and 994,568. With regard to 
fingerprint matches, matching rates of more than 10% were made at the initial stage of 
the implementation of S-Comm nationally, but these rates have gradually decreased over 
time and have remained between 4% and 5% since 2011. On average, during a 69 month 
period (October 2008 - July 2014), 6.4% of noncitizen fingerprints (48,532 matches) 
were matched through immigration or criminal status checks, which means 6.4 out of 100 
noncitizens across localities were identified by ICE as potentially having illegal or 
criminal violation histories or problems. 
Considering deportation outcomes in terms of three levels of criminality, as seen 
in Figure 3.1 (bottom), different patterns per level of criminality were found. At the 
initial time, more than two thirds of noncitizens were removed with misdemeanor charges 
(Level 3) and noncriminal violations, but these deportations gradually decreased over 
time. Reversely, deportations with Level 1 as the key enforcement target were very low, 
almost 10% at the initial time, but they gradually increased over time. Of 369,218 
noncitizens deported cumulatively during those 69 months, about 30.77% were removed 
with Level 1 criminal convictions while 19.82% were removed with noncriminal 
convictions such as immigration violations. However, interestingly, more than half of 
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noncitizen deportations (50.62%) were for noncriminal or misdemeanor (Level 3) 
charges.     
In spite of the promise and boastful claims that S-Comm has contributed to 
removing dangerous noncitizens across the country, this program has been at the center 
of debate and conflict among policy actors, in terms of the relevancy of program 
implementation and the outcomes resulting from S-Comm. Enforcement results from the 
past several years indicate that many noncitizens convicted of low-level crimes (i.e., 
traffic violations and drug possession) or with non-criminal convictions (i.e., immigration 
violations) were deported (Motomura,2014; Semple, 2014; TRAC, 2010, 2013a, 2013b, 
2014b; Vock, 2013). For example, according to 2010 data from ICE covering more than 
one year since the implementation of S-Comm, more than half of noncitizen deportations 
under S-Comm were of noncriminal noncitizens, and almost two-thirds of deportations 
were related to misdemeanor charges (level 3) and noncriminal convictions such as 
immigration violations (Feltz & Baksh, 2010). 
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Source: ICE’s Monthly IDENT-IAFIS Interoperability statistis.  
Figure 3.1. Implementation of Secure Communities at the National Level: 
Intergovernmental Interaction through Fingerprint Sharing (top) and Deportation 
Outcomes (bottom) 
Note: Monthly % of fingerprint matches were calculated by: (= total number of noncitizen fingerprint 
matches per month / total numbers of fingerprint submissions per month) * 100. Monthly deportation rates 
per level of criminality were calculated by: (= total number of noncitizen deportations per level of 
criminality per month/ total number of deportations per month)* 100.         
 
Enforcement outcomes vary considerably across localities. For example, 
according to Francis (2011), at the state level, 42% of noncitizen deportees in Florida 
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during the first two years (2009-10) had noncriminal convictions. Orange County, FL, 
had a noncriminal noncitizen deportation rate of 63% under the S-Comm program during 
the same years. Using recent Maryland enforcement data on S-Comm (2009-2013), Fritz 
(2014) found that more than 40% of deportations were of noncitizens without any 
criminal record, compared to a 12% rate of deportations of noncitizens with noncriminal 
convictions in Texas. Using 30 months of S-Comm enforcement data (October 2008 - 
April 2011), Chand and his colleagues (2014) focus on the influence of S-Comm in seven 
southern states (including Arkansas, Oklahoma, Missouri, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Tennessee, and Texas), and they found that all these states have a strikingly higher 
number of noncitizen deportations without any criminal convictions. The same was true 
in the Massachusetts city of Boston, where in 2011, 313 noncitizens without any criminal 
convictions were deported under the S-Comm framework (Preston, 2011). Using 45 
months of ICE enforcement data (October 2008 - July 2012), Cox and Miles (2013) and 
Miles and Cox (2014) also analyzed how S-Comm has been implemented. Considering 
community safety as the key outcome for this program, the authors attempted to 
determine the extent to which serious crimes have been decreased at the county level by 
activation of S-Comm. However, unlike the repeated advertising of DHS/ICE regarding 
S-Comm, they found “no meaningful reduction in the FBI index crime rate.” Such 
different enforcement outcomes from S-Comm brought about serious intergovernmental 
conflict, and several localities resisted and decided not to comply with federal 
immigration enforcement program implementation
32
 (Lind, 2014a; Semple & Preston, 
2011). 
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 At the initial stage, DHS/ICE never clearly reminded and communicated with localities in terms of how 
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3.2.3. Hidden but Key Logic under S-Comm Implementation: Activation Orders of S-
Comm and Geographical Consideration  
One interesting but nuanced aspect of the implementation of S-Comm is ICE’s 
activation and implementation strategy and ambiguous intergovernmental relations on 
activation decisions for this program at the local level. For the implementation of S-
Comm, ICE did not select a simultaneous nationwide activation strategy but followed a 
selection and concentration strategy on deportation actions through a staggered rollout 
scheme at the county level (Jung, 2015a). As the National Immigration Law Center 
(2011) nicely touched on, little information and few concrete guidelines about S-Comm 
implementation between different levels of government existed during the first 3 years 
(2008 -2010), and as in the implementation of 287(g) partnerships, ICE advertised S-
Comm to localities via interparty meetings, and finally encouraged localities to make a 
memorandum of agreement (MOA) for activation. Federal immigration bureaucrats 
repeatedly said as of 2010 that S-Comm was a voluntary enforcement program.  
                                                                                                                                                 
S-Comm works, what noncitizens are the main targets, and how noncitizens who were caught and 
transferred from localities were enforced (Lind, 2014a). ICE’s management and implementation of S-
Comm has been full of secrecy and unclear data and communication. A series of unexpected results from 
various localities gave rise to deep distrust between local noncitizens and their communities and local 
police. These results also brought about serious debate and conflicts between levels of government. Under 
this atmosphere, in 2011, three state governors from Maryland, Pennsylvania, and New York (all 
Democrats) required that their states pull out of S-Comm, and several localities including Arlington (PA), 
Boston (MA), Dallas (TX), Chicago (IL), San Francisco, and Los Angeles (CA) also participated in this 
noncompliance with ICE’s S-Comm implementation (Lind, 2014c). Then-director of ICE John Morton 
issued policy memos to address such local resistance and noncompliance, and made some minor 
modifications in S-Comm implementation through setting clearer priority for enforcement actions and 
giving broader administrative discretion to focus on targeted criminal noncitizens in the process of 
noncitizen enforcement policy. Strikingly, in August 2011, DHS/ICE rescinded all existing memorandums 
of agreement (MOA) on S-Comm, declaring that localities could not opt out because it is a mandatory 
program (Semple & Preston, 2011).  
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However, such intergovernmental enforcement partnerships based on MOAs did 
not follow the kind of mutual cooperation framework ICE mentioned. ICE has carried out 
the implementation of S-Comm “in complete secrecy, without a locality even being 
aware it had been imposed on the community” (National Law Immigration Center, 2011). 
ICE repeatedly but ironically changed arguments they made in the past - about a federal-
local cooperative enforcement framework, management of the program by MOAs, its 
being a voluntary enforcement program in which localities would have the right to repeal 
or change the existing MOAs, and changing enforcement priorities over time - and local 
voices on the decisions about the activation or repealing of S-Comm have been 
thoroughly ignored. As Cox and Miles (2013) and Miles and Cox (2014) pointed out, 
even after 2011, some localities did not identify the activation of S-Comm after ICE 
activated the program in their jurisdictions without clear notifications or MOAs.
33
 Under 
the current interoperability system on immigration data between and among multiple 
levels of government, ICE can get noncitizen-related data from any localities, even those 
that do not want to participate in such an immigration enforcement policy. 
Under such an ironic and ambiguous intergovernmental immigration enforcement 
policy governance and regime, activation of S-Comm might strongly reflect the federal 
immigration agency’s perspectives, in terms of what regions and categories (groups) of 
noncitizens are really targeted for enforcement actions. According to ICE’s internal data 
on the date of S-Comm activation in jurisdictions at the community level, one interesting 
trend can be identified: many localities with early activation of S-Comm tend to be 
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 According to the National Immigration Law Center (2011) using documents that were released after 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, activation in Pennsylvania was made without “having the 
state sign an MOA.”   
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located in southwest border areas - including the states of Arizona, California, Texas, and 
interestingly some of New Mexico - and southern areas, such as Florida, North Carolina, 
and some of Georgia. This staggered rollout strategy specifically focusing on border 
localities indicates that localities with early activation of S-Comm might be places for 
Washington politicians and policymakers to achieve more meaningful or maximized 
enforcement results under an enforcement-only regime (Jung, 2015a). Although ICE 
keeps silent about such political intentions, many localities with early activation of S-
Comm have certain demographic characteristics such as a high Latino population, which 
is the main target group for current noncitizen enforcement policy (Cox & Miles, 2013; 
Jung, 2015a; Treyger, Chalfin, & Loeffler, 2014). Based on such contextual information 
on the activation strategy of S-Comm, I create the second hypothesis as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2: There is a correlation between some contextual factors and implementation 
outcome of S-Comm. That is, different activation orders and geographical considerations 
on the activation of S-Comm led to different enforcement outcomes in local jurisdictions. 
Hypothesis 2-1: Counties with early activation of S-Comm are associated with higher 
noncitizen deportation numbers than those with late activation of this program. 
Hypothesis 2-2: Counties located in southwest border jurisdictions are associated with 
higher noncitizen deportation numbers than those in non-border regions.    
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3.3. Secure Communities and Two Key Interaction Points under the Current 
Federal-Local Cooperative Immigration Enforcement Framework     
For carrying out this program, intergovernmental enforcement cooperation is the 
key and an indispensable process under the S-Comm program. Therefore, ICE and LEAs 
have structurally organic and close communications during the whole process, from 
biometric data sharing on suspected noncitizens in local jails (LEAs  ICE), to deciding 
the level of criminality of incarcerated noncitizens in local jails (ICE  LEAs/ICE), 
detainer issuance for administratively booking these noncitizens to ICE facilities 
(ICE/LEAs  LEAs), and processing removal proceedings (ICE  LEAs). However, 
such a new trend on immigration policy created unsolved and conflicting viewpoints 
between policymakers, especially in terms of what roles, authorities, and responsibilities 
each level of government has in the process of implementing immigration enforcement 
policy, and whether localities, including states, have “inherent authority” on policing 
immigration in their jurisdictions (Franck, 2012). Therefore, such multiple interaction 
structures and points for noncitizen enforcement policy have left much room for both ICE 
and LEAs to execute discretionary power. Considering the current situation in which ICE 
remains resistant to releasing information about how S-Comm is carried out, specifically 
under an intergovernmental enforcement cooperation framework, it is almost impossible 
for the public to understand all the intergovernmental interactions. Therefore, in this 
study, I focus on how two key interaction points on noncitizen enforcement policy under 
S-Comm, detainer issuance and deportation outcomes, are carried out with the 
intergovernmental cooperation process. 
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3.3.1. Immigration (ICE) Detainer Issuance under the S-Comm 
As an administrative document (Form I-247), the immigration detainer 
(sometimes called an “ICE hold”) has been used as a tool for ICE to ask localities to hold 
suspected noncitizens in local detention facilities for up to 48 hours (excluding weekends 
and holidays) for transfer to ICE facilities for removal proceedings. Unlike a warrant for 
arrest, a detainer is just a “notification” from federal immigration agencies for 
enforcement actions (Franck, 2012; Lasch, 2013b; TRAC, 2013a, 2013b). Detainers have 
mainly been issued by federal immigration officers, but they can also be issued by local 
LEAs that have been deputized with immigration enforcement authority under 287(g) 
partnerships (Franck, 2012). According to TRAC (2013a, 2013b, 2014b), ICE has issued 
more than 200,000 detainers annually to localities for catching and transferring suspected 
noncitizens - 273,982 issuances in FY2012 and 213,325 in FY2013 - and from a monthly 
perspective, ICE has issued on average almost 20,000 detainers to localities, 22,832 per 
month in FY2012 and 17,777 per month in FY2013.  
Historically, there have been few clear legal and administrative guidelines on 
what a detainer refers to, and how it should be used in immigration policy. ICE detainers 
should be issued to localities that have noncitizens with dangerous criminal convictions 
based on enforcement priorities (i.e., level of criminality) toward which the Obama 
administration has oriented. However, critics argue that ICE has issued detainers 
indiscriminately to catch and remove almost any noncitizens regardless of criminality 
(Manuel, 2014). For example, according to the TRAC data analysis (2013d) on ICE 
detainers, ICE issued about one million (949,126) immigration detainers nationally 
during a recent 50-month period (from FY2008 through the start of FY2012), but more 
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than two thirds of the total immigration detainers issued are related to those noncitizens 
without criminal records. This ironic result has been consistent in TRAC’s back-to-back 
data analyses on immigration detainer statistics. Follow-up data analysis covering 16 
months (from October 2011 through January 2013) from TRAC (2013b) also shows that 
“no more than 14 percent” of the recent ICE detainers issued during FY2012 through the 
first 4 months of FY2013 met the stated goal of ICE immigration enforcement policy, 
targeting risky and criminal noncitizens for improving public safety or national security. 
In spite of stricter new guidelines in December 2012 (“policy change of detainer 
issuance”), the result of detainer issuances in the first 6 months of 2013 (January- June) 
was similar (TRAC, 2013c). The problems regarding ICE detainer issuances do not end 
here; as mentioned in TRAC’s in-depth analyses (2013a, 2013b, 2013c), a considerable 
number of “Level 1” crimes/offenses that ICE set for issuing detainers appear to be 
related to minor crimes or misdemeanors, such as “simple traffic violations and 
immigration violations” (i.e., illegal entry). Level 1 crimes, especially “aggravated 
felonies” charges, have been broadly and arbitrarily interpreted by ICE field agents, so 
any minor offenses - such as traffic violations, disorderly conduct, or marijuana 
possession - can be considered aggravated felonies and Level 1 charges. 
One interesting point on detainers is that their issuance or lodging has strikingly 
increased since the implementation of S-Comm (Greene, 2012; Lasch, 2013b). Increasing 
volumes of detainer issuances are associated with serious debates and confusion among 
localities on the nature and authority of detainers. In spite of recent federal court 
decisions, many localities consider detainers as requests and mere notifications for 
cooperative administrative enforcement actions, while others still see detainers as 
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commands and federal regulations for compliance (Lasch, 2013a, 2013b). Such 
ambiguities on detainer issuance under the S-Comm framework might have considerable 
local variation on the volume of local immigration detainer issuance from ICE. With this 
background information and intergovernmental context on the issuance of detainers, I 
created the following research hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: There is a relationship between local responses/choices on immigration 
and ICE detainers issued to localities under the S-Comm program. That is, different local 
responses and  perspectives on immigration result in different volumes of ICE detainers 
issued in those jurisdictions.  
Hypothesis 3-1: Counties with strong enforcement participation are likely to accept more 
ICE detainers for stepping up enforcement actions. 
Hypothesis 3-2: Counties with weak enforcement participation are likely to be resistant to 
complying with ICE hold requests on suspected noncitizens. That is, such counties 
selectively accept ICE’s detainer issuance depending on the level of criminality 
(enforcement priorities). 
 
3.3.2. Noncitizen Deportation under the S-Comm 
Deportation in the immigration system and policy generally refers to a coercive 
and forceful administrative practice for removal and expulsion of noncitizens who are 
considered unfit by the immigration system or violate related laws (Buckinx & Filindra, 
2015; Coutin, 2015; Drotbohm & Hasselberg, 2015; Kanstroom, 2012). However, in the 
history of U.S. immigration assimilation and deportation, deportation has also been a 
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process for selecting “deportable” and “unwanted” noncitizens out of all noncitizens who 
already live on American soil. The federal government has repeatedly argued that 
deportation is not a punishment but an administrative action for protecting national and 
public security (Anderson, Gibney, & Paoletti, 2011). However, in policy realities, 
specifically in local immigrant communities, deportation has been considered a direct and 
drastic punishment that is related to their lives. It has a social and economic impact in 
local communities from which deportees are removed, including collateral damages such 
as tearing families apart and putting many U.S.-born children with undocumented, 
deported parents into the foster care system. Therefore, under the strong interconnection 
between the criminal system and law and immigration counterparts, deportation is also 
considered a “criminal punishment” for the target noncitizens (Stump, 2014a, p. 95). 
Some scholars in the sociology, anthropology, and criminal justice fields consider a 
recent “deportation turn” under enforcement-focused immigration policy as a mechanism 
for “social control” or “regulation” via banishing such socially unwanted noncitizens. In 
liberal states, government deportation actions also draw the normative and legal contour 
of citizenship, and are considered a practice for setting a line between citizens and 
noncitizens and deserving and undeserving noncitizens (Anderson, Gibney, & Paoletti, 
2011; Drotbohm & Hasselberg, 2015; Kanstroom, 2012). 
Based on the program goal and enforcement priorities of S-Comm, the main target 
for punishment and deportation should be dangerous noncitizens who have committed 
criminal violations including violent crimes at the community level. Therefore, 
considering the current three levels of criminality for enforcement actions, noncitizens 
with Level 1 convictions should be the first and foremost target. However, how such 
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“dangerousness” can be interpreted and implemented in an immigration enforcement 
policy reality depends on the discretionary authority of ICE and LEAs. Considering 
unexpected enforcement outcomes under S-Comm from the first 6 years, as mentioned in 
the previous subchapter, and the increasing crimmigration trend, such scopes of 
dangerous criminal noncitizens have been arbitrarily interpreted and implemented by 
ICE, and the scope of such administratively “dangerous” noncitizens targeted for 
deportation has been likely to expand in the name of protecting communities against 
dangerous criminal aliens.    
Considering the program mechanisms under the S-Comm framework based on close 
interactions between different levels of government at each enforcement step, I assume 
immigration detainer issuances are logically and technically connected with final 
deportation orders. That is, localities with different immigration policy perspectives tend 
to first have different volumes of immigration detainer issuances, which influences 
noncitizen deportation outcomes. Based on this logic, I created the fourth research 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4: If immigration enforcement policy is relevantly carried out in compliance 
with the program goal of S-Comm, enforcement (deportation) actions from this program 
should focus thoroughly on removals of noncitizens with dangerous criminal convictions, 
which are administratively set by ICE’s risk (criminality)-based enforcement approach. 
Hypothesis 4-1: There is a relationship between local responses/choices on immigration 
and enforcement results under the S-Comm program. That is, different local responses 
and perspectives on immigration have different enforcement results in their jurisdiction. 
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Hypothesis 4-2: Counties with strong enforcement participation have high enforcement 
(deportation) of noncitizens 
Hypothesis 4-3: Counties with weak enforcement participation have low enforcement 
performance. 
Hypothesis 4-4: There is a relationship between immigration detainer issuances and 
noncitizen deportation outcomes. Localities with higher volumes of detainer issuances 
tend to have higher noncitizen deportations than localities with lower volumes of detainer 
issuances.  
Hypothesis 4-5: Considering the enforcement mechanism under the S-Comm framework, 
there is an interrelationship between or among three factors: extent of local immigration 
enforcement policy participation, immigration detainer issuances, and noncitizen 
deportation outcomes.    
 
3.4. Final Program Goal of S-Comm: Rhetoric of “Making Communities Safer” and 
“Immigrant-Crime Nexus” Hypothesis 
As this program’s name suggests, the final policy goal of S-Comm is to make 
communities safer. To accomplish this goal, the basic logic under S-Comm is simple: 
Dangerous noncitizens who already reside in local communities should be identified, 
punished, and finally removed through an effective and close intergovernmental 
communication structure. However, as I mentioned in the last subchapter, the 
administrative term of “dangerousness” and “removable” categories of noncitizens under 
the S-Comm framework is not clear and has been full of ambiguities and administrative 
discretion to maximize deportation numbers under enforcement-only hysteria. Although 
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ICE never clearly and explicitly mentions why and how this program was initiated and 
driven with the support of what policy actors and contexts, the one nuanced and hidden 
driving force behind this program is the “immigration-crime nexus,” which has been 
strongly defended by immigration restrictionists (Jung, 2015a, 2015c; Kubrin, 2014; 
Simes & Waters, 2014). This nexus basically assumes that noncitizens with (non-) 
criminal violations can become a threat to public safety, and the expansion of the scope 
of their dangerousness could also be connected with national security. Paying serious 
attention to noncitizen criminality, this assumption argues that crime is rapidly increasing 
in areas with “growing immigration populations” (Martinez & Iwama, 2014, p.339). 
According to this assumption, areas with more immigrants, specifically more Latinos, are 
likely to have higher crime rates than those with fewer Latinos (Holland, 2014; Martinez 
& Iwama, 2014). Therefore, under this logic, localities with more immigrants should be 
the first target area for enforcement actions. Following such logic, the federal 
immigration bureaucracies selected a staggered rollout scheme for implementation of S-
Comm (Cox & Miles, 2013; Miles & Cox, 2014), and the first focal localities for 
implementing this program were many jurisdictions with a high percentage of Hispanic 
population and with locations in the southwest border areas sharing the border with 
Mexico (Jung, 2015a; Treyger, Chalfin & Loeffler, 2014). This indicates that the main 
drive for ICE’s implementation of S-Comm is associated with such demographic and 
geographic factors, assuming that the Hispanic population is the main target for crime 
prevention and immigration enforcement actions (Jung, 2015a; Holland, 2014).  
There have been many studies about how noncitizen concentrations are related to 
public safety, especially at the local level. Studies have had mixed perspectives and 
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arguments on this relationship, but since the 1990s, many empirical studies have 
supported the idea that this nexus is not significant, and even if there is a relationship, it 
is negligible (Immigration Policy Center, 2011; Kubrin & Ishizawa, 2012). An argument 
linking immigration and crime has been based on social disorganization theory, arguing 
that “places” matter for deciding this link. Immigrants with little socioeconomic capital 
and resources have no choice but to reside in disadvantaged areas like slums, and due to 
lack of economic opportunities, many immigrants rely on illegal activities, which are 
connected with crimes in the communities. Some scholars have also argued that 
demographics or racial or ethnic characteristics of immigrants might be connected with 
crimes because many immigrants tend to be “young, male, relatively poor, and 
uneducated” (Davies & Fagan, 2012, p. 102), so they tend to rely on crime as “an 
alternative avenue for advancement” (Davies & Fagan, 2012, p. 103). 
However, counterarguments on such an immigration-crime nexus hypothesis have 
also been made. These arguments have paid attention to the “neutral” or “protective” 
effects on crime according to increasing immigrant populations (Carr, Lichter, & Kefalas, 
2012; Emerick, Curry, Collins, & Rodriguez, 2014; Hagan, Rodriguez, & Castro, 2011; 
Koper, Guterbock, Woods, Taylor, & Carter, 2013; Kubrin, 2014; Kubrin & Ishizawa, 
2012; Martinez & Iwama, 2014; Martinez & Stowell, 2012; Ousey & Kubrin, 2009; 
Palasz & Fennelly, 2013; Rosenfield, 2014; Simers & Waters, 2013) or a consistent steep 
declining crime trend with increasing immigrant populations at the community level 
(Davies & Fagan, 2012; DiPietro & Bursik, 2012; Kirk, Papachristo, Fagan, & Tyler, 
2012; Ousey & Kubrin, 2009; Wadsworth, 2010). Using “selectivity theory,” Kubrin and 
Ishizawa (2012) argued that immigrants are more likely to be self-selected and have 
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higher work and economic-enhancement motives, so they tend to abide by the law and 
are less likely to be involved in crime activities. Using a “healthy immigrant thesis,” 
Wadsworth (2010) also argued that many immigrants are highly motivated individuals 
and entrepreneurs, so they are less likely to be involved in criminal activities. Rather, 
they revitalize communities and create “new forms of social organization and adaptive 
social structures” in spite of the economic decline and demographic heterogeneity of 
communities. Moreover, using ethnic enclaves or social ties within immigrant 
communities, immigrants create economic opportunities and contribute to communities’ 
economic development. Therefore, the argument that an influx of immigrants increases 
crimes is baseless, according to this perspective. 
Federal immigration policymakers appear to have followed an “immigrant-crime 
nexus” logic regarding the implementation of S-Comm, considering its program goal and 
staggered rollout strategy. However, such an assumption shows different outcomes in 
policy realities, as repeatedly confirmed by recent studies. For example, according to Cox 
and Miles (2013), Miles and Cox (2014), and Treyger and her colleagues (2014), the 
implementation of S-Comm during the last few years made no discernible impact on 
making communities safer. Using crime rate changes at the county and city level before 
and after the activation of S-Comm, researchers commonly found that no FBI index 
offenses were significantly decreased. There have also been previous studies analyzing 
the influence of local immigration enforcement policy participation on community safety. 
Their arguments brought mixed results, but many researchers found that local 
involvement in immigration control policy was negatively associated with community 
safety (Dreby, 2012; Kolodziej, 2013). Based on this series of previous studies and 
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different perspectives on the immigrant-crime nexus assumption, I created the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 5: In terms of a policy implementation perspective, implementation of S-
Comm is associated with public safety at the community level. If DHS/ICE’s logic on an 
“immigrant-crime nexus” hypothesis is correct, active immigration enforcement policy 
participation at the community level under S-Comm implementation is associated with 
improving local community safety.  
 
3.5. Summary  
This chapter examined when and under what conditions localities are theoretically 
and contextually involved in immigration enforcement policy, and how S-Comm has 
been carried out since its initiation with what working mechanisms, logic, and policy 
goal. With regard to local immigration enforcement policy participation, (1) multiple 
contextual factors - including political, economic, demographic, geographical factors, and 
combinations of them - are likely to make localities get involved in local immigration 
enforcement actions legally and administratively. However, previous studies have shown 
mixed perspectives on the influences of these factors. Moreover, (2) considerable inter- 
and intralocality variations on immigration issues are also found. 
Under the immigration criminality mentality and consequent enforcement-only 
policy hysteria since the mid-2000s, S-Comm was created in the name of protecting local 
communities from dangerous noncitizens. With the “immigrant-crime nexus” 
assumption, Washington politicians and immigration policymakers politically consider 
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noncitizens with criminal and immigration violations as subject to punishment and 
removal. Moreover, with advertisement of a “smarter” and effective enforcement 
program using biometric data sharing between and among federal agencies (FBI/ICE) 
and local law enforcement agencies, DHS/ICE boastfully argues that the implementation 
of S-Comm positively impacted local communities through proactively catching, 
detaining, and finally removing dangerous noncitizens at the community level. However, 
the S-Comm implementation process during the last 6 years has been full of secrecy, 
ambiguity, and inconsistency in terms of how this program is actually carried out, which 
noncitizens have been the real target, and whether ICE has faithfully followed the stated 
policy goal, removing dangerous and the “worst of the worst” noncitizens at the local 
level. Unintended policy outcomes - too many noncitizens with no criminal history or 
with immigration violations have been removed in the name of “criminal aliens” - 
brought about serious intergovernmental conflicts on the interpretation of enforcement 
outcomes. Under a close intergovernmental interaction framework for noncitizen 
enforcement actions, different levels of government have dynamically interacted with 
each other throughout S-Comm implementation. However, despite DHS/ICE’s assertion 
of a “cooperative” enforcement implementation for S-Comm, localities actually found it 
impossible to raise their voices and make their own decisions under the S-Comm 
framework; localities were isolated from decisions to activate S-Comm, and even if they 
appealed the program’s unintended and problematic processes, ICE barely responded to 
such local arguments. Localities under the S-Comm framework were not dealt with as 
“enforcement partners,” but as “(mere) technical subordinates” under hierarchical power 
relations.  
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Based on this contextual and theoretical background on immigration policy 
implementation under intergovernmental relations, five research questions (hypotheses) 
were created. In the next three chapters, I empirically analyze these questions with 
noncitizen enforcement and related contextual data on S-Comm. The second hypothesis 
and the first part of the fourth hypothesis are discussed in Chapter 4, while the third 
hypothesis and the remaining part of the fourth hypothesis are analyzed in Chapter 5. The 
first and fifth hypotheses are discussed in Chapter 6.       
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CHAPTER 4
34
 
ANALYZING THE PROGRAM OUTCOME  
OF THE SECURE COMMUNITIES PROGRAM: STATE AND LOCAL LEVEL 
 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter systematically investigates whether S-Comm as the key enforcement 
program under the Obama administration has been faithfully implemented in compliance 
with the stated program goal of catching, detaining, and finally removing dangerous 
criminal noncitizens in local communities for public safety and security. The research 
questions and hypotheses are mentioned first, followed by descriptive and graphical 
analysis to critically analyze how S-Comm has been carried out at the state and local 
level, and whether localities have different (or similar) enforcement paths according to 
contextual factors on the implementation of S-Comm, such as activation order and 
geographical considerations. With these empirical analyses, interpretation and policy 
implications are made. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, this chapter first focuses on the implementation 
outcomes S-Comm has made during the past 4 years (2010 - 2013). How has S-Comm 
been carried out? Has this program followed the stated program goal of making 
communities safer through removing “dangerous” criminal noncitizens? How have 
contextual conditions on S-Comm implementation - such as the staggered rollout scheme 
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 The early version of this chapter was prepared in 2014 with the title of Removal of “Worst of the Worst” 
Noncitizens from Communities: An Evaluation of Program Outcome of the Secure Communities 
Framework. It was presented at the 2014 Southeastern Conference for Public Administration (SeCoPA), 
which was held in Atlanta, GA on September 17-20, 2014. This chapter is revised with comments and 
feedback from this conference. I appreciate the audience at the SeCoPA conference session for their 
comments. Also I appreciate Professors N. Joseph Cayer and Paul G. Lewis at Arizona State University. 
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and geographical considerations - influenced enforcement outcomes under the S-Comm 
framework? Based on the first question, this chapter also pays critical attention to local 
noncitizen enforcement results and their differences under S-Comm in terms of intra- and 
interlocality perspectives. How many noncitizens at the community level have been 
removed under S-Comm, and what categories of noncitizens were mainly caught and 
removed? In terms of the enforcement priorities (three levels of criminality) ICE set, have 
localities had different (or similar) enforcement outcomes? How have a certain locality’s 
(county’s) noncitizen deportation results under S-Comm changed (or remained stable) 
over time? As mentioned in Chapter 3, the second hypothesis (influence of two 
contextual factors on local immigration enforcement policy implementation) and the first 
part of the fourth hypothesis (noncitizen deportation rates at the community level in terms 
of three levels of criminality for analyzing the relevancy of policy implementation) are 
examined.  
 
4.2. Data and Methodology 
For analysis, this study used ICE’s monthly “IDENT-IAFIS Interoperability 
statistics,”35 which include the numbers of noncitizen deportations under S-Comm at the 
national, state, and local (county) level. Noncitizen deportations in these data are also 
subdivided by enforcement priorities. ICE did not release these data during the first two 
years in spite of strong requests from migrant rights groups, but as a result of lawsuits 
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 IDENT refers to “Automated Biometric Identification System” for suspected noncitizens’ immigration 
status check by ICE, while IAFIS refers to “Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System” for 
suspected criminal status check by the FBI. With an interoperability system process that is both horizontal 
(FBI and ICE) and hierarchical (ICE and local law enforcement agencies), fingerprints as biometric 
information data are shared among these agencies (ICE, 2009a). 
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and a federal court decision in 2010, it began to release data on a monthly basis, starting 
with data from April 2010, more than 17 months after the launch of S-Comm in 2008.  
Considering such monthly data availability, I used the past 44 months of ICE 
enforcement data (April 2010 - November 2013) for analysis.
36
 
The IDENT-IAFIS Interoperability statistics basically consist of three key pieces 
of information on monthly noncitizen enforcement processes under S-Comm: total 
numbers of noncitizen fingerprint submissions, IDENT matches per level of criminality, 
and deportation (removal) numbers per three levels of criminality. In addition to these 
criminality-based deportation numbers under S-Comm, these enforcement data also 
include “non-criminal” noncitizen deportation as an additional category, which is mostly 
related to immigration violations, so the data can be helpful for researchers to analyze 
deportation outcomes in terms of what noncitizen groups have been mainly targeted. 
These data include enforcement outcomes for 3,181 jurisdictions including U.S. 
territories, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, and the District 
of Columbia. After deleting some non-counties, I collected 3,169 data for county-level 
units (including some cities having independent enforcement outcomes under S-Comm) 
for analysis. For valid empirical analysis, I also differentiate localities into those with 
                                                 
36
 Logically, considering the current data structure and accessible data time points on S-Comm 
enforcement, I used 44 months of ICE data for analyzing local noncitizen enforcement results. However, 
one interesting but ironic aspect of ICE’s data format on S-Comm is that these data are based on 
cumulative data structure although ICE clearly states that S-Comm data are based on “monthly” 
interoperability statistics. Therefore, each of ICE’s monthly data releases on S-Comm is composed of 
cumulative enforcement information from the first activation month to that month. Considering April 2010 
(almost two years after the initiation of the program) as the first month ICE began to release deportation-
related data under S-Comm, I cannot calculate “pure” monthly data on S-Comm enforcement performance 
before April 2010. However, I can infer “lump-sum” enforcement data before April 2010 through the 
cumulative data format. Therefore, in Chapter 4, I sometimes used noncitizen deportation numbers from 
more than 44 months (61 months, from Oct. 2008 to Nov. 2013) in the cumulative format for understanding 
total enforcement outcomes at the state and local level.
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“meaningful” enforcement outcomes (operationalized as localities with at least 1 
noncitizen deportation per month) and those without. Through this process, I finally 
collected data on a total of 541 counties having meaningful monthly enforcement 
performance, so the sample size for this study is 541. The unit of analysis for this study is 
the locality (county)
37
. 
 
4.2.1. Dependent variable:  Noncitizen Deportation Numbers & Rates in Terms of Three 
Levels of Criminality (Enforcement Priorities)  
As the key outcome for this study, deportation numbers indicate how many 
noncitizens per month per locality are removed from local communities through the 
implementation of S-Comm. Numerical values on noncitizen deportation indirectly 
represent how strongly or weakly localities participate in immigration enforcement policy 
based on the current intergovernmental enforcement cooperation framework. However, 
such local deportation numbers cannot be compared directly because each locality has 
unique socioeconomic and demographic characteristics (e.g., unemployment rates and 
foreign-born population numbers). Therefore, deportation rates can be used for making 
local comparisons. For this study, monthly noncitizen deportation rates were calculated 
by locality, specifically in terms of three levels of criminality (Levels 1 and 3) and 
noncriminal (immigration) convictions. Considering the program goal of S-Comm - 
targeting and removing dangerous criminal noncitizens for public safety at the 
community level - the deportation rate of noncitizens who are considered “risky” 
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 Considering the fact that the main activation unit for S-Comm is at the county level, the unit of analysis 
for this study is the county. However, IDENT-IAFIS Interoperability statistics also include some cities 
(e.g., New York City; Saint Louis City, MO) that independently activated S-Comm for noncitizen 
enforcement policy. Therefore, I also included them for analysis.  
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criminals (e.g., noncitizens administratively constructed as “Level 1”criminal convictions 
by ICE) and are removed from localities can be a critical point for analyzing 
implementation results of this program. However, there is much room for ICE’s street-
level immigration bureaucrats to execute discretionary power in the process of 
enforcement policy implementation, in particular deciding which noncitizens are 
considered Level 1 criminals and which are considered a different level of criminal for 
processing removal proceedings. With this limitation, I consider that certain localities 
follow the stated goal of S-Comm if they have a higher deportation rate of noncitizens 
with Level 1 charges. However, if some localities have a higher non-criminal noncitizen 
deportation rate or Level 3-related deportation rate (related to misdemeanor charges), 
these localities are considered to have biased enforcement performance. Many previous 
studies have followed this perspective to analyze whether S-Comm has been relevantly 
implemented (Chand, Deshommes, & Bektemirov, 2014; Chand & Schreckhise, 2014; 
Kanstroom, 2012; TRAC, 2014c; Treyger, Chalfin & Loeffler, 2014). 
 
4.2.2. Independent Variables: Timing of Activation Orders & Geographical 
Considerations 
As previous studies have repeatedly considered (Cox & Miles, 2013; Gutierrez, 
2013; Jung, 2015a; Treyger, Chalfin, & Loeffler, 2014), activation orders under the S-
Comm framework might include hidden logic about what political or policy outcomes 
policymakers intended. Under an enforcement-only policy direction, DHS/ICE made 
efforts to expand deportation numbers based on the enforcement quota - about 400,000 
noncitizen deportations per year - that was set by Washington politicians and 
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policymakers
38
 (Bennion, 2014; Economist, 2014; Hsu & Becker, 2010; Golash-Boza, 
2014b; Shahshahani, 2014). In spite of an intergovernmental enforcement cooperative 
design, under S-Comm, localities had few rights and little or no say in the decision 
process behind the activation of this program in their jurisdictions (Jung, 2015a; Treyger, 
Chalfin, & Loeffler, 2014). Under this working logic, localities with early activation of S-
Comm might be places for Washington politicians and policymakers to make more 
politically meaningful or maximized results on noncitizen enforcement policy under an 
enforcement-only regime. For this study, I operationalized “early” adopters of S-Comm 
as localities that activated S-Comm before October 2010, which marked the first 24 
months (from November 2008 through October 2010) of S-Comm’s rollout activation. 
“Late” adopters in this study are localities that activated S-Comm after October 2010.39 
Using such a binary locality differentiation, this study analyzes how localities with 
different activation orders have different (or similar) noncitizen deportation results over 
time.    
Moreover, geographical considerations regarding the implementation and activation 
of S-Comm were also made by DHS/ICE to maximize noncitizen deportation numbers 
within a limited time. Considering the fact that the main target noncitizen group for 
enforcement under the current immigration policy is Hispanics, federal immigration 
bureaucrats have political and policy incentives to activate S-Comm preferentially in (1) 
the southwest border localities that are the main routes of entry for the Hispanic 
                                                 
38
 This quota was kept secret and only communicated with internal immigration agencies - DHS/ICE - but 
one 2010 internal document from ICE was released through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, 
and the public knew of the existence of such an enforcement quota. 
39
 Previous studies used a similar distinction between early and late activation order of the implementation 
of S-Comm (Cox & Miles, 2013; Treyger, Chalfin, & Loeffler, 2014). 
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undocumented and (2) places where many Hispanics traditionally reside. Therefore, I sort 
localities into two groups based on geographical areas: border localities - southwest 
localities that are close to the U.S.-Mexico border, including those in the states of 
Arizona, California, Texas, and New Mexico - and non-border areas. Based on this 
classification, I also analyze how these two groups have different (or similar) noncitizen 
deportation results under S-Comm. 
In addition to the two abovementioned contextual factors on the implementation 
of S-Comm, two additional factors - volumes of noncitizen fingerprint submissions and 
IDENT matches (matching rates of fingerprints submitted to ICE’s immigration database) 
- can also be considered to find local differences on deportation outcomes.
40
 However, 
these enforcement processes are carried out with close intergovernmental interactions, 
and considerable levels of discretionary power are likely to be used by each level of 
government: regarding fingerprint submissions to the federal immigration agency, LEAs 
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 As the initiation of S-Comm implementation, noncitizen fingerprints are submitted by local law 
enforcement agencies (LEAs), and therefore this biometric data sharing between LEAs and ICE indirectly 
indicates how actively (or inactively) localities participate in S-Comm for noncitizen enforcement actions. 
If certain localities are interested in local participation/intervention of noncitizen enforcement policy, they 
are likely to carry out more active enforcement actions in their jurisdiction through stepped-up arrests and 
detention of noncitizens as in the case of the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office in Arizona. Therefore, the 
fingerprints of every suspected noncitizen in local jails or detention facilities in these localities are 
submitted without exception to the FBI for a criminal status check and to ICE for an immigration status 
check. On the other hand, in the case of localities that do not want to participate or are not interested in 
noncitizen enforcement policy, they might not have any obvious incentives to actively submit the 
fingerprints of suspected noncitizens caught and held in their local jails or detention facilities. Localities 
oriented toward community policing - such as the city of Chicago, Illinois, or the states of Rhode Island 
(House Bill 5237) and New Hampshire (House Bill 404) - strictly limit noncitizen arrests and cooperation 
with ICE on immigration issues, limiting such cooperation to dangerous criminal noncitizen cases like 
murders or sexual assaults. 
When noncitizen fingerprints are submitted to the FBI for criminal status check and automatically 
forwarded to ICE for an immigration status check under the S-Comm framework, ICE’s Law Enforcement 
Support Center (LESC) checks these fingerprints against ICE’s immigration database, and then finally 
decides the level of (non)criminality. Because ICE has not clearly disclosed how this series of 
administrative decisions of noncitizen criminality is made, it is almost impossible for the public to 
understand the concrete decision processes, specifically regarding when and under what conditions 
noncitizens are administratively set as “dangerous” criminals or just minor crime violators or noncriminal 
violators.          
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decide what fingerprints they should (or should not) send to ICE; regarding the decision 
of “administrative” criminality of suspected noncitizens whose fingerprints were 
submitted, ICE decides which noncitizens are dangerous criminal violators in Level 1, 
and which are mid-level or minor crime violators in Level 2 or 3. I did not use these 
factors as exploratory factors influencing local noncitizen deportation rates, but I add 
them in this study for comparing local differences regarding local deportations.       
 
4.2.3. Methods 
Considering current ICE enforcement data structure and limitations, I used 
descriptive and graphical analysis by tracing monthly noncitizen enforcement statistics 
per locality in terms of enforcement priorities to grasp how faithfully S-Comm has 
followed the stated program goal. Local enforcement results were also compared by 
activation orders of S-Comm and geographical characteristics (i.e., southwest border area 
vs. non-southwest border area). In terms of longitudinal perspective, this study also 
analyzes whether there have been inter- and intralocality differences on noncitizen 
deportations during 44 months (April 2010 - November 2013) under the implementation 
of S-Comm.    
 
4.3. State-level Enforcement Results of S-Comm 
First, I analyze how S-Comm has been implemented at the state level, in terms of 
monthly noncitizen enforcement performance (fingerprint submissions, IDENT matches, 
and removals) by state and by level of criminality (removal based on levels 1 to 3 and 
noncriminal convictions). According to Table 4.1, the states of California, Texas, 
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Arizona, and Florida account for more than two-thirds of cumulative total removal 
outcomes under the S-Comm framework. Considering that three of these “big four” states 
(California, Arizona, and Texas) are located in the U.S. - Mexico border area, we assume 
that current U.S. noncitizen enforcement policy including S-Comm has focused on 
Hispanic noncitizens who cross the southwest border areas and has  targeted them 
through capture, detainment, and removal strategies and management. In terms of 
activation orders of S-Comm (as of November 2013), the activation period of S-Comm at 
the state level has ranged from a minimum 18 months (District of Columbia, Guam, and 
the Virgin Islands) to a maximum 61 months (Massachusetts,
41
 North Carolina, and 
Texas). The top 10 states having high enforcement results in Table 4.1 tend to have 
relatively early activation and thus longer activation periods compared to others; these 
states have more than 40 months of S-Comm implementation, except New York (35 
months) and Colorado (34 months). 
 
         
                                                 
41
 Massachusetts is considered an “early” adopter of S-Comm (61 months) according to ICE data, but this is 
not an accurate classification because only one county in Massachusetts, Suffolk County, activated S-
Comm very early, and the other 13 counties within the state have a very late activation order (19 months). 
Therefore, I argue that the current reporting of activation period of Massachusetts at the state level should 
be revised.  
  
9
1 
      Table 4.1. Cumulative State-level Secure Communities Enforcement (Deportation) Results: Top 10 States 
 
Source: Author’s analysis of Monthly IDENT-IAFIS Interoperability Statistics of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 
State # of 
Counties 
activating 
S-Comm 
(activation 
period) 
# of Early 
& late 
adopter of 
S-Comm* 
(county 
level) 
# of 
Counties 
with strong 
enforcemen
t activity** 
(%) 
Monthly 
fingerprint 
submissions 
Monthly 
IDENT 
matches 
Monthly 
removal 
(% of 
total 
removals) 
# of Counties 
with more than 
50% L1 
deportation 
outcomes (%) 
# of Counties 
with more 
than 50% 
Noncriminal 
deportation 
outcomes (%) 
# of Counties 
with more 
than 50% 
L3+ 
Noncriminal 
deportation 
outcomes 
(%) 
California 58 
(54 months) 
38 early & 
20 late 
45 
(77.59%) 
104,426.50 8,970.96 2,004.13 
(38.21%) 
4 
(6.90%) 
1 
(1.72%) 
34 
(58.62%) 
Texas 254 
(61 months) 
254 early & 
0 late 
74 
(29.13%) 
57,095.67 4,047.39 1,260.48 
(24.03%) 
21 
(8.27%) 
14 
(5.51%) 
128 
(50.39%) 
Arizona 15 
(60 months) 
11 early & 4 
late 
11 
(73.33%) 
27,616.28 2,090.38 488.50 
(9.31%) 
1 
(6.67%) 
0 
(0%) 
8 
(53.33%) 
Florida 67 
(59 months) 
67 early & 0 
late 
38 
(56.72%) 
57,217.98 3,564.93 300.39 
(5.73%) 
3 
(4.48%) 
6 
(8.96%) 
54 
(80.60%) 
Georgia 159 
(49 months) 
8 early & 
151 late 
30 
(18.87%) 
28,571.16 1,316.41 212.84 
(4.06%) 
13 
(8.18%) 
11 
(6.92%) 
69 
(43.40%) 
North 
Carolina 
100 
(61 months) 
59 early & 
41 late 
23 
(23.0%) 
15,398.93 608.79 136.31 
(2.60%) 
10 
(10.0%) 
6 
(6.0%) 
56 
(56.0%) 
Virginia 129 
(57 months) 
129 early & 
0 late 
18 
(13.95%) 
17,670.96 737.70 114.30 
(2.18%) 
24 
(18.60%) 
11 
(8.53%) 
44 
(34.11%) 
New 
York 
58 
(35 months) 
0 early & 58 
late 
16 
(27.59%) 
37,449.14 2,841.91 107.49 
(2.05%) 
8 
(13.79%) 
6 
(10.34%) 
20 
(34.48%) 
Colorado 64 
(34 months) 
0 early & 64 
late 
15 
(23.44%) 
13,104.29 636.0 91.41 
(1.74%) 
3 
(4.69%) 
1 
(1.56%) 
8 
(12.5%) 
Tennessee 95 
(42 months) 
4 early & 91 
late 
18 
(18.95%) 
25,844.38 620.14 90.48 
(1.72%) 
8 
(8.42%) 
8 
(8.42%) 
43 
(45.26%) 
Total 3,169 
(61 months) 
680 early & 
2,489 late 
541 
(17.07%) 
553,408.80 28,660.66 5,245.61 342 
(10.79%) 
229 
(7.23%) 
1,103 
(34.81%) 
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*: To address the influence of activation period or orders on S-Comm implementation, based on the logic of research from Cox and Miles (2013) and 
Gutierrez (2013), I divided counties that have activated S-Comm into two dichotomous groups: “early” and “late” adopters. The cutoff point for 
differentiating between early and late activation of S-Comm was set as October 2010, which marked the first 24 months (from November 2008 through 
October 2010) of S-Comm’s rollout activation. Counties that activated S-Comm before October 2010 are considered “early” adopters, while counties that 
activated after that point are considered “late” adopters. As in this table, many states have a mixed type of activation of S-Comm. 
**: Level of strong “enforcement” activity is calculated by the number (percentage) of counties within a certain state that have had at least 1 noncitizen 
deportation per month during 44 months (April 2010 - November 2013). States with more counties that have higher numbers of deportations (removals) 
are considered to have stronger enforcement.
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Many states, such as California or North Carolina, have a mix of activation types, 
with some counties having early S-Comm activation and others late activation, while 
some states such as Texas (early adopter), Florida (early adopter), Virginia (early 
adopter), and New York (late adopter), have only one type of activation period. 
Considering the level of “strong enforcement” as the number of counties within a certain 
state that have meaningful enforcement performance (at least 1 noncitizen deportation per 
month), California (77.6%), Arizona (73.3%), Delaware (66.7%), and New Jersey 
(66.7%) had the strongest enforcement results, while Alabama (17.9%), Arkansas 
(10.7%), Idaho (15.9%), Illinois (8.8%), Kansas (8.6%), and Kentucky (2.5%) had lower 
or weak enforcement performance on S-Comm implementation during the 44 month-
period. Bivariate correlation between noncitizen fingerprint submissions and deportation 
outcomes under S-Comm was very high, r = .88, p <.001, which indicates that a higher 
volume of fingerprint submissions from localities is associated with more deportations 
under S-Comm. Bivariate correlation between IDENT matches and deportations has a 
very strong positive relation, indicating that the higher a state’s immigration database 
matching rate is, the more noncitizen deportations are made, r = .94, p <.001. Regarding 
level of criminality, Utah had the highest level 1 deportation performance during 44 
months, which means 31% of counties (9 out of a total of 29 counties) within the 
jurisdiction have more than 50% level 1 deportation outcomes. Pennsylvania (25.3%) and 
New Mexico (21.2%) had the next highest percentages of counties having more than 50% 
level 1 deportation performance. On the other hand, Massachusetts had the highest 
noncriminal deportation performance, which means 42.9% of counties (6 out of a total of 
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14 counties) within the jurisdiction have more than 50% noncriminal deportation 
performance. Following Massachusetts, Rhode Island (40%), New Jersey (38.1%), and 
Maryland (16.7%) show that a considerable number of counties within their jurisdictions 
have more than 50% noncriminal deportation performance.  If the scope of noncitizen 
deportations under S-Comm is expanded to a combination of noncriminal convictions 
and Level 3 convictions (related to misdemeanor charges, such as traffic violations), the 
enforcement results during the last 44 months show a very different picture from the 
promise of DHS/ICE. In 15 states, more than half of the counties deported noncitizens 
with minor charges and noncriminal (immigration) violations. New Jersey (95.2%), 
Massachusetts (78.6%), Connecticut (75%), and Maryland (70.8%) were the top states 
with such unintended enforcement results. This result is similar to the arguments that 
many critics of S-Comm including migrant rights groups and liberal immigration 
research groups have consistently made (Cox & Miles, 2013; Miles & Cox, 2014; 
Francis, 2011; Fritz, 2014; Jung, 2015a; Kanstroom, 2012; TRAC, 2014b; Treyger, 
Chalfin, & Loeffler, 2014; Vock, 2013). 
 
4.4. County-Level Enforcement Results of S-Comm 
As the actual place in which noncitizens settle to live, localities have been the 
main target for federal immigration agencies to conduct noncitizen enforcement policy. 
Under the crimmigration trend and enforcement-only policy hysteria, implementation of 
S-Comm based on close intergovernmental enforcement cooperation made it possible for 
DHS/ICE to rapidly expand their enforcement capacity through an automatic 
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enforcement machine and system operations. That is why ICE’s basic enforcement region 
was set at the county or community level. With this policy context in mind, I analyze how 
S-Comm has been implemented at the county level, focusing on whether this program has 
faithfully followed the stated goal of targeting and removing dangerous noncitizens 
administratively set as Level 1 criminals. Moreover, enforcement results at the inter- and 
intra-county level during the 44-month period are also discussed, as well as whether there 
have been local differences on enforcement results under the S-Comm framework.   
Table 4.2 indicates county-level enforcement results under the S-Comm 
framework. Considering all 3,169 counties activating S-Comm, about 291 noncitizen 
fingerprints were submitted from LEAs on a monthly basis, and on average, about14 
fingerprints (4.8%) per month were matched with ICE’s immigration database including 
immigrants’ legal status and criminal histories and information. Based on these 
intergovernmental enforcement actions, about 2.21 noncitizens have been deported on a 
monthly basis, and about 0.28 noncitizens per thousand foreign-born populations have 
been deported per month. In terms of enforcement priorities, one in five of these 
noncitizens were removed with Level 1 convictions per month, while one in three (33%) 
were removed with minor charges and noncriminal violations. When the focus was 
narrowed to the 541 counties having meaningful monthly noncitizen enforcement 
outcomes under S-Comm, strikingly increasing rates of enforcement actions were found. 
About 1,300 fingerprints were submitted to ICE from LEAs per month, and 74 
fingerprints were matched with ICE’s IDENT data (5.8%). About 12 noncitizens were 
finally deported per month, and adjusting for the size of foreign-born populations, 0.50 
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noncitizens per thousand foreign-born populations were deported per month during 61 
months. In terms of levels of criminality, about 27% of noncitizens deported had Level 1 
criminal convictions, while more than half of noncitizens deported (51%) were removed 
with minor charges and immigration violations. Compared to the total 3,169 localities, 
those 541 counties have 5 or 6 times more enforcement actions (fingerprint submissions 
and IDENT matches) and removal outcomes on a monthly basis.  
Through the abovementioned enforcement results, I found that localities have 
various responses to this mandatory immigration enforcement program, which brought 
about huge local variations. Of the total 3,169 counties activating S-Comm, 1,026 
localities (32.4%) have had no noncitizen deportation actions since the activation of this 
program. Moreover, 1,602 localities (50.6%) do have deportation outcomes, but it is very 
low, with less than 1 noncitizen deportation per month.
42
 Of the total 3,169 counties, 541 
localities (17.1%) have at least 1 noncitizen deportation performance per month, which 
means that about 80% of localities have no or very low noncitizen enforcement actions 
per month since the activation of S-Comm. Analysis of monthly IDENT-IAFIS 
Interoperability data indicates that 46 counties (1.5%) had no fingerprint submissions 
between federal (ICE) and local law enforcement agencies, no IDENT matches, and no 
(zero) deportation outcomes during activation of S-Comm. An additional 285 counties 
(9%) did submit fingerprints to ICE from localities, but had no fingerprint (IDENT) 
matches and no (zero) deportation performance. Therefore, under the current enforcement 
                                                 
42
 Using enforcement data from a 55 month-period (Oct. 2008 - May. 2013) under S-Comm, Chand and 
Schreckhise (2014) also found that there have been huge local deportation variations on enforcement 
results.  
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structure and local responses, these 541 localities, not all localities, have led noncitizen 
enforcement actions.        
 
Table 4.2. County-level Noncitizen Enforcement Outcomes under Secure Communities  
 
Variables 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
All counties (n=3,169) activating Secure Communities (S-
Comm) Program  
  
Monthly fingerprints submissions (#) 
Monthly IDENT matches (#) 
Monthly deportation (removals, #) 
Noncitizen removal rate (%) (=Monthly removal / foreign-born 
population*1000) 
% of removals of noncitizens with “Level 1” charges 
(cumulative) 
% of removals of noncitizens with “Level 2” charges 
(cumulative) 
% of removals of noncitizens with “Level 3” charges 
(cumulative) 
% of removals of noncitizens with “Noncriminal” charges 
(cumulative) 
% of removals of noncitizens with “Level 3 + Noncriminal” 
charges (cumulative) 
291.33 
13.77 
2.21 
.28 
 
.19 
 
.16 
 
.19 
 
.13 
 
.33 
1,133.57 
106.86 
17.89 
.98 
 
.26 
 
.23 
 
.25 
 
.22 
 
.34 
Counties (n=541) with at least 1 noncitizen removal per month 
under S-Comm 
  
Monthly fingerprints submissions (#) 
Monthly IDENT matches (#) 
Monthly deportation (removals, #) 
Noncitizen removal rate (%) (=Monthly removal / foreign-born 
population*1000) 
% of removals of noncitizens with “Level 1” charges 
(cumulative) 
% of removals of noncitizens with “Level 2” charges 
(cumulative) 
% of removals of noncitizens with “Level 3” charges 
(cumulative) 
% of removals of noncitizens with “Noncriminal” charges 
1,267.79 
73.81 
12.23 
.50 
 
.27 
 
.22 
 
.30 
 
.21 
2,505.62 
250.19 
41.90 
1.68 
 
.12 
 
.09 
 
.10 
 
.14 
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(cumulative) 
% of removals of noncitizens with “Level 3 + Noncriminal” 
charges (cumulative) 
 
.51 
 
.14 
Note: These enforcement data include noncitizen enforcement performance during 61 months (October 
2008 - November 2013) under S-Comm. I used “noncitizen removal rate,” which refers to removal 
outcomes adjusted for counties’ per thousand estimated foreign-born population (including those who are 
naturalized and non-naturalized), as Pedroza (2013) did in his study. For all 3,169 counties, the sum of 
deportation rates based on three levels of criminality (including noncriminal convictions) does not reach 1 
because 1,026 counties provided zero deportation outcomes in their jurisdictions over a period of 61 
months.    
  
4.4.1. County-Level Noncitizen Deportations Considering Two Factors: Activation 
Orders and Geographical Considerations 
  
 
Figure 4.1. Counties Activating S-Comm Based on the Staggered Rollout Scheme 
(“Early” vs. “Late” Adopters) 
Note: This figure was created using ArcMap 10.1. Circles indicate counties with meaningful noncitizen 
enforcement performance (at least 1 noncitizen deportation performance) per month since the activation of 
S-Comm. Red circles indicate localities that were “early” adopters of S-Comm (activated before October 
2010), and green circles indicate counties that were “late” adopters of S-Comm (activated after October 
2010). 
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As hypothesized in the last subchapter, two contextual factors on the 
implementation of S-Comm - timing of activation orders of S-Comm and geographical 
context - were used for analyzing how they influence noncitizen deportation results. 
Figure 4.1 graphically shows how S-Comm has been rolled out across the country with 
what political or policy intentions. First, many of the 541 localities having meaningful 
monthly noncitizen enforcement outcomes (at least 1 noncitizen deportation) tend to be 
concentrated on the border area, including the northern (U.S.- Canada border), 
southwestern (U.S. - Mexico border), and southeastern area. In addition, a few midwest- 
and relatively many northeastern localities - especially counties within Michigan, New 
York, New Jersey, Maryland, and Massachusetts - also have meaningful enforcement 
actions under S-Comm. Interestingly, however, of these 541 localities, most early 
adopters of S-Comm are likely to be located in the southwest and southern border 
regions, while some of them are in northwestern areas. This indicates that federal 
immigration bureaucrats and policymakers under the current deportation regime have 
targeted these localities for enforcement actions. These localities have some common 
characteristics on immigration: many are border counties along what has traditionally 
been the main route for migrants from Latin America, especially Mexicans, to enter and 
temporarily or permanently reside in the United States. Moreover, many of these counties 
are localities that have traditionally had an immigrant-receiving policy and culture - such 
as counties (mostly metropolitan) in New York, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Oregon, and 
California. According to Jung (2015a) on analyzing the S-Comm implementation 
outcomes during a recent 25 months (May 2011 - May 2013), counties with early 
 100 
activation of S-Comm have larger total populations and also larger Hispanic populations 
than those with late activation of S-Comm during a recent 3 years (2011-2013):  
498,715.97 total population and 130,835.64 Hispanic population for early adopters of S-
Comm, but 283,917.03 total population and 36,587.14 Hispanic population for late 
adopters. This staggered rollout strategy and geographic patterns indirectly indicate that 
the target population for noncitizen enforcement policy under S-Comm has been Latin 
Americans, especially Mexican noncitizens, and local communities where these racial 
and ethnic groups mainly reside have also become the key target enforcement localities.
  
1
0
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Table 4.3. Comparison of Noncitizen Enforcement Results in Terms of Two Key Factors: Activation Orders and Geographical 
Context (n= 541 localities) 
 
 
Counties Activation Orders  of S-Comm 
“Early adopter” 
(282 counties) 
“Late adopter”  
(259 counties) 
 
 
t Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
 
Monthly fingerprints submissions (#) 
Monthly IDENT matches (#) 
Monthly deportation (removals, #) 
Noncitizen removal rate (%) (=Monthly removal / foreign-born population*1000) 
% of removals of noncitizens with “Level 1” charges (cumulative) 
% of removals of noncitizens with “Noncriminal” charges (cumulative) 
% of removals of noncitizens with “Level 3 + Noncriminal” 
charges (cumulative) 
 
1,548.20 
97.29 
19.98 
.4892 
.2811 
.2189 
.5138 
 
2,680.85 
257.77 
56.68 
1.5707 
.1003 
.1179 
.1209 
 
962.48 
48.24 
3.80 
.5092 
.2579 
.2095 
.5093 
 
2,265.65 
239.55 
6.17 
1.7859 
.1409 
.1527 
.1660 
 
-2.73** 
-2.29* 
-4.57** 
.14 
-2.23* 
-.80 
-.37 
 
 
Geographical Context  
(Whether localities are located in southwest border areas) 
“Border localities” 
(136 counties)  
“Non-border 
localities”  
(405 counties) 
 
 
t 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
 
Monthly fingerprints submissions (#) 
Monthly IDENT matches (#) 
Monthly deportation (removals, #) 
Noncitizen removal rate (%) (=Monthly removal / foreign-born population*1000) 
% of removals of noncitizens with “Level 1” charges (cumulative) 
% of removals of noncitizens with “Noncriminal” charges (cumulative) 
% of removals of noncitizens with “Level 3 + Noncriminal” 
charges (cumulative) 
 
1,567.64 
125.55 
31.09 
.9486 
.3000 
.1830 
.4933 
 
3,567.59 
340.92 
79.22 
3.1689 
.1029 
.0996 
.1152 
 
1,167.10 
56.43 
5.90 
.3484 
.2599 
.2250 
.5179 
 
2,204.37 
208.86 
9.48 
.5534 
.1261 
.1443 
.1523 
 
-1.62 
-2.81** 
-6.28** 
-3.66** 
-3.35** 
3.15** 
1.73 
  
1
0
2 
 
Note: Regarding locality activation orders of S-Comm, the cutoff point for differentiating early and late adaptors was set as October 2010, which marked 
the first 24 months (November 2008 - October 2010) of S-Comm’s rollout activation. Concerning geographical context (southwest border localities), 
border localities include localities in the states of Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas, which neighbor the U.S.- Mexico border region. A total of 
541 localities, each having at least 1 noncitizen removal (deportation) enforcement per month, were selected for analysis. 
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Based on graphical analysis on the influence of two contextual factors (activation 
orders and geographical considerations) under the S-Comm framework, Table 4.3 
compares the means of counties’ enforcement outcomes and actions in terms of these 
variables using t tests. As I hypothesize, localities that were early adopters of S-Comm 
are likely to have stronger and high monthly enforcement results - more fingerprint 
submissions, IDENT matches, and deportation numbers - than localities that were late 
adopters. Independent t-test results on many, but not all, enforcement outcomes were 
significant for differences between the two groups. In terms of geographical 
characteristics, strong differences between southwest border localities and non-southwest 
border localities on S-Comm implementation and related enforcement outcomes were 
also found. Regarding the level of criminality, I could not find any clear group 
differences. Only Level 1 noncitizen deportations showed statistically significant 
differences considering both factors. About or less than one in three noncitizens of all 
four subgroups were removed with Level 1 convictions under this program. However, 
regardless of such subgroup classification, all groups have a high level of deportations of 
noncitizens with noncriminal and Level 3 convictions, approaching 50% for localities in 
southwest border regions and exceeding that threshold elsewhere. This is an identical 
result to the enforcement outcomes of the total 541 localities in Table 4.2. 
 
4.4.2. Inter-locality Variations in Terms of S-Comm’s Program Goal   
This section analyzes interlocality variations on noncitizen enforcement results 
during the implementation of S-Comm, specifically focusing on which localities have 
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followed the program goal by having high Level 1 noncitizen deportation rates, and 
which localities have not followed the same goal by having high noncriminal or Level 3 
deportation rates. After that, each locality group’s geographical trend and related policy 
implications are also discussed. 
Table 4.4 lists the top 20 counties having higher removal (deportation) numbers 
since the activation of S-Comm, focusing on monthly removal activity and the levels of 
criminality. Interestingly, 16 out of 20 localities (80%) with the highest deportation 
outcomes under the S-Comm framework are located in the southwest border areas as in 
Figure 4.1. Of the other four localities, two are in the south (Gwinnett County, GA, and 
Miami-Dade County, FL), one in the northeast (New York City), and one in the west 
(Clark County, NV). Such localities tend to be early adopters of S-Comm (and have a 
longer activation period) except New York City (19 months activation). Their monthly 
fingerprint submissions from LEAs were very dynamic from a minimum of 786 (Imperial 
County, CA) to a maximum of 31,619 (New York City), and IDENT matches ranged 
from about 5.3% (Walker County, TX) to 20% (El Paso County, TX). One interesting 
locality here is New York City. Of these 20 top localities having strong enforcement 
actions under S-Comm, New York City had the shortest activation period (19 months), 
which is 2 or 3 times shorter than other counties. However, in spite of such a short 
activation, New York City had strong local immigration enforcement actions with the 
highest numbers of fingerprint submissions and IDENT matches. In terms of levels of 
criminality, about 70% of the localities (14 out of 20) have higher (more than 50%) 
deportation outcomes of noncitizens with noncriminal and Level 3 convictions, a result 
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that does not match the stated goal of S-Comm. Imperial County, CA, (51%) and Walker 
County, TX, (59.4%) had the highest Level 1-based deportations as in the program goal. 
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Table 4.4. Top 20 Localities on Secure Communities Enforcement (Deportation) Results 
Source: Author’s analysis of monthly IDENT-IAFIS Interoperability Statistics of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE). 
State County 
(3,169) 
Activation 
date 
Activatio
n periods 
(months) 
Monthly 
fingerprint 
submissions 
Monthly 
LESC 
matches 
Monthly 
removal 
Cumulative noncitizen removals 
(deportations) in terms of 
criminality (L1-L3 & noncriminal 
convictions) 
% L1 % L2 % L3 % non-
crimina
ls 
% L3 + 
non-
criminals 
CA Los Angeles 08/27/2009 51 29,745.45 3,031.61 635.39 38.8 18.5 21.9 20.8 42.7 
AZ Maricopa 01/16/2009 59 21,303.49 1,756.12 397.76 34.9 14.6 31.4 19.1 50.5 
TX Harris 10/27/2008 61 11,446.93 1,052.61 353.36 30.6 22.6 38.1 8.6 46.7 
CA San Diego 05/26/2009 54 10.520.22 974.98 285.02 31.6 12.2 33.0 23.2 56.2 
CA Orange 03/16/2010 45 8,641.87 1,218.73 242.40 42.4 25.2 19.5 12.9 32.4 
TX El Paso 06/17/2009 54 1,748.35 358.20 169.69 20.3 16.7 52.5 10.4 63.0 
TX Dallas 11/12/2008 61 6,047.13 477.13 144.85 28.5 17.6 34.2 19.8 53.9 
TX Hidalgo 06/10/2009 54 1,619.31 263.31 108.39 32.4 25.9 26.9 14.8 41.7 
CA San Bernardino  04/13/2010 44 7,938.73 455.34 102.84 32.6 15.4 23.7 28.2 51.9 
CA Riverside 05/11/2010 43 5,396.81 360.12 88.09 28.5 15.0 22.4 34.2 56.6 
CA Imperial 09/09/2009 51 786.24 182.90 87.00 51.0 22.2 18.6 8.2 26.8 
TX Travis 06/16/2009 54 3,163.31 222.59 82.11 29.6 22.2 34.9 13.3 48.2 
CA Kern 09/14/2010 39 5,914.08 389.77 81.05 29.3 19.6 34.9 16.2 51.1 
FL Miami-Dade 02/24/2009 58 8,490.12 1,488.95 75.98 27.2 10.9 16.8 45.0 61.8 
TX Walker 05/18/2009 55 6,008.00 328.60 74.15 59.4 26.2 13.8 0.6 14.4 
NV Clark 07/27/2010 40 6,069.18 429.03 72.10 29.0 12.8 21.8 36.4 58.2 
NY New York City 05/15/2012 19 31,618.68 3,702.05 71.21 25.0 14.8 21.3 39.0 60.2 
GA Gwinnett  11/17/2009 49 2,434.94 290.94 67.16 21.9 19.0 35.5 23.6 59.1 
CA Ventura 07/22/2009 53 2,578.09 232.85 63.06 25.4 15.7 32.0 26.9 58.9 
AZ Pima 11/17/2009 49 3,017.94 173.88 56.98 27.0 14.7 44.4 13.9 58.3 
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Note 1. “Monthly” enforcement data was calculated by dividing each county’s cumulative enforcement data during S-Comm implementation into 
activation periods. Localities used for analysis are all 3,169 counties that have activated S-Comm. This data includes enforcement information through 
November 2013.  
Note 2. S-Comm activation periods vary by county, and can be at the beginning, middle, or end of a certain month. To clarify the calculation of S-Comm 
activation period, I set the following rule: If a county activated S-Comm at the end of a certain month (with less than 5 days in that month or after the 25th 
of that month), that month is not included as an activation period. For example, Perry County, MO, which activated S-Comm on January 25, 2011, has a 
34-month activation period for S-Comm, excluding the first few days in January 2011.  
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Table 4.5. Top 20 Localities Having Highest “Level 1” Deportation Performance under Secure Communities Program  
State County 
(541) 
Activation 
date 
Activatio
n periods 
(months) 
Monthly 
fingerprint 
submissions 
Monthly 
LESC 
matches 
Monthly 
removal 
Cumulative noncitizen removals 
(deportations) in terms of 
criminality (L1-L3 & noncriminal 
convictions) 
% L1 % L2 % L3 % non-
crimin
als 
% L3 + 
non-
criminals 
CO Fremont 05/22/2012 19 255.95 11.79 1.26 95.8 4.2 0 0 0 
TX Live Oak 06/15/2010 42 53.29 8.05 1.14 81.3 16.7 0 2.1 2.1 
NY Essex 06/01/2011 30 159.70 9.23 1.40 81.0 11.9 2.4 4.8 7.1 
CA Lassen 02/22/2011 34 192.41 12.74 1.15 79.5 7.7 7.7 5.1 12.8 
LA Grant Parish 05/01/2012 19 128.11 14.26 1.16 77.3 18.2 0 4.5 4.5 
PA Centre 05/30/2012 18 235.89 44.61 3.89 77.1 18.6 4.3 0 4.3 
WA Mason 04/03/2012 20 711.10 27.95 4.15 75.9 7.2 15.7 2.4 18.1 
IN Hendricks 06/01/2011 30 1,453.90 23.83 4.10 66.7 14.6 13.8 4.9 18.7 
OH Mahoning  07/12/2011 29 528.03 26.28 3.48 65.3 20.8 11.9 2.0 13.9 
PA Dauphin 05/30/2012 18 1,041.33 24.89 2.83 64.7 9.8 11.8 13.7 25.5 
CA Shasta 07/27/2010 40 908.25 10.78 2.50 60.0 10.0 17.0 13.0 30.0 
TX Walker 05/18/2009 55 6,008.00 328.60 74.15 59.4 26.2 13.8 0.6 14.4 
OR Clackamas 04/06/2010 44 1,419.11 53.61 8.05 57.3 12.4 13.6 16.7 30.2 
NE Lancaster 08/17/2010 40 576.38 21.35 2.40 57.3 16.7 20.8 5.2 26.0 
GA Charlton 12/06/2011 24 117.63 52.71 5.46 57.3 23.7 19.1 0 19.1 
OR Yamhill 09/27/2011 26 317.62 13.85 1.77 56.5 15.2 21.7 6.5 28.3 
IA Sioux 01/24/2012 23 33.57 3.43 1.04 54.2 20.8 8.3 16.7 25.0 
UT Washington  06/08/2010 42 333.21 10.81 3.62 51.3 22.4 19.7 6.6 26.3 
CA Imperial 09/09/2009 51 786.24 182.90 87.00 51.0 22.2 18.6 8.2 26.8 
TX Wise 08/03/2010 40 123.63 4.30 1.00 50.0 20.0 27.5 2.5 30.0 
Source: Author’s analysis of monthly IDENT-IAFIS Interoperability Statistics of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 
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Note. Localities in this table are limited to those having at least 1 noncitizen deportation per month. A total of 541 localities were selected for analysis. 
This data includes enforcement information through November 2013, recently released by ICE.  
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Table 4.6. Top 20 Localities Having Highest “Non-criminal” Deportation Performance under Secure Communities Program  
State County 
(541) 
Activation 
date 
Activatio
n periods 
(months) 
Monthly 
fingerprint 
submissions 
Monthly 
LESC 
matches 
Monthly 
removal 
Cumulative noncitizen removals 
(deportations) in terms of 
criminality (L1-L3 & noncriminal 
convictions) 
% L1 % L2 % L3 % 
non-
crimin
als 
% L3 + 
non-
crimina
ls 
NY Ontario 04/19/2011 32 326.06 8.19 1.34 14.0 9.3 9.3 67.4 76.7 
MA Middlesex 05/15/2012 19 1,818.32 151.16 9.21 12.0 5.7 15.4 66.9 82.3 
LA Jefferson Parish 11/17/2009 49 3,054.22 108.39 19.55 9.4 8.2 18.5 63.9 82.4 
MA Worcester 05/15/2012 19 1,247.79 70.79 3.00 15.8 3.5 17.5 63.2 80.7 
AL Tuscaloosa 04/26/2011 31 856.68 10.77 2.39 6.8 8.1 25.7 59.5 85.1 
NJ Cumberland 02/21/2012 22 533.64 19.82 3.32 12.3 8.2 20.5 58.9 79.5 
MO St. Louis 09/21/2010 39 3,574.08 56.10 7.21 9.3 11.4 21.4 58.0 79.4 
LA Orleans Parish 05/11/2010 43 1,466.58 26.84 6.19 10.2 10.2 22.2 57.5 79.7 
MA Bristol  05/15/2012 19 1,328.32 41.68 1.79 29.4 8.8 5.9 55.9 61.8 
MS Hinds 07/26/2011 28 690.29 5.96 1.86 9.6 11.5 23.1 55.8 78.9 
NJ Essex 02/21/2012 22 2,152.68 91.68 3.86 23.5 9.4 11.8 55.3 67.1 
NJ Camden 02/21/2012 22 1,220.59 18.77 1.73 10.5 7.9 26.3 55.3 81.6 
MS Scott 07/26/2011 28 74.96 3.46 1.04 6.9 13.8 24.1 55.2 79.3 
PA Philadelphia 07/21/2009 53 4,561.51 98.66 10.75 24.0 7.0 14.6 54.4 69.0 
MO St. Charles  02/18/2011 34 1,045.35 16.35 1.97 14.9 9.0 23.9 52.2 76.1 
MA Essex 05/15/2012 19 1,592.05 115.79 7.37 25.0 8.6 15.0 51.4 66.4 
MD Prince George’s 12/22/2009 48 2,030.65 121.83 16.08 22.4 9.5 16.8 51.3 68.1 
NJ Union  02/21/2012 22 801.27 65.91 3.05 20.9 11.9 16.4 50.7 67.2 
MD Frederick 04/06/2010 44 312.52 11.39 2.34 20.3 7.8 21.4 50.5 71.8 
MA Norfolk 05/15/2012 19 989.74 57.95 2.95 26.8 5.4 17.9 50.0 67.9 
Source: Author’s analysis of monthly IDENT-IAFIS Interoperability Statistics of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 
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(a) Geographical distribution of top 20 counties having highest monthly removal 
outcomes under S-Comm (61 months: Oct. 2008 - Nov. 2013) 
 
 
(b) Geographical distribution of top 20 counties having highest “Level 1” noncitizen 
removal outcomes under S-Comm (61 months: Oct. 2008 - Nov. 2013) 
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(c)  Geographical distribution of top 20 counties having highest “noncriminal” 
noncitizen removal outcomes under S-Comm (61 months: Oct. 2008 - Nov. 2013) 
Figure 4.2. Geographical Distribution of Counties on Noncitizen Deportation under S-
Comm   
 
Table 4.5 lists the top 20 localities following the program goal of S-Comm, with a 
higher Level 1 noncitizen deportation rate. As in (b) of Figure 4.2, geographically, 
counties are diversely distributed across the country, and few clear patterns or trends 
among these localities are found. Six out of 20 counties (30%) are border localities. Eight 
out of 20 localities (40%) are early adopters of S-Comm, and only two counties - Walker 
County, TX, and Imperial County, CA - tend to have a high level of monthly deportations 
since the activation of S-Comm. Compared to the top 20 localities in Table 4.4, these 
counties have relatively low numbers of monthly fingerprint submissions from LEAs, 
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low monthly IDENT matching rates (ranging from 1.6% to 23.3%), and low monthly 
deportation numbers (fewer than 10 noncitizens per county, except two outliers).  
Table 4.6 and Figure 4.2 (c) list the top 20 localities having higher noncriminal 
noncitizen deportation outcomes since the activation of S-Comm, which has been the 
center of debate on this program. Interestingly, many localities, 14 out of 20 (70%) are 
located in the northeastern region, including New York, Massachusetts, Maryland, and 
Pennsylvania. No southwest border localities fit in this group, but a few southern counties 
in Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi did. Considering the past serious conflict and 
opt-out debates between localities (including states of New York, Massachusetts, the city 
of Arlington, Virginia, and Cook County, Illinois) and ICE on S-Comm implementation 
and the related enforcement result, such local distribution is very suggestive of current 
intergovernmental conflicts on noncitizen enforcement policy implementation. Five out 
of 20 localities (25%) are early adopters of S-Comm, and three localities - Jefferson 
Parish, LA; Philadelphia County, PA; and Prince George’s County, MD - had relatively 
higher monthly deportation numbers (> 10 noncitizens) than others. More fingerprints in 
these counties are submitted on a monthly basis than in counties in Table 4.5, but IDENT 
matching rates are still low, ranging from 1.6% to 8.3%. All 20 counties have more than 
50% of noncitizen deportation rates with noncriminal convictions. Expanding deportation 
rate into a combination of Level 3 and noncriminal violations, more than two thirds of 
noncitizens in these counties were removed with minor charges and immigration 
violations, which are not matched with ICE’s enforcement priorities for enforcement 
actions. 
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4.4.3. Intra-locality Variations in Terms of S-Comm’s Program Goal     
In addition to interlocality variations on immigration enforcement policy under S-
Comm, enforcement actions in a certain county might change over time, due to internal 
or external stimulus or interventions. Figures 4.3 - 4.5 address intra-locality variation of 
noncitizen enforcement changes over time under the S-Comm framework. In Figure 4.3, 
most localities with the highest deportation outcomes since the activation of S-Comm 
consistently indicate that each level of deportation in each locality (Levels 1 to 3 and 
noncriminal convictions) has dynamically shifted, repeating ups and downs over time. 
Enforcement of some localities - such as Harris and El Paso counties in Texas - appears 
to be stable compared to that of other localities, but also can have minor fluctuations on 
enforcement rates over time. Although it cannot be generalized, deportations based on 
Level 1 convictions were relatively low but have increased over time, while deportations 
based on Level 3 and noncriminal convictions have reverse trajectories - a very high 
deportation rate at the initial status, but declining over time. 
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 indicate respectively how enforcement rates on level of 
criminality have changed over time. In Figure 4.4, only noncitizen deportation rates for 
Level 1 convictions tend to change dynamically, while other deportation rates for Level 3 
and noncriminal convictions appear to be relatively stable. Vice versa, in Figure 4.5, 
deportation rates for noncitizens with Level 3 and noncriminal convictions are more 
likely to dynamically fluctuate over time than those for noncitizens with Level 1 charges. 
Figure 4.6 indicates some interesting counties having accelerated enforcement actions 
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over time in spite of few enforcement outcomes in the initial stage. As seen in some 
localities - such as Garza County, Reeves County, and Howard County in Texas - few 
enforcement outcomes were made at the initial level, but as time went on, enforcement 
actions, including monthly fingerprint submissions and numbers of deportations, rapidly 
increased. This figure nicely shows such dynamic changes over time, but future research 
needs to analyze what factors in certain localities caused such rapid and interesting 
fluctuation in such a longitudinal data structure. 
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Figure 4.3. Intra-locality Noncitizen Enforcement Outcome Change over Time under Secure Communities Program: Strong 
Enforcement Counties (Activation period: beginning of activation per locality through November 2013) 
   
 Activation period: 51 months                                               Activation period: 59 months                                                Activation period: 61 months 
 Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 29,745.45     Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 21,303.49     Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 11,446.93 
 Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 3,031.61                Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 1,756.12                 Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 1,052.61 
 Monthly average # of removal: 635.39                                Monthly average # of removal: 397.76                                 Monthly average # of removal: 353.36 
 
   
 Activation period: 54 months                                               Activation period: 45 months                                                  Activation period: 54 months 
 Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 10,520.22     Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 8,641.87         Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 1,748.35 
 Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 974.98                   Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 1,218.73                   Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 358.20 
 Monthly average # of removal: 285.02                                Monthly average # of removal: 242.4                                     Monthly average # of removal: 169.69 
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Note. I decomposed ICE’s IDENT-IAFIS Interoperability Statistics from the original cumulative data format into a monthly format, and then calculated 
removal (deportation) rate of noncitizens by county under S-Comm in terms of removals of noncitizens with Level 1 (blue line), noncriminal (red line), 
and Level 3 + noncriminal (green line) convictions. The y-axis refers to deportation rate (%), and the x-axis refers to time (month) (Apr. 2010 - Nov. 
2013). 
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Figure 4.4. Intra-locality Noncitizen Enforcement Outcome Change over Time under Secure Communities Program: Counties 
Having Highest “Level 1” Deportation Rates 
   
   Activation period: 19 months                                               Activation period: 42 months                                              Activation period: 30 months 
   Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 255.95          Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 53.29           Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 159.70 
   Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 11.79                     Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 8.05                       Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 9.23  
   Monthly average # of removal: 1.26                                    Monthly average # of removal: 1.14                                    Monthly average # of removal: 1.40 
 
   
   Activation period: 34 months                                                Activation period: 19 months                                               Activation period: 18 months  
   Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 192.41           Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 128.11          Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 235.89  
   Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 12.74                      Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 14.26                      Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 44.61   
   Monthly average # of removal: 1.15                                     Monthly average # of removal: 1.16                                     Monthly average # of removal: 3.89 
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Figure 4.5. Intra-locality Noncitizen Enforcement Outcome Change over Time under Secure Communities Program: Counties 
Having Highest “Non-criminal” Deportation Rates 
   
   Activation period: 32 months                                              Activation period: 19 months                                               Activation period: 49 months 
   Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 326.06         Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 1,818.32       Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 3,054.22 
   Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 8.19                      Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 151.16                    Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 108.39     
   Monthly average # of removal: 1.34                                   Monthly average # of removal: 9.21                                     Monthly average # of removal: 19.55 
 
   
   Activation period: 19 months                                              Activation period: 31 months                                             Activation period: 22 months 
   Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 1,247.79      Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 856.68        Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 533.64 
   Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 70.79                    Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 10.77                    Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 19.82  
   Monthly average # of removal: 3.00                                   Monthly average # of removal: 2.39                                   Monthly average # of removal: 3.32 
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Figure 4.6. Intra-locality Noncitizen Enforcement Outcome Change over Time under Secure Communities Program: Counties 
with Low (few) Enforcement at the Initial Stage but Rapidly Increasing Enforcement over Time 
 
    
  Activation period: 24 months                                            Activation period: 11 months                                                Activation period: 39 months 
  Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 125.46       Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 14,563.45     Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 65.74 
  Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 47.17                  Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 1,012.45                 Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 47.41  
  Monthly average # of removal: 5.38                                 Monthly average # of removal: 15.55                                   Monthly average # of removal: 16.05 
 
    
  Activation period: 40 months                                              Activation period: 41 months                                             Activation period: 41 months 
  Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 221.85         Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 83.63         Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 174.49 
  Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 89.08                    Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 8.27                    Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 130.68  
  Monthly average # of removal: 27.25                                 Monthly average # of removal: 4.27                                 Monthly average # of removal: 47.83 
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Note 1. Each graph consists of two lines tracking changes in noncitizen enforcement performance in a certain locality over time: the primary (left) axis is 
the total number of fingerprint (biometric data) submissions per month (blue line), while the secondary (right) axis is the total number of deportations per 
month (red line). Graphs are based on raw scores from ICE’s IDENT-IAFIS Interoperability Statistics.    
Note 2. X-axis in this table is based on monthly data, but ICE has sometimes, and with no explanation, not released data for certain months. Because this 
enforcement data is not an equally-spaced format, I calculated average monthly enforcement performance of these missing months and the following 
months; for example, the average monthly enforcement outcome for 3 months (from December 2010 to February 2011) or for 2 months (from October 
2011 to November 2011).    
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4.5. Discussion 
In this chapter, I empirically investigate how S-Comm has been implemented and 
whether this program has faithfully followed the stated goal of removing dangerous 
criminal noncitizens at the community level. Moreover, based on longitudinal policy 
implementation perspectives, this chapter also analyzes how localities’ enforcement 
outcomes under S-Comm have been changed in terms of intra- and interlocality 
variations. Through analyses of ICE’s S-Comm enforcement data, I confirmed the first 
part of Hypothesis 4 on the implementation of this program. During 61 months (Oct. 
2008 - Nov. 2013), S-Comm has produced biased enforcement outcomes unlike their rosy 
promise, with more than half of noncitizens removed being those who commit 
misdemeanors and noncriminal convictions. Most noncriminal removals were related to 
immigration violations, and those with noncriminal convictions and misdemeanor 
charges fall into the trap of deportation under the language of “criminal” and “dangerous” 
noncitizens. Through descriptive statistics at the state and county level, I found that 
DHS/ICE has concentrated their enforcement energies under the implementation of S-
Comm on some target areas, such as southwest border states and localities and southern 
localities, which brought about strikingly high enforcement actions in these areas - 
including fingerprint submissions, IDENT matches, and deportation numbers.  
Hypothesis 2 on the two contextual factors on the implementation of S-Comm - 
timing of activation orders and geographical considerations - is also verified, meaning 
that these factors play a role in creating local variations on immigration enforcement 
outcomes. Based on a staggered rollout scheme, ICE targeted some counties that 
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neighbor the U.S.- Mexico border and those that are traditionally immigrant-receiving 
localities, specifically localities with significant populations of Hispanic residents, for 
enforcement actions. Of 541 localities, 282 counties (52.1%) with early activation of S-
Comm have higher monthly noncitizen fingerprint submissions and IDENT matches, and 
more than 5 times higher monthly deportation numbers than those with late activation of 
this program. Moreover, of 541 localities, border counties (25.1%) tend to also have 
higher monthly noncitizen fingerprint submissions and IDENT matches, and more than 5 
times higher monthly deportation numbers than those non-border counties. However, 
regardless of such policy contexts, in all counties roughly 50% of noncitizen deportations 
have been for minor charges and immigration violations during 61 months. Interestingly, 
counties having very high rates of noncitizen deportations with noncriminal convictions 
tend to be geographically located in the northeastern region, as in Figure 4.2. In addition 
to interlocality enforcement variation, intralocality enforcement changes over time are 
also found in Figures 4.3 to 4.6. In terms of level of criminality, deportations with Level 
1 convictions were low initially but began to increase over time, while those with Level 3 
and noncriminal convictions had the reverse trend, a very high level at the initial stage, 
but decreasing over time.  
With grandiose visions and goals oriented toward promoting S-Comm as a 
“smart,” “modernized,” and “comprehensive” administrative tool for effectively 
identifying and removing dangerous noncitizens from the local communities (Menjívar & 
Kanstroom, 2014, p. 19), federal immigration bureaucrats and policymakers advertised 
that this program will improve public safety by effectively removing dangerous 
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noncitizens through a “technological interface between local jurisdictions and the federal 
government” (Pedroza, 2013, p. 45). However, during the last 5 years of implementation 
of this program, the public can witness that it has been full of conflicts, debates, and 
confusion in terms of what S-Comm orients toward, how this program works for carrying 
out the program goal, how intergovernmental cooperation for immigration enforcement 
policy has been made under the S-Comm framework, and whether this program has really 
made our communities safer. During the implementation of S-Comm, serious 
intergovernmental conflicts were found and expanded over time. ICE/DHS has tried to 
legitimate its huge enforcement (deportation) results on “noncriminal” noncitizen 
convictions, with the logic that this category of noncitizen is one of the key priorities for 
current noncitizen enforcement policy based on ICE’s 2011 policy memo. However, S-
Comm was launched in 2008 before this policy memo was made and institutionalized, 
and even if the target population for enforcement actions has been changed or expanded, 
such a policy shift or directional change should be carefully reviewed and needs 
widespread public agreement. Unfortunately, ICE’s current noncitizen enforcement 
priority decision process and related strategies lack such public consent, and therefore 
they have become open to serious public debates and concerns.  
In spite of critical analyses of the implementation of S-Comm, these analyses 
have limitations. Due to data limitations, I have no choice but to use only limited lists of 
data on S-Comm, including deportation numbers in terms of level of criminality and 
some contextual factors. In spite of repeated data requests from researchers and migrant 
rights groups, DHS/ICE has still been very resistant to releasing information on the 
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concrete working mechanisms and consequent enforcement outcomes of S-Comm. The 
public can find S-Comm deportation numbers, but there is no  way for them to 
understand any specific information about the noncitizens deported, including exact 
noncitizen groups, age levels, and administrative and legal violations or charges for 
which noncitizens have been caught, detained, and finally removed under the current 
enforcement and deportation machines. Federal immigration agencies should release 
enforcement data and related outcomes without concealment, and based on these data, 
more in-depth research should be done in the future to understand how S-Comm has 
really been implemented and what policy outcomes have been made. In the next chapter, 
I will dig deeper into administrative processes on the implementation of S-Comm, 
specifically focusing on the connection between two intergovernmental interaction points 
- issuing immigration detainers and noncitizen deportation - and how these processes are 
related to local immigration enforcement policy participation.        
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CHAPTER 5
43
 
LOCAL CLASSIFICATIONS IN TEMRS OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
POLICY PARTICIPATION AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL ENFORCEMENT 
INTERACTIONS UNDER THE SECURE COMMUNITIES PROGRAM 
 
5.1. Introduction 
Through an analysis of how two key intergovernmental interactions under the 
implementation of S-Comm are interrelated, this chapter digs deep into the administrative 
working mechanism the current enforcement or deportation machines use for expanding 
the scope of noncitizen deportations. These two administrative actions on the 
intergovernmental cooperative enforcement structure are immigration (ICE) detainer 
issuances and noncitizen deportations. Moreover, with the increasing various local policy 
voices and perspectives on immigration - what Lewis and his colleagues consider a 
multilayered jurisdictional patchwork trend - local communities tend to have responded 
in one of three ways to such an enforcement machine and related system: active federal 
immigration enforcement policy participation as a partner or coworker; inactive (or 
passive) participation in a mandatory enforcement program or active resistance to 
involvement; or a noninterventionist perspective, following the argument that 
                                                 
43
 An early version of this chapter was prepared in 2015 with the title How Current U.S. Immigration 
Enforcement Machine Has Been Carried Out Under Immigration Patchwork Trend: Analysis on the 
Relationship Between Issuing Immigration Detainers and Deportation Numbers Using Longitudinal 
Growth Curve Modeling. It was presented at the 2015 Western Social Science Association Conference 
(WSSA), which was held in Portland, OR, on April 8-11, 2015. This chapter is revised with comments and 
feedback from this conference. I appreciate the audience at the WSSA conference session for their 
comments. I also appreciate Professors N. Joseph Cayer and Paul G. Lewis for their review and comments 
on the previous manuscript, and Professor Natalie Wilkens for her methodological comments and graduate 
classes on longitudinal modeling. I also appreciate TRAC and its co-director Susan B. Long for generously 
providing FOIA data on immigration detainer issuances from federal immigration agencies.     
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immigration policy is a responsibility of the federal government. With these complicated 
intergovernmental relations on immigration policy under enforcement hysteria in mind, 
this chapter finally investigates how three contextual factors on the current immigration 
enforcement policy - different levels (extents) of local immigration enforcement policy 
participation, and two intergovernmental interaction points under S-Comm - are 
interrelated. Additionally, I also analyze whether there are any patterns or characteristics 
counties have followed on the implementation of immigration enforcement policy over 
time. Figure 5.1 schematically indicates a conceptual framework showing the 
interrelationship among three contextual factors of the current U.S. immigration 
enforcement policy. 
To answer these questions, I empirically test two hypotheses mentioned in 
Chapter 3. These are the second hypothesis (relationship between different local 
immigration enforcement policy participation and compliance with immigration detainer 
issuances) and the fourth hypothesis excepting the first part (relationship between 
different local immigration enforcement policy participation and the numbers of local 
noncitizen deportations, and the relationship between immigration detainer issuances and 
noncitizen deportations). Considering the working logic and processes of S-Comm, I 
assume that localities having different immigration perspectives are likely to follow 
different noncitizen enforcement outcomes (or trajectories) in the process of 
implementing S-Comm. Different levels of government have no choice but to interact 
with each other due to such mandatory cooperative enforcement logic, and these two 
enforcement mechanisms should also be linked. As an interim process for noncitizen 
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enforcement actions, I assume that detainer issuance per locality might also influence 
total number of deportations per locality as the final enforcement outcome.  
 
 
Figure 5. 1. Conceptual framework for noncitizen enforcement policy under the Secure 
Communities Program 
 
5.2. Data and Methodology 
Following the logic of Chapter 4, noncitizen deportation data from ICE’s IDENT-
IAFIS interoperability statistics under S-Comm were selected and re-collected for 541 
local communities having meaningful immigration enforcement outcomes. Multiple 
public data sources were used. Most data were publicly available through web searches, 
with the exception of immigration detainer issuances and deportation data from ICE’s 
287(g) partnerships as a voluntary enforcement program. I got detainer issuance data with 
the support of the TRAC at Syracuse University, which successfully got this data through 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests and lawsuits
44
. Regarding detainer issuance 
                                                 
44
 ICE detainer issuance data from TRAC, which was originally produced by ICE for FOIA requests and 
then had some contextual and geographical information added by TRAC, consists of more than 400,000 
detainer-by-detainer records for 23 months (from Oct. 2011 to Aug. 2013, with 2 months missing in Feb. 
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and deportation numbers per locality under S-Comm, 5 monthly data points (Dec. 2011, 
Apr. 2012, Aug. 2012, Dec. 2012, and Jan. 2013) were respectively collected and revised 
for analysis, which cover a 13-month period (Dec. 2011 - Jan. 2013).
45
 Regarding local 
immigration enforcement policy participation, multiple public sources were also used 
through web searches and FOIA requests submitted to ICE
46
. Data on local involvement 
in 287(g) partnerships and activation date of S-Comm are available on the ICE web site. 
There are few official statistics or data archives on local immigration-related ordinances 
or resolutions, so I reviewed previous studies, data archives of research institutes, and 
online newspapers on local immigration activism and legislative actions
47
. Through this 
series of data collection, I combined collected data, and finally created a new dataset for 
analysis. The data sources and measurement of variables are presented below.   
                                                                                                                                                 
and Apr. 2013). It includes information about how many immigration detainers have been issued by ICE to 
local law enforcement agencies or detention facilities on a monthly basis. It also includes additional helpful 
information, including ICE program codes on detainer issuance, criminal convictions (level of criminality) 
of noncitizens who got detainers, their conviction date, and demographic data of noncitizens who got 
detainers at their localities. One problem on monthly detainer issuance data is there are many missing 
information points on detainer issuance, especially criminality of noncitizens who got detainers, so I did not 
use this information for analysis. Moreover, TRAC data was created based on the state level, while the unit 
of analysis for this study is localities (counties). Therefore, I revised the data structure from TRAC to the 
county-level through geocode (zip code) searches of every local law enforcement agency to which ICE 
detainers were issued.    
45
 The reason I selected these 5 time (month) points for analysis was due to data accessibility and matching 
between two different data sources, including monthly immigration detainer issuances (Oct. 2011 - Aug. 
2013, with 2 months missing in a 23-month period) and monthly noncitizen deportations (Apr. 2010 - Nov. 
2013, with 7 months missing in a 44-month period). Both data sources have multiple missing months, and a 
total of 15 month-length data are commonly secured for analysis. Due to time limits for data re-coding and 
-collecting for this study, I finally selected 5 time points of these 15 months of data, covering about 2 years 
from immigration detainer issuance data.           
46
 I made FOIA requests to ICE to get data on ICE’s noncitizen enforcement actions, especially the 287(g) 
partnership program’s annual deportation numbers per participating LEA (esp. FY2010 - FY2012). ICE’s 
FOIA reference numbers for the requests were 2014FY2760 and 2014-ICFO-02026.      
47
 Data regarding local immigration enforcement policy participation were from web site searches of the 
National Immigration Law Center, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE FOIA library), 
Catholic Legal Immigration Network Inc., Immigration Legal Resource Center, Center for Community 
Change, Center for Wisconsin Strategy, Center for Immigration Studies, and Federation for American 
Immigration Reform (FAIR).   
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5.2.1. Dependent Variable: Local Noncitizen Deportation Numbers
48
 under S-Comm 
Local deportation numbers refer to monthly total volume of noncitizens removed 
per jurisdiction through the implementation of S-Comm. In terms of immigration policy 
context, this indicates how a certain locality adopts a strong (or weak) immigration 
control policy toward noncitizens residing in its jurisdiction, specifically noncitizens who 
are legally and socioeconomically negatively constructed. Localities with high volumes 
of noncitizen deportations tend to consider noncitizens in their jurisdictions as the subject 
of control, punishment, and administrative removal. On the other hand, localities with 
weak (low) numbers of noncitizen deportations in their jurisdictions are likely to see 
noncitizens as the subject of integration, coexistence, and “quasi-citizens” (Moloney, 
2012). For analysis, I used the monthly raw number of noncitizen deportations by 
jurisdiction, but  raw noncitizen deportation numbers per locality consisting of 5 time 
(month) points were widely scattered, appearing to have two separate bell-shaped curves 
(SD ranges from a minimum of 35.18 through a maximum of 50.67). Therefore, I used 
log-transformed data for analysis to mitigate such a non-normality
49. ICE’s monthly 
deportation data under S-Comm have been released on their Web site as a cumulative 
format, so I revised them into a monthly deportation data format.    
 
                                                 
48
 To increase the validity of the research, deportation rate adjusting for per 1,000 total population or 
foreign-born population (i.e., per capita deportation rate) can be used. However, for this study, I used 
monthly deportation data under the S-Comm framework, and unfortunately, there are no public data 
regarding monthly total or foreign-born population at the national and local levels. Therefore, I used raw 
monthly deportation numbers that were log-transformed. Previous studies (Chand & Schreckhise, 2014) on 
S-Comm used raw deportation numbers as the DV.  
49
 Raw noncitizen deportation number data include “zero” value (no deportation number for a certain 
month in a county), which does not take the log, so I used a log(x+1) data transformation technique as a 
special case of logarithm transformation. 
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5.2.2. Independent Variable: Local Immigration Enforcement Policy Participation 
Local immigration perspectives and voices have been expressed through passing 
local ordinances or resolutions on immigration or implementing or participating in 
administrative programs influencing noncitizens’ socioeconomic and political lives. 
Previous studies have considered such distinct levels of local involvement of federal 
immigration enforcement policy via 287(g) partnerships (Capps, Rosenblum, Rodriguez, 
& Chishti, 2011; Theodore, 2012) and federal-local cooperation under S-Comm (Cox & 
Miles, 2013; Jung, 2015a; Miles & Cox, 2014; Pedroza, 2013). Moreover, in terms of the 
legal angle, local immigration enforcement participation has been discussed with local 
and state immigration activism and policy diffusion effects across the country - for 
example, in the passage of the Hazleton immigration ordinance in 2006 and Arizona’s 
SB1070 in 2010 - or the consequent multilayered jurisdictional patchwork trend 
(Varsanyi, 2010; Varsanyi, Lewis, Provine, & Decker, 2012a).   
Following the directions of previous studies, I selected four items identifying the 
level (extent) of local immigration enforcement policy participation, which reflect local 
immigration politics and policy contexts. They include (1) participation in 287(g) 
partnerships (0= no, 1= yes), (2) adoption of S-Comm (0= late adopter, 1= early adopter, 
cutoff point = Oct. 2010), (3) local ordinances/resolutions on welcoming (integrative) 
immigrants move (0= no, 1= yes), and (4) local ordinances/resolutions on 
restrictive/punitive immigration policy (0= no, 1= yes). All items have a binary scale 
reflecting how actively (or inactively) localities have been involved in the federal or local 
immigration enforcement policies. Of the four items, the first, second, and fourth are 
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related to the strength of local restrictive (punitive) immigration enforcement policy 
participation, while the third deals with a more integrative and welcoming immigration 
policy. 
 
5.2.3. Intervening or Confounding Variable: Immigration (ICE) Detainer Issuance to 
Localities 
Detainer issuance should be made ahead of ICE’s final removal orders for 
suspected noncitizens under the S-Comm framework. Under the current enforcement 
machine, immigration detainer issuance means that ICE “administratively” sets suspected 
noncitizens as “deportable” or “removable” after fingerprint matches with ICE’s 
immigration database and decisions on levels of criminality, and requests that LEAs 
detaining these noncitizens in local jails or detention facilities “hold” them - even if their 
charges are cleared - for ICE to transfer these target noncitizens to ICE facilities for 
deportation proceedings. Therefore, as a midpoint-process for noncitizen deportations, 
issuance of immigration detainers is likely to be logically connected with final 
deportation actions. However, deportation orders are not always connected with detainer 
issuances because many deportations - for example, expedited removal orders by ICE - 
have previously been made without issuing a detainer. Moreover, the recent policy shift 
focusing on border enforcement might be connected with less use of ICE detainers, while 
maintaining or increasing deportation rates (Noferi, 2014a). 
TRAC’s detainer issuance data, acquired from ICE through multiple FOIA 
requests and lawsuits, consists of 102,138 detainer-by-detainer records including the date 
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detainers were issued to local law enforcement agencies, jails, or detention facilities, as 
well as additional geographical, demographic, and contextual information on noncitizens 
issued detainers. In terms of dates detainers were issued, this data covers 23 months (Oct. 
2011 - Aug. 2013), and includes immigration detainer issuances sent to 3,900 local jails 
and detention facilities across 50 states and U.S. territories. This study focuses on 
enforcement outcomes in 541 counties under S-Comm, following the logic of Chapter 4, 
with 5 time points covering a 13-month period (Dec. 2011 - Jan. 2013). Therefore, of a 
total of 102,138 detainer-by-detainer records from the previous TRAC data, I selected 
71,777 detainer issuance records on 541 localities for this study. Thereafter, I first 
calculated a total number of detainer issuances per county per month. Then I restructured 
the existing data with a wide format for longitudinal data analysis. TRAC data include 
lists of ICE programs through which detainers have been issued, including the Criminal 
Alien Program (CAP) under ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO), 287(g) 
partnerships, Fugitive operations, the Joint Criminal Alien Response Team, the Violent 
Criminal Alien Section, and Detention and Deportation. However, one serious problem 
for this study is that there is no identification of how many ICE detainers have been 
issued by the S-Comm program, although previous studies have paid special attention to 
the connection between an increasing number of ICE detainer issuances and the 
implementation of S-Comm (Lasch, 2013b; Manuel, 2014; TRAC, 2013b, 2014b, 2014c). 
With such limitations on access to data, I recalculated the total number of detainer 
issuances by the ERO’s CAP out of total detainer issuances; CAP has the largest share of 
detainer issuances and also has a working logic similar to S-Comm under the current U.S. 
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immigration enforcement system. With this revised number, I used it as a proxy volume 
of detainer issuances per locality on S-Comm implementation.
50
 As in deportation 
numbers, raw detainer issuance numbers per county varied widely (SD ranges from a 
minimum of 54.33 through a maximum of 73.23), so I used log-transformed data for 
analysis to mitigate such a non-normality. 
 
5.3. Modeling strategy 
I undertook two quantitative analyses for understanding the interrelationship 
between and among three contextual variables on current U.S. immigration enforcement 
policy. First, regarding the independent variable, I needed to categorize or classify the 
total 541 localities into sub-groups or -classes having distinct characteristics. That is, 
considering contextually the existence of multilayered jurisdictional patchwork trend and 
local variations on immigration-related issues, it statistically indicates that there are likely 
to be “hidden” or “unobserved” sub-groups or -categories within a single population. To 
identify statistically significant numbers of subgroups in 541 localities that have activated 
S-Comm, this study used latent class analysis (LCA) as a method. 
 
5.3.1. Latent Class Analysis (LCA) for Local Classifications 
                                                 
50
 I contacted ICE in November 2014 to ask why S-Comm has had no records on immigration detainer 
issuances, in spite of clear evidence from previous studies and ICE’s administrative detention-related data. 
ICE did not reply, however, and finally rejected my questions, saying that I had not submitted them with 
proper official documents. Therefore, on January 15, 2015, I officially submitted a FOIA request to ICE 
requesting detainer-by-detainer issuance records on ICE detainer issuances under S-Comm since the 
initiation of this program (Oct. 2008 - Dec. 2014). As of the beginning of May, 2015, my FOIA request is 
still pending. This FOIA request’s reference number is 2015 - ICFO - 61957.  
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LCA is a quantitative method for “identifying unobserved groups based on 
categorical data” (Samuelson & Dayton, 2010, p. 173) or for classifying research units  
into statistically reliable numbers of latent (unobserved) classes/subgroups based on data 
(response) patterns (Finch & Bronk, 2011; Flaherty & Kiff, 2012; Geiser, 2013). Based 
on item response theory (IRT), LCA considers that the “relationships between items are 
explained by the presence of a priori unknown subpopulations, or latent classes,” (Geiser, 
2013, p. 232), although this membership is probabilistic, not deterministic (Samuelson & 
Dayton, 2010). Methodologically, LCA has similar logic to exploratory factor analysis 
(EFA), considering both approaches identify latent constructs based on data reduction of 
manifest variables (Geiser, 2013; Oser, Hooghe, & Marien, 2013; Samuelson & Dayton, 
2010). However, one big difference between these two approaches is the scale of the 
newly-created latent construct: while EFA creates continuous latent classes from 
continuous variables, LCA identifies categorical latent classes from categorical manifest 
variables. Under the LCA perspective, exploratory and confirmatory approaches both can 
be used for analysis, and what approach the researcher selects depends on the existence 
of “well-developed” substantive theories (Finch & Bronk, 2011), but exploratory LCA 
has been frequently used due to its flexibility.  
For identifying local variations on immigration enforcement policy participation, I 
used an exploratory LCA. As I mentioned in the independent variables subsection 5.2.2., 
I collected four items on local immigration enforcement policy directions in terms of 
administrative and legal perspectives, which are all binary scales, and also assuming that 
there is a latent categorical construct Y, and the following LCA model is created: 
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 51
 
Where 
  
  = Probability that a randomly selected county (as a unit of analysis) will be in latent 
class t of latent variable Y 
    
    
 = Probability that a member of latent class t will provide a response of i for 
observed variable X 1 (participation in 287(g) partnerships)  
   
    
 = Probability that a member of latent class t will provide a response of j for 
observed variable X 2 (timing of activation of S-Comm) 
   
    
= Probability that a member of latent class t will provide a response of k for 
observed variable X 3 (passage of integrative/welcoming local immigration ordinances) 
    
    
 = Probability that a member of latent class t will provide a response of l for 
observed variable X 4 (passage of punitive/restrictive local immigration ordinances) 
 
In (1) representing an equation of LCA, four items indicating the extent of local 
immigration enforcement policy participation are X 1, X 2, X 3, and X 4 respectively. As I 
mentioned, Y refers to a latent categorical construct representing local immigration 
enforcement policy participation, and t refers to numbers of subclasses or -groups within 
Y. I, J, K, and L in the equation (1) refer to the number of categories in each of four items. 
Because these four items are a binary scale as I already mentioned, I, J, K, and L are 2 (0 
= no, 1 = yes). Under the logic of LCA, each of four observed items is “conditionally 
independent” given that latent class membership is known (Finch & Bronk, 2011; 
Samuelson & Dayton, 2010). For example, suppose a certain county of 541 localities has 
the following probability values for the three-class solutions:   
 = .07,    
 = .25, and   
 = 
                                                 
51
 For model building in LCA, previous studies used various mathematical expressions and equations, but 
general readers sometimes find it hard to understand their logic. For purposes of simplicity and 
clarification, here I followed Finch and Bronk’s mathematical explanations (2011, pp. 133-134) to account 
for LCA.     
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.05. Then this county is likely to be in Class 1 of a latent construct Y, with a 1/4 chance of 
being in Class 2 and less than a 1/18 chance of being in Class 3. A value for       
    
 refers 
to a county in the first class in Y that would be likely to activate (coded as “yes”) 287(g) 
partnerships with the federal immigration agency (regarding X1).                 
For exploratory LCA, I specified models with two- through four-class solutions 
using four items reflecting extents of local immigration enforcement policy. Then I 
compared what model had the best model fits (including absolute and relative model fits) 
and estimates based on standard structural equation modeling (SEM) procedures. Choice 
of the best model under LCA should not exclusively rely on model fits or estimates. 
Multiple points - such as not only statistical model fits and estimates, but also theoretical 
and substantive justification, the interpretability of the solution - should be considered 
simultaneously (Flaherty & Kiff, 2012; Geiser, 2013; Ram & Grimm, 2009). 
 
5.3.2. Longitudinal Growth Curve Modeling for Analyzing Immigration Enforcement 
Trajectories Under the S-Comm Framework 
The second analysis used is longitudinal latent growth curve modeling (LGM), 
which is a modeling of “change” or “the form of change” (Duncan & Duncan, 2009; 
Duncan, Duncan & Strycker, 2010; Eggum-Wilkens, 2014; Flora, Khoo, & Chassin, 
2007; Geiser, 2013; Preacher, 2010) in the same repeatedly measured variable over time. 
As “a special case of structural equation modeling (SEM),”52 LGM follows most of the 
                                                 
52
 For specifying and fitting LGM, two different methods - structural equation modeling (SEM) and 
multilevel modeling framework (MLM) - have been used. These frameworks have different perspectives 
and logic to estimate growth trajectories of repeated observed measurements, but they tend to have similar 
outcomes (Eggum-Wilkens, 2014; Grimm, Ram, & Estabrook, 2014). Therefore, the type of LGMs 
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methodological logic of SEM to assess dynamic aspects of individual change - intra- and 
interunit change perspectives - as “random effects” (Preacher, 2010, p. 189). These 
random effects can be expressed with “means, variances, and covariances of individual 
differences in intercepts and slopes” (Preacher, 2010, p. 185). Based on developmental 
studies and theory of change (called “growth” under LGM logic), LGM makes it possible 
for researchers to grasp individual changes - including growths and declines - over time 
by estimating their growth trajectory (Bollen & Curran, 2006; Davidov, Thörner, 
Schmidt, Gosen, & Wolf, 2011; Jung & Wickrama, 2008; Soest & Hagtvet, 2011). 
Unlike traditional approaches for measuring change - such as analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) or regression-based analyses - mainly focusing on mean-level changes and 
considering individual differences as merely “error variance,” one of the key arguments 
from LGM is that such error variance includes important information on changes of a 
repeatedly measured variable (Duncan & Duncan, 2009).   
Each growth (change) trajectory of certain repeated observed measurements can 
be described by its two latent constructs under the logic of LGM, labeled intercept and 
slope factors, and the covariance of these two factors. Intercept factor refers to the initial 
status of repeated measurements, and it is constant for any individual across time, so 
factor loadings for intercept factor are fixed at 1. Slope factor refers to slope or rate of 
change (growth or decline) over a period of repeated measurements, so factor loadings 
are changed reflecting the time metric.
53
 Moreover, these two factors are allowed to 
                                                                                                                                                 
selected for analysis - whether based on MLM or SEM framework - is the researcher’s choice. LGM based 
on SEM is more flexible in situations involving complex models (Eggum-Wilkens, 2014; Preacher, 2010).   
  
53
 For model identification, at least two factor loadings of the slope factor under LGM (e.g, 0, 1…) should 
be fixed, although what numbers on the loadings are used depends on the scale of time. For more concrete 
 139 
covary in the process of growth trajectories of certain repeated measurements. This logic 
under LGM can be schematically expressed in the following path diagrams: 
 
        
Figure 5.2. Basic (Typical) LGMs for one repeated-measured variable Yk (k = time point) 
with four occasions of measurement (k=1, 2, 3, 4). Examples of a linear LGM (left) and a 
quadratic LGM (right)   
Note: Under SEM framework, rectangles are observed or manifest variables (repeated measures here) while 
circles are unobserved or latent variables; single-headed arrows are path coefficients, while double-headed 
arrows are variance or covariances.   refers to time-specific residuals or disturbances. Factor loadings for 
intercept factor are fixed at 1 because they equally influence each repeated measure, while those for slope 
factor are set by several options (e.g., 0, 1, 2, 3 for a linear LGM and 0, 1,4, 9 for fixing the values of linear 
loadings squared). Various forms of growth curve models can be selected (e.g., linear, quadratic, and 
cubic), and which shape (form) of model is selected depends on theory or data.      
  
For this study, I first estimated two respective individual enforcement trajectories 
- immigration detainer issuances and noncitizen deportations - during 5 time points, 
covering a 13-month period under the S-Comm framework as unconditional (no 
predictors) LGMs.
54
  
                                                                                                                                                 
setting and interpretation of numerical values for factor loadings under LGM, see Chapter 8 of Little 
(2013).     
54
 Under the SEM-based framework, LGM follows a two-step process for estimating trajectories of a 
certain repeatedly measured variable: first an “unconditional” model, which has no predictor and focuses 
on estimation of “the growth portion of the model”; then a “conditional” model with predictors that might 
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           =    +      +      (i = 1, 2,…541, t = 0, 1,…4)        (2) 
           =    +       +  
    +     (i = 1, 2,…541, t = 0, 1,…4)        (3) 
 
In equation (2),            refers to a “linear” immigration detainer issuance 
trajectory for county i at time t; in equation (3), it is expressed with a nonlinear or 
quadratic immigration detainer issuance trajectory for county i at time t;  In equations (2) 
and (3),    indicates the random intercept for every county i;    represents the random 
slope for every county i;    represents the value of trend variable for time t; and     
indicates disturbance of immigration detainer issuance trajectory for county i at time t. In 
equation (3) regarding a nonlinear LGM,     refers to the random linear slope for every 
county i, while     indicates the random quadratic slope for every county i.  
In equation (2), the intercept and slope factors can also be expressed as functions 
of means and county-specific disturbances away from those means. 
 
   =    +                  (4) 
   =    +                   (5) 
 
For example, the random intercept,    , consists of the mean intercept across all 
counties (  ) and county-specific disturbance or error term for intercept (   ). Likewise, 
slope factor,   , is subdivided into the mean slope across all counties (  ) and county-
                                                                                                                                                 
influence growth or decline of the previous unconditional growth model (Keith, 2015, p. 497). Following 
this logic, this study also first made unconditional models for the two respective immigration enforcement 
actions under S-Comm, and then made conditional models with a predictor. 
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specific disturbance for slope (   ). Therefore, the following equation (6) can be made by 
inserting equations (4) and (5) into equation (2):  
 
           = (   +     ) + (    +        +    )      (6) 
 
In equation (6), a linear detainer issuance trajectory during 5 time points consists 
of two parts: the first bracket for a fixed component representing mean structure of all 
541 counties and the second one for a random component representing county-specific 
variability. This is the first model for unconditional LGM in this chapter. Turning the 
intercept and slope factors under a quadratic LGM in equation (3), they can be expressed 
with the following slightly complicated form: 
 
   =    +                  (4) 
    =      +                  (7) 
    =      +                   (8) 
 
Compared with the first model, the linear LGM on detainer issuance trajectory, 
the slope factors under the quadratic LGM are subdivided into linear and quadratic slopes 
    and     respectively, and they can also be expressed as functions of means and 
county-specific disturbances away from those means. Through inserting equations (4), 
(7), and (8) into equation (3), the following equation (9) is finally made for a quadratic 
LGM: 
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           = (   +       +   
    ) + (    +        +   
      +    )      (9) 
 
As in the linear LGM in equation (6), here the quadratic LGM consists of two 
components: the first bracket for a fixed component representing mean structure of all 
541 counties and the second one for a random component representing county-specific 
variability. As in the process of immigration detainer issuance trajectory, the following 
equations are created for the second enforcement action, noncitizen deportation trajectory 
during 5 time points under S-Comm, and this is expressed for linear (equation 10) and 
quadratic LGM (equation 11) respectively.  
 
              = (   +     ) + (    +        +    )       (10) 
              = (   +       +   
    ) + (    +        +   
      +    )    (11) 
 
Based on the abovementioned unconditional LGMs for two enforcement actions, 
the next step is to create conditional LGMs for them. For linear conditional LGMs, new 
intercept and slope factors with predictors - local distinct immigration enforcement policy 
participation - can be applied to equation (2): 
 
   =    +        +        + … +         +               (12) 
   =    +        +        + … +         +                (13) 
 
Where  
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the random intercept,     and the random slope,   , basically consist of the mean intercept 
(slope) across all counties (  /   ) and county-specific disturbance or error term for 
intercept (   ) or slope (   ) as in the previous unconditional LGMs. However, with the 
addition of predictors or covariates,    ,   ,…     equations (12) and (13) include county-
specific value of predictors (       ) and predictors’ coefficients for the intercept factor 
(        ) and slope factor (        ) respectively. Through inserting equations (12) 
and (13) into equation (2), the third and fourth models for conditional LGMs for two 
enforcement actions, equations (14) and (15) are made: 
 
           = (   +     ) + (         )     +…+ (         )     + (    +        + 
   )   (the number of predictors or covariates = 1, 2,….n)                   (14) 
              = (   +     ) + (         )     +…+ (         )     + (    +        
+    )   (the number of predictors or covariates = 1, 2,….n)                   (15) 
 
With the abovementioned four unconditional and conditional LGMs for two 
enforcement actions under S-Comm, next, two separated enforcement trajectories were 
connected using parallel-process LGMs as the fifth model. In this model, I analyze how 
these two enforcement trajectories are related using correlation. As an extension of the 
fifth model, the sixth model adds regression paths between these two enforcement 
trajectories. Finally, using all three variables on the current immigration enforcement 
policy under S-Comm - extent of local immigration enforcement policy participation, 
immigration detainer issuance, and noncitizen deportations - longitudinal mediation 
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analysis is made. For the final model, a longitudinal mediation model is parameterized 
with the following two equations using Figure 5.1: 
 
M (detainer issuance trajectory) =     +      +      + … +          +            (16) 
Y (deportation trajectory) =    +       +       + … +          + bM +           (17) 
(i = constant, a,b, and c' = direct/indirect effects in Figure 5.1., D = predictor with a 
multicategorical scale, M = mediator variable, and e = error term under SEM 
framework)
55
   
 
Based on a series of equations on three contextual factors on the implementation 
of S-Comm, Figure 5.3 presents a path diagram representing the relationship between the 
hypothesized growth trajectories for two enforcement mechanisms. Figure 5.3 consists of 
three parts: a growth trajectory for detainer issuance (at the top) across five time (month) 
points, a growth trajectory for noncitizen removals (at the bottom) across five time 
points, and influence of extents of local immigration enforcement policy participation to 
these two enforcement change trajectories (in the middle, between two growth 
trajectories over time). Five time points - 1 (Dec. 2011), 4 (Apr. 2012), 8 (Aug. 2012), 12 
(Dec. 2012), and 13 months (Jan. 2013) - were commonly measured for two enforcement 
actions, but these times were not equally-spaced. These five time points were coded as 0 
(the first month for analysis, Dec. 2011), .31 (the 4th of 13 months, =4/13), .62 (the 8th 
of 13 months, =8/13), .92 (the 12th of 13 months, =12/13), and 1 (the 13th of 13 months, 
=13/13) respectively. 
                                                 
55
 I followed Hayes and Preacher’s study (2014) analyzing statistical mediation analysis with a predictor 
based on a multicategorical scale for creating related equations here.    
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Figure 5. 3. A path diagram representing the hypothesized parallel-process latent growth 
curve model for detainer issuance and noncitizen deportations under the Secure 
Communities program 
Note: To avoid complexity, I do not include covariance between intercept and slope factors here. Through 
fitting two univariate LGMs, a quadratic model for detainer issuances and a linear model for noncitizen 
deportation have the best model fits and estimates. For the two models, factor loadings for intercept were 
fixed at 1, factor loadings for linear slope were rescaled 0, .31, .62, .92, 1, and factor loadings for quadratic 
slope were fixed at the values of the linear loadings squared, 0, .1, .38, .85, 1. 
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For doing LGM, each single growth model is specified to identify what form of 
change (linear vs. nonlinear) over time has the best model fits and estimates with various 
conditions (residual variances constraints vs. free). Then I connected two growth models 
for detainer issuance and noncitizen deportation through specifying a parallel process 
LGM for analyzing the relationship between two univariate LGMs without covariates. 
Finally, I created a longitudinal mediation model interrelating three variables, and 
analyzed how different extents of local immigration enforcement policy participation 
influence two enforcement actions - detainer issuances and noncitizen deportations - 
under the S-Comm framework.   
 
5. 4.  Local Classifications in Terms of Extent of Local Immigration Enforcement 
Policy Participation 
Table 5.1 presents a series of classifications of 541 localities based on exploratory 
LCA model fits. I ran two through four-class solutions for model selection, and 
considering the entropy reflecting the quality of the classification under LCA, the two-
class solution might be considered. However, most relative model fit indexes show that 
the three-class solution becomes the best model reflecting the characteristics of the data 
structure consisting of four items on local immigration enforcement policy participation. 
Considering average latent class probabilities for localities, each of the three classes on 
local involvement in immigration enforcement policy has a very high certainty and 
reliability of the classification (.897 for Class 1, .979 for Class 2, and .867 for Class 3). 
Localities of Class 3 also have a relatively high average probability of belonging to Class 
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1 (.121), which means there is a possibility of a certain degree of overlap between these 
two classes, but the quality of this classification can still be statistically satisfactory. 
Moreover, previous studies (Pham & Pham, 2014; Varsanyi, 2010; Wong, 2014a) have 
tended to follow local immigration activism in terms of dichotomous 
(“integrative”/“welcoming” vs. “restrictive”/“punitive” immigration policy) or a small 
number of local perspectives (“active,” “inactive,” and “noninterventionist” immigration 
policy), so the three-class solution can be a theoretically justifiable and feasible option for 
an empirical analysis. The best log likelihood value for this model for the three-class 
solution was -1,055.404. For overcoming the local maxima problem
56
 under the LCA 
framework, this model was rerun several times, and this model was well-defined and 
there was no convergence or identification problem. Estimation was based on maximum 
likelihood estimation with robust standard errors (MLR).
57
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
56
 For LCA, the maximum likelihood (ML) estimation is used for producing the best solution with “the 
largest possible log-likelihood value” (Geiser, 2013, p. 238). That is, if the best log-likelihood value is 
found, replication of log-likelihood across random start values should have the same log-likelihood value. 
However, researchers sometimes find replication of log-likelihood across random start values produces 
different log likelihood values. This is because an iterative estimation process terminated without finding 
the best log-likelihood value. It is called local likelihood maximum. To prevent this local maxima problem, 
various strategies are recommended, such as increasing sufficient numbers of random starts, using a 
sufficient number of initial stage iterations, using fewer latent classes, and using a tight convergence 
criterion (Eggum-Wilkens, 2014; Geiser, 2013).    
57
 For exploratory LCA, the log-likelihood values were extracted from a total of 1,000 sets of start values 
showing the largest log likelihood values after using the initial 10,000 random sets of starting values. 
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Table 5. 1. Exploratory latent class analysis (LCA) model fit statistics on local 
immigration enforcement policy participation      
 2-Class 3-Class 4-Class 
Sample size 
1st class (%) 
2nd class (%) 
3rd class (%) 
4th class (%) 
 
31 (5.73%) 
510 (94.2%) 
 
88 (16.3%) 
34   (6.3%) 
419 (77.4%) 
 
28   (5.18%) 
254 (46.95%) 
35   (6.47%) 
224 (41.41%) 
Absolute Model Fit    
# of parameters 
Likelihood Ratio  
Pearson   
(p-value) 
Relative Model Fit 
9 
40.018 
(6) =37.78 
(<.0001) 
14 
4.136 
(1) =4.309 
(.0038) 
19 
Non-
identified 
Non-
identified 
Non-
identified 
 
AIC 
BIC 
aBIC 
2,164.69 
2,203.33 
2,174.76 
2,138.81 
2,198.92 
2,154.47 
2,145.13 
2,226.70 
2,166.39 
Entropy .951 .723 .973 
Vuong-Lo-Mendell-Rubin LRT p-
value 
Lo-Mendell-Rubin adjusted LRT 
p-value 
Parametric bootstrap LRT p-value 
<.0001 
<.0001 
<.0001 
.0011 
.0013 
<.0001 
 
 
Note: Class membership with two to four-class solutions of 541 localities under LCA was based on 
estimated counts based on the posterior probabilities. Local maxima problem was found in the four-class 
solutions. The four-class solution also failed to be identified due to the lack of df. AIC refers to Akaike’s 
information criteria, BIC refers to Bayesian information criteria, and aBIC refers to sample-size adjusted 
BIC. Lower relative model fit (AIC and BIC) reflects better model fit under LCA (Geiser, 2013). 
 
With the three-class solution strategy, 541 localities were classified, with one 
large class and two relatively small classes. Of the three sub-classes on local immigration 
enforcement policy participation, Class 2 - operationalized as localities with “active” 
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noncitizen enforcement policy - has a size of approximately 6.3% (n= 34 counties). 
Localities in Class 2 tend to very actively participate in federal-local immigration 
enforcement policy programs, by voluntarily participating in 287(g) partnerships (65%) 
and activating S-Comm very early (100%). Nine out of 10 localities in this class passed 
restrictive or punitive local immigration ordinances or resolutions through 2013, while 
almost 40% of localities in this class also passed integrative local immigration legislation. 
Classes 1 and 3 represent localities with inactive local immigration enforcement policy 
participation compared to localities in Class 2, but they have a slightly different direction 
on noncitizen enforcement actions. The 88 localities in Class 1 (16.3%) of the total 541 
localities, have inactively participated in noncitizen enforcement policy by having little 
participation in 287(g) agreements (< 4%) and a low rate of early activation of S-Comm 
(17%). However, more than 60% of localities in this class passed local punitive or 
restrictive immigration ordinances through 2013, so they are operationalized as localities 
that are “administratively-inactive-but-legally-punitive-leaning” on immigration issues. 
Like Class 1, localities in Class 3 tend to inactively participate in noncitizen enforcement 
policy, by having little participation in 287(g) partnerships (5.9%), and by not passing 
local punitive immigration ordinances. However, one big difference of this class 
compared to Class 1 is that Class 3 localities appear to have a mixed perspective on 
immigration; they tend to have early activation of S-Comm (58.5%) for administrative 
enforcement actions, while some of them (22%) have a welcoming immigrant 
perspective, evidenced by passage of integrative local immigration ordinances. More than 
two thirds of localities in the United States (77.4%) follow this Class 3 perspective. 
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Therefore, I operationalized localities in Class 3 as those with an “inactive but mixed 
perspective” on immigration issues. With this classification strategy, I analyze how 
localities under a strong trend of local immigration variation respond to federal 
immigration enforcement policy implementation, especially S-Comm. 
 
5. 5.  Analyzing Two Key Noncitizen Enforcement Change Trajectories Using 
Longitudinal Latent Growth Curve Modeling 
Table 5.2 indicates how many immigration (ICE) detainers have been issued on 
average to local LEAs, and how many consequent noncitizen deportations have been 
made during a 13-month period under the current federal-local immigration cooperative 
enforcement system. As seen in this table, two immigration enforcement numbers have 
continuously changed over time, with dynamic variations. Detainer issuances increased 
during the first two time (month) points, but began to steeply decrease after that. In the 
case of noncitizen deportations, there have been no clear change trends, but a pattern of 
repeated up-and-down oscillations over time. 
Considering local immigration activism and the consequent immigration 
patchwork trend since the 2000s, Table 5.2 also includes how three classes of localities, 
based on the statistical classification from LCA, respond to administrative immigration 
enforcement actions. Localities with active noncitizen enforcement policy participation, 
in spite of their small numbers, have actually led the federal enforcement-only policy 
direction by having a very high volume of detainer issuances and high deportation 
numbers during the 13-month period, compared to the other two classes. Considering the 
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raw numbers in this table, such active localities, on average, had enforcement outcomes 4 
to 10 times higher than those of inactive localities. Interestingly, Class 1 counties 
(operationalized as administratively-inactive-but-legally-punitive-leaning) had lower 
enforcement outcomes, including both detainer issuances and deportations, than Class 3 
counterparts, counties with inactive-but-mixed perspectives on immigration. Therefore, 
hypothesis 2 and hypotheses 4-1 through 4-3 are partially verified; counties with active 
immigration enforcement policy participation have tended to have higher detainer 
issuances and noncitizen deportation outcomes than other counties. These hypotheses are 
empirically tested using LGMs in Table 5.3.  
Figure 5.4 graphically indicates how 541 localities have actually carried out 
immigration enforcement policy under the S-Comm framework. In the two graphs in this 
figure using 100 randomly selected counties, each thin gray line represents the growth 
(change) trajectory of a single locality for detainer issuances and noncitizen deportations 
during the 13-month period, and the thick black line represents the mean change 
(trajectory) of all 541 localities over time. Considering the dynamic forms of changes 
seen in the thin lines, both graphs indicate that each locality has a distinct form of 
detainer issuance and deportation trends over time. In other words, they have various 
enforcement numbers on detainer issuances and deportations at the first month, 
December 2011 - some localities having a very high level of enforcement numbers, while 
others have a very low level - and in terms of rate of change of such enforcement actions, 
there is huge variability over time. Therefore, few clear trends - upward or downward - 
are found for both enforcement actions during 13 months. In terms of mean trajectories, a 
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growth trajectory for detainer issuances appears to have a curvilinear form, while that for 
noncitizen deportations has no clear change pattern; it rather has a zigzag form, 
oscillating up and down over time.       
 
Table.5.2. Descriptive statistics on local immigration enforcement policy measured with 
5 months (n= 541, unit of analysis = county, standard deviation in parentheses on 
averaged monthly detainer issuances and deportation numbers) 
 December 
2011 
April  
2012 
August 
2012 
December 
2012 
January 
2013 
Detainer issuance      
Total # of detainer issuances 
(# of detainers on ERO 
CAP) 
18,624 
(15,237) 
19,948 
(16,556) 
19,139 
(15,810) 
14,805 
(12,081) 
14,921 
(12,036) 
Averaged total monthly 
detainer issuances  
28.16 
(71.79) 
30.60 
(73.23) 
29.22 
(70.20) 
22.33 
(54.33) 
22.25 
(57.81) 
Active localities 
(34 localities) 
95.15 
(218.66) 
107.62 
(210.21) 
102.21 
(202.24) 
79.91 
(151.43) 
79.71 
(164.90) 
Administratively-
Inactive-but-legally-
punitive-leaning localities  
(88 localities) 
14.32 
(18.56) 
13.92 
(17.43) 
13.11 
(18.59) 
10.89 
(13.96) 
9.58 
(13.20) 
Inactive-but-mixed 
localities  (419 localities) 
25.64 
(48.99) 
27.86 
(53.18) 
26.69 
(50.71) 
20.06 
(40.75) 
20.25 
(42.76) 
Deportations (removals)      
Total # of deportations 
(removals) from 3,184 
localities under S-Comm 
6,828 6,507 7,549 5,988 6,869 
Monthly total deportations 
(removals) from 541 
localities under S-Comm 
15.14 
(50.67) 
12.96 
(46.17) 
14.03 
(50.11) 
11.13 
(35.18) 
12.70 
(41.13) 
Active localities  
(34 localities) 
85.12 
(156.79) 
80.12 
(151.21) 
89.68 
(166.74) 
67.87 
(111.08) 
74.71 
(125.63) 
Administratively-
Inactive-but-legally-
punitive-leaning localities 
(88 localities) 
4.45 
(6.26) 
4.20 
(5.46) 
4.62 
(6.19) 
3.72 
(4.83) 
4.60 
(5.10) 
Inactive-but-mixed 9.42 8.61 9.79 8.03 9.37 
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localities (419 localities) (21.77) (19.44) (22.87) (18.15) (24.43) 
Note: Localities (counties) for analysis were classified into three subclasses based on the result of 
exploratory latent class analysis. Active localities are those with relatively active (strong) noncitizen 
enforcement policy participation and local restrictive/welcoming immigration-related ordinances, while 
administratively-inactive-but-legally-punitive-leaning localities are those with relatively weak (inactive) 
administrative noncitizen enforcement policy involvement but that have passed strong local restrictive 
immigration ordinances/resolutions in their jurisdictions. Inactive-but-mixed localities are those that have 
little involvement in 287(g) partnerships but were relatively early adopters of S-Comm, and interestingly, 1 
in 4 localities of them expressed an immigrant integrative perspective by passing local welcoming 
ordinances/resolutions in their jurisdictions. For detainer issuances, I used the total number of detainer 
issuances on the Criminal Alien Program (CAP) under ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) 
as a proxy volume for those numbers issued under the Secure Communities program. There are no missing 
data on detainer issuances, while 90, 39, 3, 3, 0 missing data were made on removal numbers during the 
five time points (Dec. 2011 - Jan. 2013). Means and standard deviation estimates are estimates using full 
information maximum likelihood methods to adjust for missing data.   
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Figure 5.4. Longitudinal growth (change) plots for 100 randomly selected localities on 
immigration enforcement policy actions, immigration detainer issuances (top) and 
noncitizen deportations (bottom) during a 13-month period (n=541). 
Note: The x-axis indicates time (month) points during 13 months from December 2011 to January 2013. 
These 13 months were rescaled from 0 (Dec. 2011) to 1 (Jan. 2013). The y-axis refers to log-transformed 
total number of detainers issued per month (top) and total number of noncitizen deportations per month 
(bottom).  
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With such graphical change of two noncitizen enforcement actions during the 13-
month-period, LGM was used for analyzing how the two enforcement actions have 
changed over time. Prior to fitting a model for the simultaneous changes of two 
immigration enforcement mechanisms under S-Comm, I first analyzed what functional 
form for growth (change) trajectories are appropriate for each of the two enforcement 
actions separately. The best functional forms of models for each enforcement action were 
finally selected through comparing 2 difference test and model fit indexes including 
RMSEA, SRMR, and CFI/TLI.
58
 For detainer issuances and noncitizen deportations, I 
compared model fits of linear and quadratic forms with the conditions of freely 
estimating or constrained residual variances respectively. 2 difference tests indicate that 
a quadratic form of growth (change) trajectory with constrained residual variances for 
detainer issuance and a linear form of growth (change) trajectory with freely estimating 
residual variances for noncitizen deportations fit the data well
59
. The graphical results in 
                                                 
58
 Under LGM logic based on structural equation modeling (SEM) framework, various functional forms of 
LGMs are hierarchically related (nested), and therefore they can be statistically compared by the chi-square 
(2) difference test. This test compares the model-implied means and covariances and the model-observed 
means and covariances. Significant values for this test indicate that the more parsimonious model (having 
fewer df) represents the data well to some degree and leads to selection of the final model (Cole & Ciesla, 
2012; Eggum-Wilkins, 2014).      
59
 Reflecting the nonlinear mean trend (like a “zigzag” form) for noncitizen deportation under the S-Comm 
program, I fitted various functional forms of models - linear, quadratic, and cubic LGMs fixing the time 
scores and freely estimating time scores - but few forms of change clearly would not adequately explain 
such deportation change trajectories, including the sign of poor fits or misfits of the models (i.e., estimation 
of negative factor variances). Of these functional forms, a quadratic model with freely estimating residual 
variances (but time scores should be freely estimated) had the best model fit, but a quadratic variance 
should be fixed at zero to maintain this model fit. Considering the local heterogeneity in Figure 5.4, this 
model might not be a good choice, even though the quadratic model shows a better fit. Therefore, I finally 
selected a linear model with freely estimating residual variances as the second best model considering the 
model fits indexes and estimations. The concrete    difference tests among various shapes of noncitizen 
enforcement trajectories (e.g., linear, quadratic, and cubic) are included in the appendix.    
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Figure 5.4 support a nonlinear form of change trajectory for detainer issuances, while a 
linear form of change trajectory for noncitizen deportations is a rather unexpected result.
  
1
5
7 
Table 5.3. Parameter Estimates for Noncitizen Enforcement Policy under the Secure Communities Program using Latent Growth 
Curve Modeling (including parallel process growth curve models and a longitudinal mediation analysis) 
 (Model 1) 
Immigration 
detainer 
issuance 
trajectory 
(unconditional) 
(Model 2) 
Immigration 
detainer 
issuance 
trajectory with 
a covariate 
(conditional) 
(Model 3) 
Noncitizen 
deportation 
trajectory  
(unconditional) 
(Model 4) 
Noncitizen 
deportation 
trajectory with 
a covariate 
(conditional) 
(Model 5) 
Interrelation 
between 
detainer 
issuance & 
deportation 
trajectories 
(Model 6) 
Interrelation 
between 
detainer 
issuance & 
deportation 
trajectories: 
adding 
regression paths 
(Model 7) 
Longitudinal 
mediation 
analysis: 
interrelationshi
p among three 
enforcement  
variables 
The first month 
(detainer) 
       
Mean/intercept 
Variance  
Residual variance 
“Active” localities 
“inactive/punitive 
leaning” localities 
2.455*** 
1.414*** 
2.468*** 
 
1.393*** 
.427* 
-.247* 
  2.453*** 
1.441*** 
2.453*** 
1.407*** 
2.469*** 
 
1.369*** 
.428 
-.249* 
The first month 
(deportation) 
       
Mean/intercept 
Variance  
Residual variance 
“Active” localities 
“inactive/punitive    
leaning” localities 
  1.600*** 
1.292*** 
1.533*** 
 
1.079*** 
1.790*** 
-.284** 
1.590*** 
1.290*** 
.125 
.551*** 
1.466*** 
 
.846*** 
1.438*** 
-.271* 
 
Growth rate 
(Linear - 
detainer) 
       
Mean/intercept 
Variance 
.411*** 
.898*** 
.482*** 
 
  .393*** 
1.418*** 
.397*** 
.432* 
.480*** 
 
  
1
5
8 
Residual variance 
“Active” localities 
“inactive/punitive    
leaning” localities 
.871** 
-.651* 
-.182 
 
-.655* 
-.173 
Growth rate 
(Linear - 
deportation) 
       
Mean/intercept 
Variance 
Residual variance 
“Active” localities 
“inactive/punitive    
leaning” localities 
  .020 
.114*** 
.028 
 
.111*** 
-.201* 
.034 
.033 
.084** 
.113 
.013 
.028 
 
.111** 
-.200** 
.033 
Growth rate  
(Quadratic-
detainer) 
       
Mean 
Variance 
Residual variance 
“Active” localities 
“inactive/punitive    
leaning” localities 
-.684*** 
.884*** 
-.746*** 
 
.849** 
.767** 
.081 
  -.664*** 
1.327*** 
-.668*** 
.316** 
-.744*** 
 
.151*** 
.771** 
.074 
Regression path 
I2  I1 
I2L1 
I2Q1 
S2  I1 
S2  L1 
      
.796*** 
.183 
.839** 
-.097** 
.400** 
 
.141*** 
 
.375*** 
 
2(df) 10.79 (10) 
p = .374 
14.98 (14) 
p = .379 
40.18 (10)*** 
p <.001 
43.77 (16)** 
p <.001 
58.78 (32)** 
p =.003 
60.85 (37)** 
p =.008 
126.56 (50)** 
p <.001 
CFI 
TLI 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
.990 
.999 
.991 
.989 
.996 
.995 
.997 
.996 
.989 
.986 
RMSEA .012 .011 .075 .057 .039 .035 .053 
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(90% CI: .00, .05) (90% CI: .00, .04) (90% CI: .05, .10) (90% CI: .04, .08) (90% CI: .02, .06) (90% CI: .02, .05) (90% CI: .04, .07) 
SRMR .011 .009 .021 .017 .016 .016 .026 
Note: N= 541. Standard errors are not included in this table due to space limitations; these can be provided on request. As a multi-categorical scale, extent 
of local immigration participation consists of three categories, and localities with inactive-but-mixed enforcement policy participation were set as the 
reference/omitted category for group differences. For detainer issuances, the quadratic model with constrained residual variances, and for noncitizen 
deportations, the linear model with freely estimating residual variances were finally selected for analysis. I followed a stepwise model specification 
process as in previous studies (Eggum-Wilkens, 2014; Flora, Khoo, & Chassin, 2007), from estimating the unconditional model (Models 1 and 3) for two 
immigration enforcement actions, estimating the conditional (adding the predictor) model (Models 2 and 4), fitting the parallel-processes growth curve 
model and the extension of this model (Models 5 and 6), to a longitudinal mediation model among the key variables. Means and (co)variances of the 
latent intercept and slope were calculated for the unconditional LGMs, while intercepts and residual (co)variances of the latent intercept and slope were 
calculated for the conditional LGMs because the intercept and slope factors are endogenous in this model. Full information maximum likelihood method 
was used as an estimation option to adjust for missing data. Regarding global model fit indexes, CFI = comparative fit index, TLI = Tucker-Lewis index, 
RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation, and SRMR = standardized root mean square residual. The CFI and TLI values greater than .95 
represent good fits, while RMSEA and SRMR close to zero (or at least less than .060) generally suggest a good fit (Cole & Ciesla, 2012). I1, L1, and Q1 
refer to intercept, linear slope, and quadratic slope for detainer issuances, while I2 and S2 refer to intercept and linear slope for noncitizen deportation.  *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 5.3 indicates parameter estimates for a nonlinear (quadratic) model for 
detainer issuances and a linear model for noncitizen deportation, in Models 1 and 3 as 
unconditional LGMs. Models 2 and 4 fit conditional models adding the extent of local 
immigration enforcement policy participation as a predictor to unconditional Models 1 
and 3. Moreover, based on univariate or separated LGMs for the two enforcement actions 
in Models 1 through 4, this table also fits models for concurrent (statistically “parallel-
process” or “multivariate”) growth (change) trajectories of these two immigration 
enforcement mechanisms in Models 5 and 6. Model 7 is a longitudinal mediation analysis 
combing three key variables - the two noncitizen enforcement actions and local 
immigration enforcement policy participation - for analyzing interrelations among them. 
Models 1 and 3 fit univariate unconditional (no predictor) LGMs for detainer 
issuances and noncitizen deportations. For detainer issuances, the mean of the latent 
linear slope factor was positive and significantly different from zero, indicating that, on 
average, the rate of instantaneous change of localities’ detainer issuances at the first 
month (Dec. 2011) was increasing. However, the mean of the latent quadratic slope factor 
was negative and significantly different from zero, indicating the amount of change in the 
slope of localities’ detainer issuances for a one-unit change in time (month) was 
decreasing. On average, the slope decreased .684 (.982 in raw numbers) every month, 
considering the fact that I used a log(x+1) data transformation technique. With regard to 
the random effects, there was significant local variation on detainer issuances in the latent 
factors for the intercept, linear slope, and quadratic slope. There were local differences in 
values of detainer issuances at the first month. Moreover, there was local variability in 
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the rate of instantaneous change in detainer issuances at the first month, and there was 
also similar local variability in the amount of change in detainer issuances in the slope 
that occurred per one-unit change in time (month). For noncitizen deportations, negative 
and significant covariance between the latent intercept factor and the slope factor was 
found, r = -.17, p <.001, although it was not reported in this table. This indicates that 
localities that had higher noncitizen deportation numbers at the first/baseline month had a 
lower rate of growth (change) in deportation numbers over time, or vice versa. Regarding 
the fixed effects (mean changes), the mean of the slope was positive but not significant. 
This means that on average, localities’ deportation numbers did not significantly change 
over time. Thus, deportation intercept factor, not the slope factor, would serve as an 
outcome for other follow-up models, especially the longitudinal mediation analysis in 
Model 7 as the final model. Concerning the random effects (individual variability), the 
intercept variance was significantly different from zero, indicating that there were local 
differences in deportation numbers at the first month. The linear slope variance was 
significantly different from zero, suggesting that there were local differences in rate of 
change in deportation number over time. This model also had significant residual 
variances at each of five time points representing time-specific variation and 
measurement error variation. 
Next, Models 2 and 4 fit univariate LGMs separately for detainer issuances and 
noncitizen deportations conditioned on extents of local immigration enforcement policy 
participation.
60
 For detainer issuances LGM, the extent of local immigration enforcement 
                                                 
60
 As the predictor, extent of local immigration enforcement policy participation has a multi-categorical 
scale, consisting of three categories, created as the result of exploratory LCA. Localities with 
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policy participation was a significant predictor of the volume of detainer issuances at the 
first month, such that localities with active immigration enforcement policy participation 
had 53.3%
61
 higher detainer issuances at the first month than localities with inactive-but-
mixed enforcement policy participation as the reference locality. However, localities with 
administratively-inactive-but-legally-punitive-leaning enforcement policy participation 
had 21.9% lower detainer issuances at the first month than the reference localities. 
Considering the rate of change (slope factors) in detainer issuances over time, localities 
with active immigration enforcement policy participation had a significant and steep rate 
of instantaneous decrease (52.2%) in detainer issuances at the first month, but this 
decrease strongly rebounds over time, indicating a 115.3% increase in the slope of 
detainer issuances over time in comparison to the localities with inactive-but-mixed 
enforcement policy. The extent of local immigration enforcement policy participation 
was not significantly different between the two types of localities labeled inactive. These 
results indicate that detainer issuance trajectories partially verified hypothesis 3; using 
LGM, I found that different classes of counties have different volumes of detainer 
issuances over time. In terms of initial status, Class 2 counties having active immigration 
enforcement policy participation have much higher detainer issuances than other 
counties, but in terms of rate of change, detainer issuance trajectories followed a 
                                                                                                                                                 
administratively-inactive-but-legally-punitive-leaning enforcement policy participation were coded 1, while 
localities with active immigration enforcement policy participation were coded 2. Localities with inactive-
but-mixed enforcement policy participation were coded 3. For group difference, localities with inactive-but-
mixed enforcement policy participation were set as the reference/omitted group (category). 
  
61
 I used the log-transformed values for two enforcement actions for this study so as to mitigate non-
normality of the data. These log-transformed values can be expressed by exponential values for 
interpretation (percentage change by one-unit change). The log-transformed value .427 for detainer 
issuance for localities with active immigration enforcement policy was transformed 0.5326 (=e
.427
 -1) for 
percentage interpretation.  
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curvilinear form; detainer issuances of counties with active immigration enforcement 
policy participation have decreased instantaneously compared to other classes, but over 
time the rate of detainer issuances rebounded and increased more steeply than other 
localities. On the other hand, there have been fewer significant differences in the volumes 
of detainer issuances between counties in Classes 1 and 3 having inactive immigration 
enforcement participation.    
In Model 4, the intercept and slope factor was regressed on the extent of local 
immigration enforcement policy participation for noncitizen deportations under the S-
Comm program. The extent of local immigration enforcement policy participation was 
also a significant predictor of noncitizen deportation at the first month, such that localities 
with active immigration enforcement policy participation had 498.9% higher noncitizen 
deportation numbers then than the reference localities. On the other hand, localities with 
administratively-inactive-but-legally-punitive-leaning enforcement policy had 24.7% 
lower noncitizen deportation numbers at the first month than the reference localities. 
Interestingly, the active localities significantly decreased their deportation rate over time 
by 18.2% more than localities with inactive-but-mixed enforcement policy. There was no 
significant rate of noncitizen deportation change between localities with inactive 
immigration enforcement policies. Through this result, I found that hypothesis 4-1 was 
verified; there have been huge local variations on noncitizen deportation outcomes under 
S-Comm during a 13-month period. Counties with active immigration enforcement 
policy participation tended to have strikingly higher deportation numbers than other 
counties at the initial status. However, rate of deportation change in Class 1 counties has 
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been significantly lower than in counties of other classes. There are also fewer 
differences between counties (Classes 1 and 3) with inactive immigration enforcement 
policy participation, in terms of deportation change rate. Therefore, hypotheses 4-2 and 
4-3 are partially verified.   
Through Models 1 through 4 fitting unconditional and conditional two univariate 
LGMs, I found that the 541 localities under the implementation of S-Comm had dynamic 
initial status and considerable local heterogeneity in immigration enforcement actions 
during the 13-month period. Moreover, considerable locality differences on the level of 
immigration enforcement policy participation were also found, especially between 
localities with active enforcement policy participation and those without. Extending these 
results, Models 5 and 6 fit LGMs for two immigration enforcement actions 
simultaneously as the parallel-process models. In Model 5, I examined an 
interrelationship between two enforcement changes (growth) through covariance of two 
growth factors, and in Model 6, this interrelationship was also analyzed through creating 
direct regression paths between two enforcement growth factors, paying special attention 
to how the volumes of immigration detainer issuances at the local communities influence 
noncitizen deportation outcomes under S-Comm. In Model 5, there were few changes in 
the directions and effect sizes of the fixed and random effects for two immigration 
enforcement actions under S-Comm, compared to the previous models. Regarding 
covariance between two enforcement actions, the intercepts of noncitizen deportations 
and detainer issuances under S-Comm had a positive and significant relation, r =.93, p 
<.001. However, the slope of noncitizen deportations and the intercept of detainer 
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issuances had a negative and significant covariance, r = -.08, p=.02, indicating that 
localities with higher detainer issuances at the first month tended to have less of an 
increase (lower slope) in noncitizen deportation numbers under S-Comm over time. The 
slope of noncitizen deportations and the linear slope of detainer issuances under S-Comm 
had a positive and significant covariance, r = .14, p=.02, indicating that localities with 
steeper increases of detainer issuances tended to have steeper increases in noncitizen 
deportation numbers. 
In Model 6 adding regression paths to investigate direct effects between the two 
enforcement growth factors, this interrelationship was confirmed in that the relations 
between the initial status of the two enforcement actions or between their rate of change 
(growth) were positively related, but the interrelation between the initial status and rate of 
change for the two enforcement actions appeared to be negatively associated over time. 
According to regression paths between two growth factors, a 10% increase in detainer 
issuances at the first month is associated with 7.6% (.0758e=.796*log(1.1)) increase of 
noncitizen deportations at the first month. However, due to a nonlinear form of detainer 
issuance growth trajectory, the direction between the two enforcement actions changed 
over time and in terms of rate of changes. For example, a 10% increase of detainer 
issuances at the first month reduces the rate of change (growth) of noncitizen deportation 
numbers over time by 0.92% (.0092e= -.097*log(1.1)). Interestingly, a 10% increase of 
instantaneous change of detainer issuances at the first month is associated with a 3.8% 
increase of noncitizen deportation numbers over time under S-Comm. Therefore, 
hypothesis 4-4 is partially verified; two enforcement actions under S-Comm have been 
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positively interrelated with each other during 13 months in terms of status factor, but the 
relationship between status factor and growth factor was negative.     
The final model (7) is a longitudinal mediation analysis regarding 
interrelationships among all three key variables on immigration enforcement policy. The 
extent of local immigration enforcement policy participation was used as the predictor, 
and a noncitizen deportation trajectory was used for the dependent variable. Detainer 
issuance trajectory was used for the intervening or mediator for this model. In this model, 
both status (initial status) and growth (change) factors of detainer issuances mediate the 
relationship between extent of local immigration enforcement policy participation and 
only the status factor, not growth factor, of noncitizen deportation numbers under the S-
Comm program, because growth (rate of change) factor of noncitizen deportations was 
not significant in the univariate LGM. I also did not consider the linear slope of detainer 
issuances as the mediator in this longitudinal mediation analysis because it was not 
significant in Model 6. To examine whether detainer issuances mediate the relationship 
between locality immigration enforcement policy participation and noncitizen deportation 
numbers under S-Comm, the intercept deportation factor at the first month was regressed 
on the intercept detainer issuance factor at the first month, and was also regressed on the 
quadratic change in detainer issuance over time. Additionally, all intercept and slope 
factors (including the linear and quadratic) for the two enforcement actions were each 
regressed on the two different classes on local immigration enforcement policy 
participation.    
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The model estimation results in Figure 5.5 indicate that as with the univariate 
LGMs, extent of local immigration enforcement policy participation was a significant 
predictor of detainer issuance trajectory over time. For localities with active immigration 
enforcement policy participation, their instantaneous change rate of detainer issuances is 
declining at the first month, but over time, their amount of detainer issuances rate tends to 
increase more than those of localities with inactive immigration enforcement policy 
participation. Localities with administratively-inactive-but-legally-punitive-leaning 
enforcement policy participation were 28.3% less likely to issue immigration detainers 
than localities with inactive-but-mixed enforcement policy participation as the reference 
group at the first month, but slope factors representing rate of change in detainer 
issuances were not significant. Detainer issuances intercept and quadratic slope factors 
were significant predictors of noncitizen deportations under the S-Comm framework, 
suggesting that higher levels of detainer issuances at the first month and a steeper 
increase of detainer issuances over time led to higher noncitizen deportation numbers at 
the first month (b=.141, standard error =.035, p <.001 for detainer intercept factor, 
b=.375, se = .142, p <.001 for detainer quadratic slope factor). Extent of local 
immigration enforcement participation as the predictor remained a significant factor of 
noncitizen deportations at the first month, controlling for the detainer issuance trajectory 
(including the intercept and slope factors). The above-mentioned results preliminarily 
indicate evidence that detainer issuance trajectories mediate the relationship between 
distinct local immigration enforcement policy participation and noncitizen deportation 
trajectories. To test whether this preliminary result was really reliable, a Sobel test and 
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bootstrapped mediation effects were analyzed using biased-corrected bootstrap 
confidence intervals
62
. I found that the intercept detainer issuance factor significantly 
mediated the relationship between localities with inactive-but-punitive-leaning 
immigration enforcement policy and deportation intercept factor (ab = -.031, 95% CI = -
.089, -.003). Moreover, quadratic slope detainer issuance factor significantly mediated 
the relationship between localities with active immigration enforcement policy 
participation and deportation intercept factor (ab = .255, 95% CI = .019, .781).
63
  
Therefore, hypothesis 4-5 is verified.                 
 
                                                 
62
 The use of conventional significance tests produce biased and problematic indirect effects because they 
are the product of two or more regression coefficients, which brings about a nonnormal distribution (Flora, 
Khoo, & Chassin, 2007; Geiser, 2013). Bootstrapping is an alternative method using asymmetric 
confidence intervals for significance testing of indirect effects, and under Mplus program for latent variable 
analysis the biased-corrected bootstrapping method estimates alternative confidence intervals based on 
10,000 bootstrap samples.     
63
 The indirect effect for the mediation analysis was expressed as ab in Figure 5.1, referring to the product 
of the relationship between the predictor and the mediator (a) and the relationship between the mediator 
and the outcome (b). 
 169 
 
Figure 5.5. The structural part of parallel process latent growth curve model for the 
mediating effect of detainer issuances on noncitizen deportation numbers under the 
Secure Communities program 
Note: This figure shows only the structural part of the model in Figure 5.3 to prevent model complications. 
In this figure, one-sided arrows refer to the regression path between variables. Bold arrows represent 
significant regression paths, while dashed arrows represent non-significant paths. The strongest bold lines 
represent mediating effects (paths) between the predictor and the dependent variable. Based on structural 
equation modeling (SEM) framework, the rectangles indicate manifest or observed variables, while the 
circles indicate latent or unobserved variables. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. Standard error in parentheses. 
 
5.6. Discussion 
This chapter empirically analyzes how the current immigration enforcement-only 
policy drive under the S-Comm framework and immigration patchwork trend has been 
carried out, especially focusing on the interrelationship between detainer issuances and 
noncitizen deportations. Using exploratory LCA, three classes of localities having distinct 
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policy perspectives on immigration issues were extracted based on local immigration 
policy contexts, and they have different immigration enforcement trajectories over a 13-
month period under the implementation of the S-Comm program. Longitudinal LGMs - 
including parallel process LGMs and a longitudinal mediation analysis - confirmed there 
were considerable dynamic noncitizen enforcement trajectories and local heterogeneity 
over time in terms of the status, growth (change) factors, and their covariances. 
Regarding detainer issuances, a nonlinear (curvilinear) change trend was found over time, 
while for deportation numbers, there was no clear trend, and it appeared to be oscillating 
up and down over time. Two noncitizen enforcement trajectories were positively related 
over time, but their status factor (initial status) and growth factor (rate of change over 
time) tend to be negatively associated with each other, so counties that have higher 
detainer issuance at the first month tend to have less of an increase in noncitizen 
deportation numbers over time, or vice versa. Finally, detainer issuance trajectories 
mediated the relationship between distinct local level of immigration enforcement policy 
participation and noncitizen deportation numbers (rates) under the S-Comm framework, 
suggesting that distinct local policy contexts on immigration enforcement actions predict 
the volume of detainer issuances at the initial month and over time, which in turn predicts 
noncitizen deportation trajectories at the initial status. 
This study has implications for the current enforcement-only immigration policy 
direction and related program implementation. The first implication is related to the 
recognition of some localities leading the current immigration enforcement policy 
direction. As statistically found from the result of LCA in this chapter, counties in Class 2 
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- in spite of making up a small number of the more than 3,000 localities - have led the 
current strong punitive and restrictive immigration policy locally and nationally. Most 
localities in this class are metropolitan areas and also have on average a considerable 
(more than 400,000) Hispanic population in their jurisdictions. As this chapter confirms, 
localities in this class have the highest detainer issuances and monthly deportation 
numbers, 80 - 110 monthly detainer issuances and a consequent 70 - 90 monthly 
noncitizen deportation outcomes, which is 4 to more than 10 times higher than 
deportation outcomes for counties with inactive immigration policy participation. These 
34 active localities - including Maricopa County, Arizona; Harris County, Texas; and Los 
Angeles County, California - make up 6.3% of the total 541 localities for this study, and 
just 1.1% of total of the 3,181 localities that have activated S-Comm across the country. 
In spite of their marginal share of the total number of localities, their political power and 
voices toward a more punitive and enforcement-oriented policy drive has been enormous. 
As in the experience of passage of Arizona’s SB1070 and consequent strong anti-
immigration policy diffusion across the country since the mid 2000s, these localities have 
played a role as moral or punitive immigration policy entrepreneurs. More than 90% of 
localities inactively participate in immigration enforcement-only policy. In this study, I 
found 419 localities (77.4%) have an inactive-but-mixed enforcement policy stance, 
indicating that more than three fourths of localities in the United States have mixed or 
conflicting perspectives on immigration-related issues. 
The second implication is the necessity of reconsidering the current enforcement-
only immigration policy direction. This study explicitly analyzes how current 
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immigration enforcement actions have been carried out under the S-Comm framework 
through two key enforcement tools, but also implicitly touches on the working 
mechanism of the current “enforcement machine,” and how such a machine has been 
stepped up over time. Strong punitive and restrictive perspectives on immigration from 
Washington politicians since the 1990s led federal immigration administrators to create 
and implement enforcement-only systems. With successful construction of rhetoric about 
an immigration-crime nexus and the convergence of the federal immigration system and 
criminal justice system through back-to-back federal anti-immigration legislation, 
DHS/ICE’s main goal was to have higher “numbers” of noncitizen captures, detentions, 
and deportations in the name of public safety and national security. Under the current 
enforcement machine, monthly and yearly enforcement quotas have been set by 
Washington, and ICE must create and provide more enforcement numbers to get public 
resources from Congress. Such an enforcement machine has skillfully been connected 
with private-sector interests, especially the privatization of immigration detention as an 
industry, through enormous lobbying powers, and has faithfully reflected the private 
sector’s perspective on increasing immigration enforcement to maximize their profits 
(Ackerman & Furman, 2013; Krisberg, Marchionna, & Harteny, 2014). In spite of 
significant public concerns and criticisms of the current enforcement machines and their 
working mechanism immersed in maximizing enforcement numbers, noncitizen 
enforcement actions and related administrative programs have become increasingly 
automated and sophisticated with a view to expanding enforcement numbers, in spite of 
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multiple policy malfunctions and related signals as I pointed out in Chapter 4 on the 
biased enforcement outcomes from the implementation of S-Comm.  
In spite of such implications, this chapter has limitations on the data analysis. As I 
mentioned, ICE has been strongly resistant to releasing noncitizen enforcement data, 
especially on deportations and detainer issuances, under the S-Comm program. Due to 
such strong resistance, monthly detainer issuance data for this study is based on that of 
the Criminal Alien Program under ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations as proxy 
data. The inability to access concrete and reliable enforcement data on S-Comm and the 
resultant use of proxy data might produce bias in the process of empirical data analyses.  
Based on the results of Chapter 4 (descriptive and graphical analysis of monthly 
noncitizen deportation outcomes under the implementation S-Comm during the last 61 
months) and Chapter 5 (analysis of enforcement mechanisms under the current 
enforcement machine and related system, focusing on two key enforcement actions under 
S-Comm and distinct local immigration enforcement policy participation), the next 
chapter  creates a more “comprehensive map” to account for the current complicated U.S. 
immigration enforcement policy process, by adding contextual factors representing local 
political, economic, geographic, and demographic perspectives. Moreover, based on the 
main goal of S-Comm - making communities safer by removing “dangerous” noncitizens 
- the next chapter analyzes whether the implementation of S-Comm really increased 
community safety in localities as this program boastfully promised. 
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CHAPTER 6
64
 
FACTORS SHAPING LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT POLICY 
AND EVALUATION OF PROGRAM OUTCOMES  
UNDER THE SECURE COMMUNITIES PROGRAM 
 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter offers a comprehensive perspective of current immigration 
enforcement policy through an examination of contextual factors shaping local 
immigration policy choices and an evaluation of how effective the implementation of S-
Comm during the last 5 years has been at making local communities safer as DHS/ICE 
have argued. The following questions are discussed in this chapter: What factors make 
local communities follow a more restrictive and punitive approach to immigration 
policy? What factors make localities actively participate in immigration enforcement 
policy under the current intergovernmental cooperation framework? Under the current 
enforcement machine system immersed in maximizing detention and deportation 
numbers, how well has the implementation of S-Comm, as the key immigration 
enforcement program under the Obama administration, accomplished the intended 
program goal? That is, has S-Comm secured our local communities?  
                                                 
64
 Some parts of this chapter were presented as a paper at the Blurring the Border conference at the 
University of California at Merced, April 17-18, 2015, and published in Politics of Color with the title Has 
“Secure Communities” Really Secured Our Communities? I appreciate Professor Tanya Golash-Boza, who 
hosted a research conference for discussing U.S. deportation policy with an interdisciplinary perspective. 
Also I appreciate the audiences’ valuable comments from this conference. Finally, I appreciate Professors 
N. Joseph Cayer and Paul G. Lewis for detailed reviews and comments on the previous draft.     
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To answer these research questions, two hypotheses were set in Chapter 3: the 
first hypothesis (relationship between contextual factors - demographic, political, 
economic, and geographical contexts - and local immigration enforcement policy 
participation) and the fifth hypothesis (association between the implementation of S-
Comm and local public or community safety). As an extension of Chapter 5 focusing on 
analysis of the intergovernmental immigration enforcement mechanism under the S-
Comm framework, specifically the association between three factors, this chapter creates 
a more comprehensive framework to discuss the abovementioned research questions. 
Figure 6.1 schematically indicates a more expanded conceptual framework compared to 
the previous chapter. 
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Figure 6.1. Conceptual framework for understanding contextual factors shaping local 
immigration enforcement policy participation and evaluating implementation results from 
the Secure Communities program 
Note: The dotted circle in this figure refers to the administrative immigration enforcement working 
mechanism under S-Comm based on intergovernmental enforcement cooperative framework. Empirical 
analyses in Chapter 5 were predominantly presented in this circle.     
 
6.2. Data and Methodology 
For analysis, this chapter used multiple data sources on current U.S. immigration 
enforcement policy implementation and local political, socioeconomic, and geographical 
contexts. Three variables that were already used for analysis in Chapter 5 - extent of local 
immigration enforcement policy participation based on three classifications, as well as 
monthly immigration detainer issuances and monthly noncitizen deportations per locality 
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under the S-Comm framework - are also used in this chapter, so I will not repeat them 
here. Most data collected regarding local communities cover multiple years (from 2010 to 
2012 or 2013), specifically reflecting the periods in which S-Comm has been initiated 
and implemented up to recently. With the same samples used for analysis in Chapter 5, 
541 counties having meaningful monthly immigration deportation outcomes under the S-
Comm framework (> at least 1 noncitizen removal per month) are used with 5 time 
(month) points covering a 13-month period (Dec. 2011 - Jan. 2013).   
 
6.2.1. Dependent Variable: Local Community Safety
65
  
In Figure 6.1, the outcome variable is local community safety as the 
implementation result of S-Comm. DHS/ICE’s main logic for doing stepped-up internal 
enforcement actions based on intergovernmental cooperation is the “immigrant-crime 
nexus” assumption; therefore, according to the argument from federal immigration 
agencies, the implementation of S-Comm at the local level should improve community 
safety through proactively catching and removing dangerous noncitizens. Many previous 
studies have tended to use local crime rates and their change as indicators for public or 
community safety (Cox & Miles, 2013; Koper, Guterbock, Woods, Taylor, & Carter, 
2013; Treyger, Chalfin, & Loeffler, 2014). Various types of crime numbers or rates used 
for measuring community safety from the previous studies include the number of 
offenses reported, violent and property crime rates, crime victims as a percent of 
                                                 
65
 Community safety can be defined and considered by various operationalizations, but generally, scholars 
consider community safety as “the freedom from crime and violence as well as the fear of crime and 
violence” (Whitzman & Zhang, 2006). Broadly, the community safety issue tends to be connected with 
social wellbeing and economic and environmental sustainability issues. However, most studies consider 
community safety in terms of “crime, security, and injury prevention” (Clare & Plecas, 2012). 
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population, and public perspective on the feeling of community safety via survey or 
interview. Following those previous studies, I used local (county) Crime Rate Changes 
Per 100,000 Population during a recent 4 years (2010 - 2013)
66
, which cover a 13-month 
period under S-Comm that this chapter uses.  
Data for county-level crime numbers and rates were basically collected from web 
site searches of 45 states’ law enforcement agencies or criminal justice information 
centers.
67
 Web sites of some states did not provide statistics of county-level crimes, so I 
contacted the related states’ LEAs and requested county-level crime data via an official 
state data request format per state.
68
 Twenty counties did not respond to the data request, 
so their crime data have been omitted, thus crime data covering 4 years were collected 
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 I used crime rate changes at the county level during a recent 4 years, not averaged crime rates at the 
county level during the same period, because crime rate changes reflect more clearly the changing rates and 
directions of crime level. Previous studies (Cox & Miles, 2013; Miles & Cox, 2014; Treyger, Chalfin, & 
Loeffler, 2014) on the program effectiveness and relevancy of S-Comm selected crime rate changes at a 
longitudinal perspective.  
67
 The 541 counties for this study do not include localities within six states and U.S. territories that did not 
have meaningful noncitizen deportation outcomes during the last 5 years (2008 - 2013), including counties 
in Alaska, Maine, Montana, North Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia, and Puerto Rico. Most previous 
studies tend to use the FBI’s crime statistics for county-level criminal actions (Chand & Schreckhise, 2014; 
Cox & Miles, 2013), but I did not use these statistics because FBI crime data at the county level do not 
include total crimes; according to FBI crime statistics at the county level (http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/tables/table-10/table-10-
pieces/table_10_offenses_known_to_law_enforcement_by_alabama_by_metropolitan_and_nonmetropolita
n_counties_2013.xls), it clearly says that “the data shown in this table do not reflect county totals, but are 
the number of offenses reported by the sheriff’s office or county police department.” Therefore, FBI crime 
statistics are likely to underreport the numbers of crimes at the county level. On the other hand, each state’s 
law enforcement agency releases county-level crime data, which includes sheriff’s offices and city-level 
crime data within that county. That is why I used each state’s own data on crimes. The list of state LEAs 
and their Web links I accessed for data on crime statistics at the county level is in the appendix.   
68
 The Web sites of five states - Colorado, Indiana, Louisiana (some counties), Massachusetts, and 
Mississippi - did not provide county-level crime statistics per year. So I contacted these states’ LEAs to get 
the data. However, only Colorado provided reliable data, so crime data from the other states were dealt 
with as missing data.   
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from a total of 521 counties. Based on the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) 
format, crime data were collected in terms of total, violent, and property crimes.
69
             
 
6.2.2. Explanatory Variables: Local Contextual Factors  
Multiple demographic, political, economic, and geographical factors at the county 
level were collected from public data sources. Based on previous studies, Percentage of 
Hispanic Population during a recent 5 years (2009 - 2013), and Percentage Change of 
Hispanic Population during a recent 5 years (2008 - 2012) were used to reflect the 
demographic situations at the county level. As a proxy variable for Hispanic population, 
Percentage of Foreign-Born Population (2009-2013) and Percentage Change of 
Foreign-Born Population (2008 - 2012) during a recent 5 years were also collected. All 
of these data were obtained from the American Community Survey (ACS) from the U.S. 
Census Bureau.  
As political factors, presidential election data at the county level were used. Many 
previous studies used these data as one of the key political variables on immigration 
perspectives at the local level (Chand & Schreckhise, 2014; Lewis, Varsanyi, Provine & 
Decker, 2013b; Wong, 2014a). Republican-leaning Counties from two previous 
presidential voting results (Obama vs. McCain in the 2008 election and Obama vs. 
Romney in the 2012 election) were collected and calculated from average Republican 
voting percentage (the percentage of voters who voted for Republican candidates). 
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 In compliance with the FBI’s UCR format, violent crimes consist of four subcategories (homicide, rape, 
robbery, and aggravated assault), and property crimes consist of three subcategories (burglary, larceny, and 
motor vehicle theft). Total crimes refer to the combination of violent and property crimes, and consist of 
seven individual crime categories. Crime rates were calculated by dividing the number of reported crimes 
by the total population, and then this result is finally multiplied by 100,000 as general population size.  
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Election data were obtained from Wolf’s data archive (2013) regarding election data from 
states, counties, and districts since 2000. Moreover, with special attention to the 
connection between increasing immigration enforcement hysteria since the 2000s and the 
role of the business sector, specifically private prison businesses, to expand punitive and 
enforcement-based local and federal immigration policy, I add Private Prison Company 
as another political or contextual factor shaping local participation in immigration 
enforcement policy.
70
 As repeatedly pointed out from many previous studies - 
specifically from human- and migrant-rights groups and the social justice field - private 
prison businesses have considerably influenced the direction of local immigration politics 
and policy through aggressive lobbying powers and secret public-private partnerships, 
such as the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC),
71
 and by contracting out 
immigrant detention services
72
 for deportation proceedings in local jurisdictions 
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 There have been multiple private prison companies involving immigrant detention services in the United 
States, and little information  has been released on exactly how many of them have been involved in 
immigration enforcement policy with federal or local governments via public-private partnerships. Of these 
multiple companies, two big private prison companies, Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and the 
Geo Group, Inc., have been famous for detaining immigrants through various forms of detention contracts 
with federal or local governments. CCA has owned and managed 44 facilities in the United States with an 
additional 21 facilities (owned by federal or local governments but run by CCA) for immigration 
detainment, which include spaces for 91,000 inmates. As the second-largest prison company, Geo Group is 
currently operating 65 corrections and detention facilities in the United States. The Management & 
Training Corporation is the third-largest private prison company with the capacity to house 29,000 inmates 
at 22 facilities nationwide (Ackerman & Furman, 2013; Brown, 2012; Doty & Wheatley, 2013; National 
People’s Action & Public Accountability Initiative, 2012). The list of counties and private prison 
companies in their jurisdictions on immigration detainment and operations is in the appendix.  
71
 ALEC has officially been known as an organization for organic public-private network or partnership. 
However, it has also been famous for a secret and shadowy public-private combination for sharing and 
shaping conservative policy ideas at the local and federal level. As a “right-wing organization,” ALEC has 
oriented toward pro-market and small-government views while institutionally combining and connecting 
the public, policymakers, politicians and private-sector interest or pressure groups (Stuart, 2011a, 2011b). 
Private prison companies have been a high-profile private-sector member participating in creating model 
bills and sponsoring conferences and meetings among members including lodging, dining, and other costs.   
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 The structure of immigration detention since the increasing enforcement-only policy drive has been more 
and more complicated, and actually little information is available about how the public and private sectors 
have been involved in immigration detention services financially and operationally. TRAC, through FOIA 
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(Ackerman & Furman, 2013; Doty & Wheatley, 2013; Gottschalk, 2014; National Public 
Radio, 2009). For analysis, I dichotomize counties into two groups: counties with 
detention facilities that are run or owned by private prison companies in their 
jurisdictions under a government contract (coded 1) and counties without (coded 0). 
Related data on private prison companies’ connection with the immigration detention 
business were collected from TRAC, the detention facility locator on ICE’s web site, 
facility location and client (contractor) searches on two big private prison companies’ 
web sites, and references from previous studies.                
Regarding economic factors reflecting local economic conditions, Unemployment 
Rate and Unemployment Rate Change per county during a recent 3 years (2010 - 2012, 
not seasonally adjusted) were collected from the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. 
Department of Labor. As a proxy variable for unemployment rate and unemployment rate 
change, Poverty Rate and Poverty Rate Change per county during the same recent 3 years 
(all ages, 2010 - 2012)
73
 were also collected from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Small Area 
Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE) program.  
Geographical factors, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, have been closely 
associated with choices of more punitive and restrictive immigration perspectives and 
related policies in local jurisdictions. Following the logic of previous chapters, Southwest 
Border Localities (Counties) geographically neighboring U.S. - Mexico border areas, 
                                                                                                                                                 
requests, nicely classifies such current complicated immigrant detainments and facility operations into 7 
types, including ICE’s own management (“ICE service processing center”), public-private contract, and 
intergovernmental service agreement (IGSA) facility. For more information on the complicated structure of 
immigrant detention and facility operation, see TRAC, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/222/       
73
 According to the U.S. Census Bureau, poverty rate is basically measured by “the percentage of people 
whose income fell below the poverty threshold” (Bishaw & Fontenot, 2014).   
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including counties within the states of Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas, were 
selected to reflect a geographical context on local immigration policy choice. Related 
data were collected from web searches and previous studies on the border states or 
localities. Table 6.1 lists all variables and sources used for analysis. 
 
Table 6.1. Variables Used for Analysis 
Variable Source 
Demographic Variables  
Hispanic population (%, 2009-13)  
American Community Survey, U.S. 
Census Bureau 
Hispanic population change rate (%, 2008-12) 
Foreign-born population (%, 2009-13, including 
naturalized & non-US citizens) 
Foreign-born population change rate (%, 2008-
12) 
 
Economic Variables  
Unemployment rate (%, 2010-12) Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Unemployment rate change (%, 2010-12) 
Poverty rate (%, 2010-12) Small Area Income and Poverty 
Estimates (SAIPE) Poverty rate change (%, 2010-12) 
Geographical Variable  
Border (Southwest) counties  Web search & referring to previous 
studies  
Political & Contextual Variables  
Republican-leaning localities (averaged % 
during two presidential elections, 2008-12) 
Election data at the county level 
(Wolf, 2013) 
Private prison complex detaining noncitizens for 
deportation proceedings 
TRAC 
ICE’s detention facility locator 
search 
Private prison companies’ (CCA & 
Geo Group) facility search on 
immigration detention 
Media search & previous studies on 
private prison business on 
immigration enforcement  
Local ordinances/resolutions on 
welcoming/restrictive immigrants 
Public/nonprofit groups’ data & 
Web search 
 
Crime rates per 100,000 population (including Each state’s law enforcment agency 
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violent and property crimes) or criminal justice information 
center  
Administrative Variables  
Monthly immigration detainer issuance  TRAC 
ICE (Freedom of Information Act 
[FOIA] request)  
Monthly immigrant deportation numbers ICE (FOIA library on the web site) 
287(g) partnerships at the local level ICE (FOIA requests & FOIA 
library on the web site) 
Adoption of Secure Communities program at the 
local level 
ICE (FOIA library on the web site) 
Note: Administrative and some political variables (local ordinances on welcoming/restrictive 
immigration) are not explained in this chapter because they were already discussed in Chapter 5. 
Some administrative variables in this table - monthly immigration detainer issuance and monthly 
immigrant deportation numbers - were longitudinal variables with five repeated measurements 
over time, while others were fixed (including time-variant and -invariant) variables which were 
measured only one time.         
      
6.3. Modeling Strategy 
For this chapter, three modeling strategies were used for analysis. As in Figure 
6.1, the circled area dealing with the interrelationship between and among three 
contextual factors on immigration enforcement actions under S-Comm was already 
analyzed in Chapter 5, and new explanatory variables (left side) shaping local choices on 
immigration policy and outcome variable (right side) are added. Therefore, the first 
model focuses on the relationship between IVs and local immigration enforcement policy 
participation, and analyzes how various local political, economic, demographic, and 
geographical factors influence localities’ immigration enforcement policymaking. The 
second model focuses on the relationship between noncitizen deportation numbers under 
the implementation of S-Comm and community safety at the county level. According to 
logic from DHS/ICE for legitimating the implementation of S-Comm, intergovernmental 
enforcement cooperation under S-Comm and proactive removals of dangerous 
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noncitizens at the county level make local communities safer through decreasing the rates 
of crimes committed by risky noncitizens. If these two variables are significantly and 
negatively associated (e.g., increasing deportation numbers at the county level is 
significantly related to decreasing crime rates during a recent 4 years), the 
implementation of S-Comm has followed the direction federal immigration bureaucrats 
intended. The final model includes all variables in Figure 6.1, and as a combined model, I 
analyze how current immigration enforcement policy has been carried out, and as the 
second model, whether S-Comm has faithfully followed the stated goal of making 
communities safer. 
 
6.3.1. The First Model: Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis Between Local 
Contextual Factors and Distinct Local Immigration Enforcement Policy Participation 
For the first model, I used a multinomial logistic regression model considering the 
fact that the DV in this model, extent of local immigration enforcement policy 
participation, has an (unordered) multicategorical scale, which was statistically extracted 
as three subclasses or -groups from LCA in Chapter 5. Of three subclasses on the DV in 
this model, I set Class 3 counties, counties with inactive-but-mixed immigration 
enforcement policy participation, as the reference group for group comparisons, and the 
following basic equation is used for analysis: 
 
log 
                       
                      
 =   +      +      + … +             
log 
                       
                      
 =   +      +      + … +                    (1) 
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In equation (1), this model is basically composed of two logit models because 
each of two classes (Classes 1 and 2) should be compared with the reference group, Class 
3 counties. As the explanatory variables, I set four different contextual factors influencing 
the DV: demographic, political, economic, and geographical factors. Therefore, these 
factors can be inserted into the equation as follows: 
 
log 
                       
                      
 =   +              +             +            +                +        
log 
                       
                      
 =   +              +             +            +                +      (2) 
 
Equation (2) shows the full model including all four contextual factors, but there 
are multiple scenarios modeling the relationships between IVs and the DV, including 
using some of the IVs, but not all four, or adding the interaction effects between IVs. 
Multiple research scenarios for multinomial logistic regression are discussed in the 
results section.  
 
6.3.2. The Second Model: Addition of Local Crime Rate Changes as the Outcome into 
Noncitizen Deportation Trajectory under LGM  
The second model is to analyze program implementation through the relationship 
between deportation outcomes under the implementation of S-Comm during a recent 13-
month period (Dec. 2011 - Jan. 2013) and consequent crime rate changes at the county 
level during a recent 4 years (2010 - 2013). In Chapter 4 using descriptive and graphical 
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analyses, I already found that S-Comm has been implemented unlike the program goal 
(which is to catch and remove noncitizens with dangerous criminal violations) and at the 
county level more than half of noncitizens removed during the last 5 years have been 
with minor charges and immigration violations in the name of “criminal aliens.” While 
Chapter 4 analyzes the implementation of S-Comm with enforcement numbers and the 
level of criminality based on ICE’s enforcement priorities, this chapter analyzes this 
program with a slightly different angle, specifically correspondence between the program 
goal - making communities safer - and implementation result of S-Comm via community 
safety level. In the previous chapter, the noncitizen deportation trajectory during a 13-
month period was considered the DV, but as in Figure 6.1, it was used as the predictor 
influencing community safety at the local level. Figure 6.2 indicates a path diagram 
showing the relationship between variables.      
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Figure 6.2. A path diagram representing the relationship between noncitizen deportation 
trajectory during a 13-month period under the implementation of S-Comm and 
community crime rate changes during a recent 4 years (2010 - 2013) 
Note: Based on the result of a univariate noncitizen deportation LGM in Chapter 5, a linear model for 
noncitizen deportation has the best model fit and estimate. 
               
Using equation (10) in Chapter 5 for noncitizen deportation LGM, the following 
regression equation can be made for the second model: 
 
 188 
              = (   +     ) + (    +        +    )          (3)
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    =    +                 +                       (4) 
 
6.3.3. The Third Model: A Combined Model Including All Variables 
Based on the first and second models in the previous section, the third model 
comprehensively analyzes enforcement actions and logic under the current immigration 
enforcement policy, including local choices on immigration enforcement policy 
participation, interrelationships between and among intergovernmental enforcement 
actions, and the implementation result of S-Comm. The main analytic point for this 
combined model is still the implementation result of S-Comm, focusing on whether this 
program has really secured local communities’ safety through decreasing crime rates over 
time. Other parts, such as local choices and administrative interrelationships between 
enforcement actions, are also discussed, with special attention given to whether effect 
size and directions of path coefficients in Figure 6.1 are changed. Graphical analyses are 
also included to critically analyze the relationship between noncitizen deportation 
trajectories and crime rate changes at the county level.        
 
6.4. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6.2 shows descriptive statistics on variables regarding IVs and the DV in 
Figure 6.1. For understanding local differences, this table subdivides the 541 counties 
used for analysis into three classes statistically extracted from LCA in the previous 
                                                 
74
 Equation (3) here is the same as equation (10) in Chapter 5 referring to a univariate LGM for noncitizen 
deportation trajectory under the implementation of S-Comm. 
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chapter, and then analyzes differences in their local political, economic, and demographic 
conditions. Four contextual factors shaping local extent of immigration enforcement 
policy participation show interesting trends or characteristics between counties. Counties 
with strong immigration enforcement policy (“Class 2”) have traditionally and relatively 
large shares of Hispanic (20.76%) and foreign-born population (15.15%, naturalized and 
non-U.S. citizens combined) compared to other localities. Moreover, many counties in 
this class, more than one third, tend to be located in the southwest (US - Mexico) border 
area, and about 1 in 4 counties in Class 2 made contracts with private prison companies 
to detain immigrants caught in their jurisdictions, which is between 3 and 10 times more 
than in other counties.  
Considering Hispanic population change rates during a recent 5 years (2008-12), 
however, Class 1 counties with administratively-inactive-but-legally-punitive 
immigration policy participation tend to have a faster increasing rate (38.24%) than other 
counties. However, with regard to foreign-born population change during the same years, 
counties with inactive-but-mixed immigration enforcement policy participation (Class 3) 
had the fastest increasing trend among all other localities (17.86%). This result indicates 
that counties have different shares and speeds of Hispanic and foreign-born population 
changes in their jurisdictions. Many Class 2 counties, as immigrant-gateway localities, 
traditionally have large Hispanic and foreign-born populations, while Classes 1 and 3 
have a faster rate of change of these population groups than Class 2 counties.  
Politically, all 541 counties had higher rates of supporting Republicans than 
Democrats during the last two presidential elections, averaging 57.3%. Of the three 
 190 
classes, interestingly, Class 1 counties had the highest Republican-preferred tendencies 
(69.32%) during the last two presidential elections. In terms of economic situations, few 
differences were found among the counties, but counties orienting toward 
administratively restrictive (Class 1) and active immigration enforcement policy (Class 2) 
tend to have experienced more serious economic declines than Class 3 localities.  
 
Table 6.2. Descriptive Statistics on Variables Shaping the Direction of Local 
Immigration Enforcement Policy Participation and Local Crime Rate Changes 
Variables Total 
Counties  
Class 1 
Counties 
Class 2 
Counties 
Class 3 
Counties 
N 541 88 34 419 
Demographic factors     
Hispanic population (%, 2009-
13)  
17.53 
(.171) 
10.08 
(.102) 
20.76 
(.148) 
18.84 
(.180) 
Hispanic population change rate  
(%, 2008-12) 
26.27 
(.187) 
38.24 
(.255) 
15.56 
(.134) 
24.82 
(.161) 
Foreign-born population (%, 
2009-13, including naturalized & 
non-U.S. citizens) 
 
11.03 
(.077) 
 
7.47  
(.052) 
 
15.15 
(.081) 
 
11.45 
(.079) 
Foreign-born population change  
(%, 2008-12) 
16.67 
(1.33) 
16.74 
(.390) 
4.83  
(.220) 
17.86 
(1.52) 
Economic factors     
Unemployment rate (%, 2010-
12) 
8.79 
(2.81) 
9.15 
(2.48) 
9.29 
(3.52) 
8.68 
(2.81) 
Unemployment rate change  
(%, 2010-12) 
-1.46 
(.939) 
-1.48 
(1.04) 
-1.87  
(.91) 
-1.43  
(.91) 
Poverty rate (%, 2010-12) 16.26 
(5.88) 
17.09 
(6.68) 
15.62 
(4.07) 
16.14 
(5.83) 
Poverty rate change (%, 2010-
12) 
.51 (1.75) .78 (1.87) .54 (1.28) .46 (1.75) 
Geographical factors     
Border (southwest) localities (%) 25.14  
(136 
counties) 
9.09  
(8 counties) 
32.35  
(11 
counties) 
27.92  
(117 
counties) 
Political & contextual factors     
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Republican-preferred counties 
(%, averaged from two [2008 & 
2012] presidential turnout rates) 
57.30 
(310 
counties) 
69.32  
(61 
counties) 
55.88 
(19 
counties) 
54.89 
(230 
counties) 
Localities with private prison 
complex detaining noncitizens for 
deportation proceedings (%) 
7.02 
(38 
counties) 
2.27 
(2 counties) 
20.59  
(7 counties) 
6.92  
(29 
counties) 
Crime rates per 100,000 
population (%, 2010-2013) 
 (77 
counties) 
(34 
counties) 
(409 
counties) 
Violent crime rates 395.15 
(270.27) 
360.63 
(258.02) 
400.23 
(230.15) 
401.22 
(275.62) 
Property crime rates 2,860.32 
(1,177.09) 
3,098.34 
(1,263.71) 
3,026.93 
(1,092.57) 
2,801.65 
(1,162.76) 
Total crime rates 3,255.46 
(1,365.85) 
3,458.97 
(1,444.18) 
3,427.17 
(1,272.88) 
3,202.88 
(1,356.64) 
Crime rates change  
(%, 2010-2013) 
    
Violent crime rates change -.055 
(.314) 
-.043 
(.322) 
-.081 
(.128) 
-.055 
(.323) 
Property crime rates change -.063 
(.189) 
-.082 
(.170) 
-.083 
(.097) 
-.058 
(.197) 
Total crime rates change -.065 
(.190) 
-.082 
(.167) 
-.085 
(.090) 
-.060 
(.200) 
Note: In the first row, there are three groups of counties. Those in Classes 1 and 3 were categorized by 
latent class analysis in the previous chapter. Class 1 refers to counties with administratively-inactive-but-
legally-punitive immigration enforcement policy participation; Class 2 refers to localities with active 
immigration enforcement policy participation; and Class 3 refers to localities with inactive-but-mixed 
immigration enforcement policy participation. Regarding crime rates, there are missing data for two of the 
locality classes: 11 for Class 1, and 10 for Class 3. Crime rate data were collected in compliance with the 
FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) format. Based on the UCR format, violent crime includes four 
offenses (homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault), and property crime includes three offenses 
(burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft). Total crime combines violent and property crimes. Standard 
deviations in parentheses except geographical and political and contextual variables. 
 
As the outcome variable, total crime rate of 541 localities activating S-Comm 
during a recent 4 years (2010-13) was 3,255.46 per 100,000 population, which is slightly 
higher than the U.S. national level (3,249.33) during the same period. There are some 
variations on crime rates among the three classes, but localities (Classes 1 and 2) having a 
rather (administratively) punitive immigration stance and active immigration enforcement 
policy participation tend to have higher total crime rates than Class 3 counties. All 
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counties regardless of class tend to have a slightly decreasing crime trend during a recent 
4 years (2010 - 2013), but interestingly, counties with active immigration enforcement 
policy participation have higher and faster decreasing crime trends than other counties. 
Based on these descriptive statistics, I found that counties with active immigration 
enforcement policy participation have had more Hispanic and foreign-born populations 
than other counties, and have been the main target areas for the implementation of S-
Comm. It is partially supported by strikingly large shares of involvement of private 
prison businesses in Class 2 counties. However, interestingly but ironically, crime rates in 
Class 2 counties have decreased faster over time than counties in other classes. This 
indicates that the “immigrant-crime” hypothesis that immigration restrictionists have 
argued is not supported. Table 6.3 represents a correlation matrix regarding the 
interrelationship between and among four contextual predictors consisting of 11 
individual variables. According to this correlation matrix, Hispanic population and 
foreign-born population at the county level have a strong positive relation, which is a sign 
of some possible overlap between them. Moreover, a moderate positive relation between 
Hispanic population at the county level and southwest border counties was found.   
  
1
9
3 
 Table 6.3. Correlation Matrix of the Independent Variables (values 0.5 and higher in bold) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
1. Hispanic population (%) 1.00           
2. Hispanic population change (%) -0.54 1.00          
3. Foreign-born population (%) 0.74 -0.45 1.00         
4. Foreign-born population change (%)  -0.10 0.13 -0.10 1.00        
5. Unemployment rate (%) 0.36 -0.28 0.22 -0.06 1.00       
6. Unemployment rate change (%) 0.02 0.22 0.03 0.08 -0.31 1.00      
7. Poverty rate (%) 0.18 -0.05 -0.07 0.04 0.43 -0.09 1.00     
8. Poverty rate change (%) -0.00 -0.09 0.01 -0.13 0.17 0.01 0.11 1.00    
9. (Southwest) Border counties  0.59 -0.33 0.32 -0.05 0.28 -0.05 0.18 -0.03 1.00   
10. Republican-preferred counties (%) -0.13 0.12 -0.41 0.06 -0.07 -0.11 -0.09 -0.15 0.03 1.00  
11. Counties with private prison 
detaining immigrants in their 
jurisdictions 
0.31 -0.14 0.25 -0.01 0.19 -0.01 0.14 0.03 0.25 -0.09 1.00 
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6.5. Finding Factors Shaping Local Immigration Enforcement Policy Participation 
Through Multinomial Logistic Regression  
Table 6.4 shows multinomial logistic regression results representing influences of 
four types of contextual factors and their interactions on distinct levels of local 
immigration enforcement policy participation. This table consists of five models in the 
first row: estimating influence of demographic factors for the first model; economic 
factors for the second model; a geographical factor and related interaction effects for the 
third model; political factors and related interaction effects for the fourth model; and a 
combined model including all four contextual factors for the fifth model. To analyze 
influences of each contextual factor and prevent statistical misinterpretations, I did 
multicollinearity checks after doing the regression of each model, and then dropped 
problematic predictors bringing about high intercorrelations between IVs beyond the 
threshold of the variance inflation factor (VIF).
75
 
With regard to Model 1 on demographic factors, shares (%) of foreign-born 
population at the county level significantly help counties lean toward a more punitive and 
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 I checked the VIFs to diagnose a multicollinearity problem per model estimation, and most predictors 
had an acceptable level of VIFs. Conventionally a threshold value for VIF commonly used by quantitative 
scholars for checking for a multicollinearity problem is 10 or higher, which is identical to 0.1 or less than 
0.1 for tolerance (=1/VIF). However, I found that interaction terms on the predictors (i.e., an interaction 
between geographical factor and demographic factor, or an interaction between political factor and 
demographic factor) indicate relatively high VIFs, which was a sign of multicollinearity. It is inescapable 
when a model has interaction terms as a predictor; when the model is composed of predictors a, b, and ab, 
both a and b are likely to be highly correlated with their product (Allison, 2012). Econometric studies 
(Allison, 2012; Wooldridge, 2010) recommend that in such situations, researchers can ignore the high 
multicollinearity issue. Centering is frequently recommended for reducing high VIFs, but I did not use such 
a strategy here, and selected another option, dropping problematic predictors and interaction terms. When 
percentages of foreign-born population and Hispanic population were simultaneously interacted with 
geographical factor (Model 3) and political factor (Model 4), multicollinearity problems arose, so I dropped 
one of them in their models. It might be due to a relatively high bivariate correlation between these two 
IVs. However, interestingly, in Model 1 including them simultaneously, I found no sign of a 
multicollinearity problem and VIFs ranged from 1.02 to 2.52.        
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active noncitizen enforcement policy turn than a mixed immigration perspective, given 
that the other variables in the model are held constant (  = .77, relative risk ratio76 [rrr] = 
2.15). However, interestingly, percent of Hispanic population as a proxy demographic 
factor did not significantly influence local choices toward more active immigration 
enforcement actions. Rather, Hispanic population change rate makes counties more likely 
to become Class 1 counties having an administratively-inactive-but-legally-punitive 
immigration perspective (  = 2.94, rrr = 19.04), and less likely to select a more active 
enforcement-focused policy either administratively or legally (  = -4.27, rrr = .01). As 
previous studies have had mixed results on the influence of demographic factors on local 
immigration perspectives, this result follows that trend.  
Economic contexts in Model 2, including unemployment rate and poverty rate at 
the county level, did not significantly influence local immigration enforcement policy 
participation, although previous studies showed mixed signals on these factors (Chand & 
Schreckhise, 2014; Walker, 2014; Wong, 2014b). When an economic factor 
(unemployment rate) is linked with a geographical factor (border area), however, 
localities tend to lean slightly and significantly toward a more punitive immigration 
policy turn, through passing local versions of punitive and restrictive immigration 
ordinances or resolutions, not administrative enforcement actions ( =.16, rrr = 1.17). 
With regard to the influence of the geographical factor in Model 3, southwest border 
localities that are close to the U.S.-Mexico border appear to have active immigration 
                                                 
76
 Under a multinomial logistic model, a relative risk ratio (rrr) as the exponentiated coefficient is used 
rather than an odd ratio. When an ordered logistic model is estimated, the values of response are not 
independent because they are considered to be ordered, while the responses under a multinomial logistic 
model are unordered and therefore are independent of each other (Hilbe, 2009). However, this coefficient 
using rrr can also be interpreted as an odd ratio.        
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enforcement participation when the geographical factor is combined (interacted) with a 
demographic factor (percentage of Hispanic population) or an economic context 
(unemployment rate) at the community level, but it was not significant at the 
conventional level. On the other hand, counties in Class 1 are less likely to be located in 
the southwest border area than localities in Class 3 ( = -5.10, rrr =.01). This result does 
not support the first hypothesis for this study, but follows the logic of Walker and Leitner 
(2011) arguing that geographical factors are not directly associated with more restrictive 
immigration policy at the local level, but combining them with other local contexts 
significantly accounts for a local punitive and enforcement turn on immigration issues.      
As many previous studies (Lewis, Provine, Varsanyi, & Decker, 2013b; 
Ramakrishnan & Wong, 2010; Wong, 2014a, 2014b) mentioned, political factors in 
Model 4 provide the strongest and most consistent incentives for localities to lean toward 
more active immigration enforcement policy participation. Republican-leaning counties 
participated more strongly than other counties in local immigration enforcement policy 
via administrative and legal options given that the other variables in the model are held 
constant (  =2.54, rrr = 12.65). Counties that are strongly Republican-leaning and have 
high foreign-born populations also tend to be more actively involved in local immigration 
enforcement policy than other counties with inactive-but-mixed immigration policy 
stances (  = 1.02, rrr = 2.76). On the other hand, the interaction of partisanship and 
demographic factors made counties with an administratively-inactive-but-legally-punitive 
immigration perspective less likely than other counties to participate in local immigration 
enforcement policy actions (  = -.61, rrr = .54). Interestingly, private prison involvement 
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in immigration enforcement actions at the local level plays an important role in shaping 
local immigration enforcement policy activation and implementation (  = 1.05, rrr = 
2.85). That is, counties with private prison facilities in their jurisdictions for immigrant 
detention via public-private contracts for immigration enforcement policy tend to 
consider immigration as a public safety and security issue. Private prison businesses, 
considering immigration as a kind of business opportunity for maximizing their benefits, 
may use strong lobbying powers and participation of conservative public-private 
partnerships such as ALEC to influence local politicians and policymakers to adopt local 
ordinances toward a more punitive and enforcement-focused immigration turn. This 
series of different interests between local governments and the private sector made it 
possible for some localities to create and implement more active immigration 
enforcement policy administratively and legally.
77
    
In Model 5, which includes a series of factors from Models 1 to 4, effect sizes of 
regression coefficients are slightly changed due to interactions and combinations among 
predictors, but directions and significance levels are almost the same. Political factors and 
a demographic factor - specifically the percentage of foreign-born population, not 
Hispanic population, at the county level - play a role in shaping more active immigration 
enforcement policy participation in their jurisdictions. Therefore, hypothesis 1 is partially 
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 Barry (2009) provides another possible or plausible incentive or interest for more punitive immigration 
enforcement policy implementation between local governments and private prison businesses. Some cities 
and municipalities with economic difficulties since the end of the 2000s began to consider invitations of 
private prison facilities in their jurisdictions for immigration detainments as a kind of “economic 
redevelopment project.” According to Barry’s logic, some localities with economic decline or lack of 
economic capital are likely to make such public-private contracts regarding immigration detainments. I did 
not test this hypothesis for this study, so future studies will analyze this assumption to understand the link 
between local governments’ more punitive immigration enforcement policy turn and the involvement of the 
private prison sector.       
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verified. Combination of contextual factors did not clearly make counties lean toward a 
more enforcement-focused and punitive immigration turn. How is this statistical result 
interpreted in policy contexts? Why did some localities have mixed perspectives on 
immigration issues (Class 3) or have an administratively inactive stance on immigration 
enforcement actions while leaning toward a legally punitive tendency (Class 1)? 
Immigration politics (adopting local immigration ordinances reflecting local political and 
policy voices) and implementation of such legal/institutional laws through administrative 
actions are different tasks carried out by two branches of governments, but they should be 
logically connected. However, under the S-Comm framework, even some localities that 
have integrative immigration perspectives or noninterventionist perspectives must 
participate in this mandatory program based on intergovernmental enforcement 
cooperation. In such an ironic and dilemmatic situation, localities tend to make 
inconsistent and incompatible enforcement actions in their jurisdictions, such as an early 
activation of S-Comm while passing integrative immigration ordinances. Class 1 counties 
appear to consider immigration as a local issue, so the federal involvement or lead under 
intergovernmental enforcement cooperation was not welcomed in their jurisdictions, 
which might have brought about inactive participation in such intergovernmental 
administrative immigration enforcement programs. Through this first analysis, I found 
that counties have participated in the current intergovernmental immigration enforcement 
policy due to mainly local political and demographic contexts. However, as in previous 
studies on this linkage between local immigration policy choices and contextual factors, 
this study also found mixed results. Economic and geographical factors did not 
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significantly influence local involvement of immigration enforcement policy 
participation. 
  
2
0
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Table 6.4. Multinomial Logistic Regression on Factors Influencing the Extent of Local Immigration Enforcement Policy 
Participation 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Class 1 
Localities 
Class 2 
Localities 
Class 1 
Localities 
Class 2 
Localities 
Class 1 
Localities 
Class 2 
Localities 
Class 1 
Localities 
Class 2 
Localities 
Class 1 
Localities 
Class 2 
Localities 
Demographic 
factors 
          
Hispanic population 
(%) 
.15 
(1.16) 
-.20 
 (.82) 
      .34 
(1.41) 
-.98* 
(.38) 
Hispanic population 
change (%, 2008 - 12) 
2.95*** 
(19.04) 
-4.27** 
(.01) 
      3.24*** 
(25.55) 
-4.02** 
(.02) 
Foreign-born 
population (%) 
-.53* 
(.59) 
.77** 
(2.15) 
      -.12 
(.89) 
1.60** 
(4.97) 
Foreign-born 
population change (%, 
2008 - 12) 
-.08 
(.92) 
.01 
(1.01) 
        
Economic factors           
Unemployment rate 
(%) 
  .03 
(1.03) 
.05 
(1.06) 
    .13* 
(1.13) 
-.13 
(.88) 
Unemployment rate 
change (%, 2010 - 12) 
  -.04 
(.96) 
-.45** 
(.64) 
    .01 
(1.01) 
-.51** 
(.60) 
Poverty rate (%)   .02 
(1.02) 
-.04 
(.96) 
      
Poverty rate change 
(%, 2010 - 12) 
  .09 
(1.09) 
.03 
(1.03) 
      
Geographical 
factors 
          
Border localities      -5.10** -.15   -3.08* 1.59 
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(.006) (.86) (.05) (4.88) 
Border + Hispanic 
population (%) 
    -1.46** 
(.23) 
.30 
(1.35) 
  -1.44 
(.24) 
1.30 
(3.66) 
Border + 
unemployment rate (%) 
    .16* 
(1.17) 
.07 
(1.07) 
    
Political/contextual 
factors 
          
Republican-
preferred 
      -1.09 
(.34) 
2.54** 
(12.65) 
.27 
(1.31) 
2.38** 
(10.77) 
Republican + Hispanic 
population (%) 
        -.20 
(.82) 
.56 
(1.75) 
Republican + foreign-
born population (%) 
      -.61** 
(.54) 
1.02** 
(2.76) 
  
Private prison       -.89 
(.41) 
1.05** 
(2.85) 
-12.59 
(3.39e-
06) 
1.36** 
(3.88) 
N 422 541 541 541 422 
Model  2 44.45*** 12.31 27.23** 30.40*** 87.41*** 
Log likelihood -274.45 -354.82 -347.36 -345.77 -256.14 
Pseudo R
2 
 .085 .017 .038 .042 .146 
Notes: Regression coefficients here are based on unstandardized parameter estimates, and the numbers in parentheses are relative risk ratios. Robust 
standard errors were used for statistical tests of parameter estimates. The dependent variable, local immigration enforcement policy participation, consists 
of three categories, and the third of which (localities with inactive-but-mixed immigration enforcement policy) was set as the reference/comparison 
category for group comparisons, so it was omitted in this model. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Some 
predictors and interaction terms were dropped after multicollinearity checks. 
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6.6. Implementation Result from S-Comm: Estimation of Local Crime Rate 
Changes Through Noncitizen Deportation LGMs  
The second model fits a univariate LGM with the addition of a continuous 
outcome variable referring to community safety level, which was operationalized by local 
crime rate changes during a recent four years (2010 - 2013). Through this modeling, I 
empirically analyze how the implementation of S-Comm, specifically noncitizen 
deportation numbers as the final enforcement outcomes under this program, influences 
local community safety. Figure 6.3 indicates the relationship between noncitizen 
deportation trajectories during a 13-month period (Dec. 2011 - Jan. 2013) and consequent 
crime rate changes in terms of three crime categories:  total crime, violent crime, and 
property crime rate changes during four years (2010 - 2013).  
LGMs in Figure 6.3 have basically the same model fitting and estimation 
compared to a linear noncitizen trajectory in Model 3 in Table 5.3 - the same five 
repeatedly measured time points, covering a 13-month period - but one difference 
between them is the addition of the outcome variable here. In terms of effect sizes and 
directions of estimates of LGM per se, they have similar effect sizes and directions: the 
mean of the intercept for noncitizen deportation is positively and significantly different 
from zero, and in terms of county variability, there was county-level variability in 
noncitizen deportation numbers (outcomes) at the first time (Dec. 2011) and the rate of 
change of noncitizen deportations over time. However, unlike model 3 in Table 5.3, 
insignificant rate of change of noncitizen deportation numbers over time, slope factor 
means for LGMs in Figure 6.3 commonly show statistical significance, indicating that 
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noncitizen deportations did significantly decrease over time. For each one-month change 
in time, noncitizen deportation numbers at the county level decreased by 0.27 units.         
      
 
  
 
Figure 6.3. Linear noncitizen deportation trajectory model with local crime rate changes 
during a recent 4 years (2010 - 2013) as the outcome  
Note: There are three individual noncitizen deportation LGMs here: LGMs with total crime rate changes as 
the DV (top left), with violent crime rate changes (top right), and with property crime rate changes (bottom 
left). Each of two latent factors (the intercept factor left and the slope factor right) have latent factor mean 
 204 
(M) and variance or disturbance (D). Observed endogenous variables (rectangular-shaped under SEM 
framework) have residual variances, including measurement errors. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at the10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Model fit indexes of all three 
LGMs, including   , CFI, TLI, and SRMR, had acceptable values: larger than 0.95 for CFI, TLI, and 
below .05 for SRMR. RMSEA has a rather higher than recommended good model fit, .05, ranging from 
.096 to .098. I already discussed this point in Chapter 5. Estimates used in three LGMs were based on the 
unstandardized solution.  
 
In terms of the relationship between latent factors (the intercept and slope factors 
under LGM) and the outcome variable, crime rate changes, three LGMs commonly 
indicate that there were no crime-prevention effects from the implementation of S-Comm 
during a 13-month period. In terms of the latent intercept factor, increasing numbers of 
noncitizen deportations in 541 counties at the 1st month (Dec. 2011) were associated with 
a significant increasing crime trend (positive crime rate changes over four years). 
However, considering the rate of noncitizen deportation number changes during a 13-
month period, insignificantly positive relationships between variables were commonly 
found with all three LGMs. That means that the more noncitizen deportations are made 
over time in 541 counties, the more crime rates at the county level remain unchanged (or 
rather increasing), although it is not statistically significant. This suggests that the basic 
logic for the implementation of S-Comm - that through nationwide implementation of 
intergovernmental immigration enforcement actions and removal of dangerous 
noncitizens at the local level, community safety can be finally accomplished - has never 
been kept. Rather, as in the results of Figure 6.3, no meaningful crime rate decreases can 
be seen in the 541 counties during a 13-month period. These results are consistent with 
other national-level comprehensive research on the implementation of S-Comm (Chand 
& Schreckhise, 2014; Cox & Miles, 2013; Miles & Cox, 2014; Treyger, Chalfin, & 
Loeffler, 2014). Figure 6.4 graphically analyzes how these two variables - noncitizen 
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deportation numbers and crime rate changes (total, violent, and property crimes) - are 
related to each other in terms of per local classifications (extracted from LCA) and 
longitudinal perspective. As seen there, most graphs show no clear decreasing crime 
trends over time via the implementation of S-Comm at the community level. Many of the 
graphs appear to have an almost flat line. Based on these empirical results, hypothesis 5 
is not supported. 
As a sensitivity analysis of the second model I tested in this study, Table 6.5 
reports on the retest of the relationship between the implementation of S-Comm at the 
county level and consequent community safety level during a 13-month period with 
different types of indicators related to community safety. Based on the FBI’s UCR 
format, I first classified the previous two comprehensive crimes - violent and property 
crimes - into seven individual crime categories (homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated 
assaults for violent crimes and burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft for property 
crimes). Then I fit seven univariate LGMs with seven individual crime categories as the 
DV. As consistent in Figures 6.3 and 6.4, no significant and meaningful crime decrease 
and prevention effects were found from the implementation of S-Comm during a 13-
month period. With regard to crime categories, including murder and rape, increasing 
numbers of noncitizen deportations in 541 counties at the 1st month were associated with 
a significant increasing crime trend. However, over time, rates of murder and rape-related 
offenses decreased, but these rates of crime change were not significant at the 
conventional level. Other individual crime categories had different crime status (1st 
month) and rate of change (growth or decline) over time via increasing noncitizen 
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deportation numbers under the S-Comm framework, but no significant crime decline 
effects were found.         
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Class 1 (Localities with administratively-inactive-but-legally-punitive-immigration enforcement policy participation): 88 localities 
   
Class 2 (Localities with active immigration enforcement policy participation): 34 localities 
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Class 3 (Localities with inactive-but-mixed immigration enforcement policy participation): 419 localities 
 
   
 
Figure 6.4. Scatterplots representing relationships between removal (deportation) outcomes under Secure Communities and 
crime rate changes (total, violent, and property crimes) by three classes of county 
Note: Each group has two lines on the data distributions: one is regression fit line (linear, curvilinear, or cubic form) and the other is local weighted 
scatterplot smoothing (frequently called “LOWESS”).    
  
2
0
9
 
Table 6.5. Sensitivity Analysis for the Second Model Regarding the Relationship Between Noncitizen Deportation Trajectory and 
Local Crime Changes (Seven Individual Crime Categories) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
The 1st month of noncitizen 
deportation (Dec. 2011) 
  Mean 
  Variance 
 
 
2.51*** (.06) 
1.45*** (.10) 
Grow rate of noncitizen 
deportation 
Mean 
Variance 
 
 
-.27*** (.03) 
.19***  (.04) 
 DV: Violent Crime Category DV: Property Crime Category 
 Murder Rape Robbery Aggravated 
Assault 
Burglary Larceny Motor Vehicle 
Theft 
The 1st month (status) .04** (.02) .04** (.02) -.01 (.01) -.00 (.01) -.00 (.01) -.07 (.07) -.02 (.02) 
Growth rate (growth) -.03   (.07) -.02    (.07) .02 (.05) .02 (.03) .02 (.03) .00 (.30) .09 (.09) 
2(df) 69.69 (11) 
p <.001 
69.28 (11) 
p <.001 
66.59 (11) 
p <.001 
65.76 (11) 
p <.001 
65.65 (11) 
p <.001 
67.33 (11) 
p <.001 
65.42 (11) 
p <.001 
CFI .984 .984 .985 .985 .985 .984 .985 
TLI .978 .978 .979 .979 .979 .979 .979 
RMSEA .099 
(90% CI: .08, .12) 
.099 
(90% CI: .08, .12) 
.097 
(90% CI: .08, .12) 
.096 
(90% CI: .07, .12) 
.096 
(90% CI: .08, .12) 
.097 
(90% CI: .08, .12) 
.096 
(90% CI: .07, .12) 
SRMR .022 .021 .021 .021 .021 .021 .021 
Note: N= 541. Standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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6.7. Comprehensive Review of Current U.S. Immigration Enforcement Policy 
Implementation and Related Results from S-Comm: Using a Combined Model 
As the final model, Table 6.6 represents a combined model including all variables 
used in this study. Through this model, the key analytic point is still to understand 
whether removals of dangerous noncitizens through the implementation of S-Comm have 
really secured local communities and thus improved public safety. The bottom row in 
Table 6.6 directly confirmed that there has been no evidence that the removals of 
noncitizens from the 541 counties were associated with any significant declines of local 
crime rates (including total, violent, and property crimes) over a recent four years, fully 
covering a 13-month period for detainer issuance and noncitizen deportation trajectories. 
Increasing noncitizen deportations in terms of status (1st month) and growth factor (rate 
of change) are only weakly associated with any significant changes of crime rates. 
Therefore, the fifth hypothesis for this study is finally rejected. 
Most effect sizes and directions of estimates in this combined model remain 
similar compared to those separated models that were discussed in this chapter and 
Chapter 5. As in the first model in this chapter, a demographic factor (percentage of 
foreign-born population) and political factors (Republican-preferred counties and 
involvement of private prison business in local immigration enforcement policy) played 
key contextual driving forces for local communities to lean toward a more restrictive and 
active immigration enforcement policy. As discussed in Chapter 5, detainer issuance 
trajectories have tended to follow a curvilinear trend, increasing at the 1st month, but 
instantaneously decreasing over time, and then turning to a steep increase for counties 
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with active immigration enforcement policy participation. For a noncitizen deportation 
trajectory, Class 2 counties with active immigration enforcement policy involvement 
tended to increase deportation numbers at the initial month, but over time their 
deportation rates were significantly decreased, except under the model with violent crime 
rate changes as the DV. On the other hand, Class 1 counties with administratively-
inactive-but-legally-punitive-leaning immigration perspectives had no clear trend on 
noncitizen deportation: decreasing deportation numbers at the 1st month compared to 
counties with inactive-but-mixed immigration policy perspectives (Class 3 as the 
reference group), but over time, there was no significant trend on deportation number 
changes. As in parallel-process LGMs and longitudinal mediation analyses in Chapter 5, 
two intergovernmental interaction points under S-Comm - immigration detainer issuances 
and noncitizen deportations - were significantly interrelated, and immigration detainer 
issuances were used as a mediator between Class 2 counties and their deportation 
outcomes under the implementation of S-Comm during a 13-month period in this 
combined model. Finally, I add Figure 6.5 here to graphically reconfirm my conclusion 
that the implementation of S-Comm has not made local communities safer; this figure 
includes comparisons of mean-level crime rate change before and after the full-scale 
expansion of this program across the county as a mandatory enforcement program, 
specifically using six key individual crime categories.  
 
 
 
 212 
Table 6.6. LGMs Including All Variables on the Current U.S. Immigration Enforcement 
Policy: Focusing on Community Safety as Implementation Results of S-Comm  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Factors influencing local immigration 
enforcement policy participation  
(esp. regarding Class 2 counties 
having active immigration 
enforcement policy participation; 
Class 3 as the reference group) 
 % Hispanic population change (2008-12) (-) 
 % foreign-born (+) 
 Unemployment change (-) 
 Republican-preferred (+) 
 Private prison (+) 
Detainer (first month) 
“Active” counties 
   “inactive/punitive leaning” counties 
 
.26 (.35) 
-.23* (.13) 
Detainer (growth rate - linear) 
“Active” counties 
   “inactive/punitive leaning” counties 
 
-.74** (.35) 
-.43 (.28) 
Detainer (growth rate - quadratic) 
   “Active” counties 
   “inactive/punitive leaning” counties 
 
.89** (.38) 
.36 (.25) 
Deportation (1st month) 
   “Active” counties 
   “inactive/punitive leaning” counties 
 
1.01** (.33) 
-.44** (.20)  
 
1.00** (.34) 
-.46** (.20) 
 
1.02** (.34) 
-.45** (.20) 
Deportation (growth rate - linear) 
“Active” counties 
   “inactive/punitive leaning” counties 
 
-.16* (.10) 
-.00 (.09) 
 
-.15 (.10) 
.02 (.08) 
 
-.16* (.10) 
-.00 (.08) 
Interrelationship between two key 
intergovernmental interaction 
points  
(detainer issuance  noncitizen 
deportation) 
 
Yes 
I1  I2  
Q1 I2 
 
Yes 
I1  I2  
Q1 I2 
 
Yes  
I1  I2  
Q1 I2 
Mediation effect among three 
contextual factors 
(local immigration enforcement 
policy participation  detainer 
issuance  noncitizen deportations) 
 
 
Yes  
(D1 Q1 I2) 
 
 
Yes  
(D1 Q1 I2) 
 
 
Yes  
(D1 Q1 I2) 
 DV: Total crime 
rate change  
(2010 - 2013) 
DV: Violent crime 
rate change 
(2010 - 2013) 
DV: Property crime 
rate change (2010 - 
2013) 
Noncitizen deportation trajectory 
  The 1st month (status)  
 
-.001 (.00) 
 
.002 (.13) 
 
-.002 (.01) 
  Growth rate (growth) .04 (.30) .01 (.05) .04    (.85) 
Note: N = 422 (due to missing data from IVs), standard errors in parentheses. (+) refers to positive and 
significant associations between variables, while (-) refers to negative and significant associations between 
them. As in Chapter 5, for detainer issuances, the quadratic model with constrained residual variances, and 
for noncitizen deportations, the linear model with freely estimating residual variances were finally selected 
for analysis. I1, L1, and Q1 refer to intercept, linear slope, and quadratic slope for detainer issuances 
trajectory, while I2 and S2 refer to intercept and linear slope for noncitizen deportation trajectory. D1 refers 
to Class 2 counties with active immigration enforcement policy participation, while D2 refers to Class 1 
counties with administratively-inactive-but-legally-punitive-leaning immigration policy perspectives. *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at the10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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       (a) Murder          (b) Rape         (c) Robbery 
 
       
           (d) Aggravated Assault        (e) Burglary                   (f) Larceny 
 
Figure 6.5. Mean-Level crime rate change before and after full-scale activation of S-Comm by class: six key individual crime 
categories by the FBI 
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Note: Each graph has a dotted vertical line indicating the date (Oct. 2010) beginning of the full-scale activation of S-Comm across the country. Moreover, 
through the classification of localities by latent class analysis, each graph has four lines, a solid line for all 541 localities a square- dot line for Class 1 
localities, a round-dot line for Class 2 localities, and a dashed line for Class 3 localities.       
 215 
6.8. Discussion 
In this chapter, I used a more comprehensive perspective to analyze how current 
U.S. immigration enforcment policy has been carried out. Two questions were mainly 
discussed: (1) how and what local political, economic, demographic, and geographical 
contexts influence local choices on active immigration enforcemnt policy participation; 
and based on intergovernmental stepped-up enforcement efforts under the S-Comm 
framework, (2) whether the implementation of this program has really secured local 
communities as this program promised. As in previous studies, I found mixed results on 
the first question. Of four representive contexutal factors, political factors - such as 
Republican-preferred counties and involvment of private prison business regarding local 
immigration enforcement actions through public-private contracts - have strongly and 
consistently shaped local communities’ lean toward more active and specifically punitive 
and restrictive immigration policy stances in their jurisdictions administratively and 
legally. Moreover, interestingly, only shares of forign-born population at the county 
level, not Hispanic population, signficantly influence local directions of more active 
immigration enforcement policy participation. More in-depth research on the relationship 
between various local contexts and policy choices on immigration issues will be needed 
in future scholarship.    
With regard to the second question, as in Chapter 4, I reconfirmed that the 
implementation of S-Comm has been carried out unlike its promised direction, making 
communities safer via catching, detaining, and finally removing dangerous noncitizens at 
the community level. As in the empirical results of the second and third models in this 
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chapter, little relationship between increasing stepped-up noncitizen enforcment actions, 
expanding deportation numbers, and the level of community safety was found. This result 
is very suggestive to the current policy direction and political logic that DHS/ICE and 
Washington and local conservative politicians have steadily argued. Enforcement-only 
hysteria since the 2000s and its jusitification has been considered as a kind of reasonable 
thesis at the national level, and with the backup of the conservative media, immigration 
and immigrants living in local communities have been constructed as a security and 
public safety issue. In spite of a continued decreasing crime trend at the national level 
during the last decades, wrong policy assumptions on the immigration phenomenon and 
efforts to connect immigrants to crimes after the 9/11 terrorist attack made immigration 
issues in the United States more difficult and unsolvable. Politicians and policymakers 
have habitually said that “our immigration system is broken,” but few of them have 
critically and clearly pointed out what specific parts of the administrative or legal systems 
are broken (Suro, 2015). Interestingly but ironcially, fewer politicians, including many 
Democrats, have fully presented this problem of an enforcement-only policy direction, 
and discussions of immigration issues in today’s political atmosphere are still dominated 
by the control and enforcement perspectives.  
This study still has limitations. The first is a need of a more concrete and 
comprehensive understanding of local choices on immigration issues. I dicussed four 
broad contexts influencing immigration issues at the local level based on previous 
scholarship, but many undiscussed factors - such as local history, role of media, and 
influential individuals such as political and ethical immigration entreprenuers - should be 
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deeply considered together in future studies. The second point is related to a 
measurement of “community safety” in the immigration contexts. As poltical or policy 
rhetoric, the term community or public safety can be operationalized and measured with 
various angles and perspectives. Following the previous studies, I considered this as the 
level or rate of local crimes with public data, but public perspectives on community 
safety can be changeable and differently expressed beyond mere numerical data on 
crimes. Qualitative backup - through interviews of local residents, including immigrants, 
or participation observations on community safety issues and related policy agendas - is 
also needed for more valid measurement of community safety.      
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
The United States has created an enormous deportation machinery. The budget for 
border security and immigration enforcement is now eighteen billion dollars a year - 
substantially more than the budget for all other criminal federal law-enforcement 
agencies combined (the F.B.I., the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Secret Service, the U.S. 
Marshals, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives)... The machinery 
exists, it has its political incentives, and because its targets are weak, its accountability is 
slight, its impunity great… Between 1892 and 1997, the United States deported 2.1 
million people. By the end of the next year, if present trends continue, the Obama 
administration will have deported that many in a mere six years.  
 
William Finnegan, “The Deportation Machine,” The New Yorker, April 19, 2013 
 
The goal of Secure Communities was to more effectively identify and facilitate the 
removal of criminal aliens in the custody of state and local law enforcement agencies. 
But the reality is the program has attracted a great deal of criticism, is widely 
misunderstood , and is embroiled in legal litigation; its very name has become a symbol 
for general hostility toward the enforcement of our immigration laws. Governors, 
mayors, and state and local law enforcement officials around the country have 
increasingly refused to cooperate with the program, and many have issued executive 
orders or signed laws prohibiting such cooperation. A number of federal courts have 
rejected the authority of state and local law enforcement agencies to detain immigrants 
pursuant to federal detainers issued under the current Secure Communties program. 
 
The overarching goal of the Secure Communities remains in my view a valid and 
important law enforcment objective, but a fresh start and a new program are necessary. 
As recommended by the Homeland Security Advisory Council Task Force, Secure  
Communities “must be implemented in a way that supports community policing and 
sustains the trust of all elements of the community in working with local law 
enforcement.”… Accordingly, I am directing U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) to discontinue Secure Communities. 
 
Policy memo from Jeh Johnson, Secretary of Department of Homeland Security,  
Nov. 20, 2014 
 
7.1. Summary 
Paying special attention to an increasing enforcement-only immigration policy 
hysteria, crimmigration trend, and complicated intergovernmental relations on 
immigration issues in the United States since the 2000s, this dissertation analyzed how 
the current Obama administration’s immigrant control and punishment policy has been 
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carried out, and what policy outcomes we found through the implementation of S-Comm 
during the last 6 years. In spite of DHS/ICE’s grandiose policy visions and goals for 
making local communities safer through “smarter” and more “proactive” immigration 
enforcement policy, policy implementation and the consequent results at the community 
level from S-Comm have given rise to conflicts, concerns, and ambiguities among 
policymakers, local communities, law enforcement agencies, and the public. Therefore, 
the main goal of this study was to criticially evaluate S-Comm in terms of a program or 
policy implementation perspective, using immigration enforcment data. Many social 
science studies - specifically in the fields of sociology, social justice studies, political 
science, and legal studies - have discussed S-Comm with different focal points and 
angles, but few studies have analyzed this program with longitudinal enforcement data 
from S-Comm. With more than 4 years’ data collection efforts through  FOIAs, TRAC, 
and public resources, this study analyzed whether S-Comm has really secured our local 
communities as DHS/ICE promised, and how the current immigration enforcement 
machines immersed in mass detention and deportation of noncitizens have been carried 
out under complicated intergovernmental interactions.  
In Chapters 2 and 3, I reviewed American immigration policymaking and related 
administrative and policy contexts in terms of historical and threotical perspectives. U.S. 
immigration policy has historically targeted some noncitizen groups for controlling their 
influx onto the American soil, and these unwanted and unwelcome noncitizen groups 
have changed over time depending on socioeconomic and political contexts. From such a 
historical analysis on immigration policy, two interesting points were found. The first is a 
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“racialized” or “racially motivated” immigration policy trend, which made it possible for 
policymakers to select and frame who can and cannot be admitted and naturalized, and 
who can or should be unwelcome and finally removed from American soil (FitzGerald & 
Cook-Martin, 2014; Melta, 2015; Moloney, 2012). The second is that some noncitizen 
groups, specifically the Hispanic population, have been the main target for control and 
punishment since the 1980s. In Chapter 3 as another theoretical background for this 
study, multiple contextual factors shaping enforcement-oriented policy at the local level - 
political, economic, demographic, geographical, and their interaction effects - were 
discussed, as well as how the current immigration enforcement policy has been carried 
out with what working mechanisms, policy assumptions, and goals, specifically focusing 
on S-Comm. 
As key analysis parts, Chapters 4 and 6 presented longitudinal noncitizen 
deportation data and discussed whether S-Comm has faithfully followed the stated 
program goal of making communities safer. In terms of deportation numbers and level of 
criminality for enforcement actions (Chapter 4), S-Comm has been wrongfully 
implemented through removal of noncitizens with misdemeanor charges or immigration 
violations who, in the name of dangerous “criminal aliens,” make up over half of those 
deported under the program. Such implementation outcomes were reconfirmed in 
Chapter 6 through analysis of the correspondence of policy goals (proactively enforcing 
and removing dangerous noncitizens at the local level) and outcomes (improving local 
community safety); there was no significant and meaningful association between these 
two factors. Moreover, I also found that political factors (e.g., Republican-preferred 
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counties and the involvement of private prison businesses on immigration detainment in 
their jurisdictions) and demographic factors (e.g., shares of foreign-born population) 
significantly made counties lean toward more enforcement-oriented immigration policy 
actions and policies. 
In Chapter 5, I focused on how two key intergovernmental interactions under the 
current enforcement machine system - immigration detainer issuances and noncitizen 
deportations - were interrelated, and how localities under the multilayered jurisdictional 
patchwork trend followed what trajectories of immigration enforcement actions over 
time. Through LCA, three distinct, statistically reliable subclasses on local immigration 
enforcement perspectives were extracted, and based on the result of LCA, longitudinal 
modeling via LGMs indicates that there were interrelationships between and among three 
variables on the implementation of S-Comm. Through a series of analyses on the 
implementation of S-Comm, I finally argue that this program has been mismanaged with 
a biased policy assumption - that of an “immigrant-crime nexus” - and in DHS/ICE’s 
efforts to meet an enforcement quota set by Washington politicians and policymakers, too 
many noncitizens - including legal residents and the undocumented - have fallen into the 
trap of current enforcement and deportations as they are administratively named as 
dangerous criminals.  
 
7.2. Policy Implications 
Based on this study, the following three implications should be critically 
discussed. The first implication is related to reconsideration of policy discourse on 
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immigrant “illegality” and “criminality” which has been mainly used by immigration 
restrictionists for legitimating immigration control and punishment. Since the passage of 
the 1996 federal immigration laws, negative social and legal constructions of immigrants 
have drastically and institutionally expanded, and consequently the numbers of 
administratively named “illegal” and “criminal” noncitizens under a strong crimmigration 
trend have been explosively inflated. Post-1996 immigration governance and 
management has followed stepped-up enforcement-focused policy directions at the 
border and interior areas with back-to-back administrative initiatives, such as Operation 
Streamline. A series of legal and administrative steps have made it possible for federal 
immigration agencies to create and manage an enforcement regime and almost automatic 
machinery system run by mass detainment and deportations via immigrant control and 
punishment.    
Such an enforcement-only policy direction since the 2000s without 
comprehensive understanding of the immigration phenomenon in the American context 
caused immigration issues to be considered as political issues, not economic issues based 
on circular migrations of people with a supply-and-demand mechanism. To most 
Washington politicians and immigration policymakers, noncitizens should merely be 
subjects of control and expulsion; noncitizens don’t have any legal and administrative 
rights in the current immigration system, and violations of constitutional rights for them 
can be tolerated in the name of public safety and national security. Many criminal 
categories - such as aggravated felony charges under the 1996 laws for mandatory 
detention and final removal regardless of a noncitizen’s legality - were created and 
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expanded over time, and these charges have retroactively applied to noncitizens who 
have lived in the United States for decades and who have strong family and community 
ties. Under the current enforcement hysteria, immigration enforcement and the 
consequent criminal and deportation numbers have been administratively created and 
“manufactured” as Warner (2005 - 06) argued. Under the current enforcement-only 
policy regime and working mechanisms focusing on punishment and immigration control 
and prioritizing a frame of  immigrant illegality and criminality, policymakers cannot 
solve the fundamental problems of immigration - including why noncitizens immigrate 
here, what administrative actions or initiatives from the federal government made it 
impossible for noncitizens who already resided in the United States to return to their 
countries, and how noncitizens are connected with local communities and their 
socioeconomic systems.  
Narrowing down the scope of the discussion to S-Comm, federal immigration 
policymakers should recognize how the implementation of S-Comm has negatively 
influenced local communities and brought about intergovernmental conflicts through 
biased program assumptions and program implementation. ICE’s obsession to expand 
enforcement and deportation numbers - with an enforcement quota of 400,000 removals 
per fiscal year - might bring about unreasonable discretionary power in the process of 
deciding noncitizens’ “dangerousness” under the enforcement machine system. One of 
the key contentious issues on S-Comm implementation was how ICE defines noncitizen 
“dangerousness” for removals, and whether such enforcement actions based on 
dangerousness should be recognized by local counterparts and the public. By using the 
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three levels of criminality (severity), ICE clearly argues their enforcement actions focus 
on catching and removing noncitizens with Level 1 convictions - such as murders, sexual 
assaults, aggravated felonies, and terrorism - who pose a serious threat to public safety 
and national security. However, as seen in the empirical results from this study (esp. 
Chapter 4), more than half of noncitizens deported during a 61-month period had Level 3 
and immigration violations, the lowest enforcement priorities. Many of the so-called 
“dangerous” aliens would not have been criminally charged before the 1996 federal 
immigration laws and related administrative initiatives. Such hugely different 
perspectives between federal immigration agencies and localities (and the public) on 
what level of seriousness or dangerousness warrants noncitizen enforcement actions has 
caused serious intergovernmental conflicts, leading several localities - including states, 
counties, and cities - to pass local laws institutionally preventing local law enforcement 
agents from communicating or sharing information with ICE
78
. Through empirical data 
analyses under the implementation of S-Comm, I would argue that federal bureaucrats’ 
current enforcement actions of removing “dangerous” criminal noncitizens have been 
seriously biased and mismanaged.  
To break the current serious immigration policy malfunctions and repeated policy 
failures, we need, as Jones-Correa and Graauw (2013) pointed out, to reframe the current 
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 Local resistance to ICE’s immigration enforcement actions has generally followed two tracks. The first 
track is to pass state-level laws or local-level ordinances to limit local interactions with ICE in the process 
of immigration enforcement policy or rescind the existing intergovernmental agreement. California and 
Connecticut’s Transparency and Responsibility Using State Tools (TRUST) Act in 2012 and 2013, and 
Washington D.C. city council’s resolution can be placed in this category. The second track was mainly 
made by local law enforcement agencies, via noncompliance with ICE’s detainer issuances requesting 
noncitizens with minor charges be forwarded to federal facilities for deportation proceedings. Many local 
law enforcement agencies - including Santa Clara County, CA; Champaign County, IL; Milwaukee 
County, WI; and Multnomah County, OR - have passed local ordinances or County Sheriff policy against 
ICE’s detainer policy since 2012.       
 225 
enforcement-only immigration perspective and policy approach. As seen in the empirical 
results from this study (esp. Chapter 6), the enforcement-only policy drives and 
implementations did not create any meaningful decline in crime over time. Actually, null 
effects between deportation outcomes under S-Comm and local public safety were found. 
A policy goal of S-Comm - making communities safer through targeting and removing 
dangerous noncitizens at the community level - was wrong at the start line; DHS/ICE 
never targeted dangerous noncitizens as they declared in the enforcement priorities, and 
they framed many noncitizens with immigration violations and misdemeanor charges as 
very “dangerous” and the “worst of the worst” who pose a serious threat to public safety 
and national security. As Davies and Fagan (2012, p. 100) pointed out, community 
crimes are closely related to the “neighborhood conditions, specifically poverty, 
anonymity, and heterogeneity” that a locality faces, not a certain racial and ethnic group 
per se.  
The final implication of S-Comm implementation is reconsideration of the role 
and place of noncitizens. Under an enforcement-only policy drive, voices of noncitizens 
have been thoroughly ignored. If DHS/ICE and LEAs really want to consider local 
community safety in the immigration policy context, the first role of federal and local 
governments is to directly meet community members residing in local communities, 
including noncitizen residents, and consider their vivid voices about the problems and 
concerns related to various (sub)groups of noncitizens, and reach a consensus about how 
these problematic and insecure situations can be solved. Under the S-Comm framework, 
LEAs have been required to implement incompatible roles simultaneously - as 
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community protectors for all community members and as immigration agents for 
catching immigrants residing there - and ICE dealt with noncitizen residents via 
enforcement-focused frames (Jung, 2015b). Policy intentions for making communities 
safer through the implementation of S-Comm have ironically made their fellow 
communities more insecure, through expanding serious mistrust between and among the 
federal government (ICE), LEAs, and local (including immigrant groups)  communities. 
The experience of S-Comm during the last 6 years makes us ask the following questions: 
community safety for whom? Does the local community safety under S-Comm consider 
the migrant communities’ voices and concerns? Do or should immigrants living in local 
communities be considered the subject of management and control? When a policy is 
wrongfully implemented with biased policy assumptions or information, how do we 
overcome such problems? A series of self-questions might be finally connected and 
permit us to return to the basic but fundamental questions of immigration: who we are, 
how we deal with migration issues as an inescapable global phenomenon in today’s 
world, and how we coexist with noncitizens who are living in our communities.   
With serious debates and conflicts on the program relevance and unintended 
enforcement outcomes during the last six years, DHS Director Jeh Johnson issued two 
policy memos in December 2014, in which he declared the discontinuation of S-Comm 
and the slight revision of immigration enforcement priorities, as stated in the epigraph of 
this chapter. Many migrant rights groups and localities celebrated and welcomed the end 
of S-Comm, and expected the creation of a new direction and discourse for a better 
immigration policy. However, in spite of the official ending of S-Comm, everything 
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except the name of the program - including information sharing between levels of 
government for immigration enforcement actions, catching and detaining noncitizens at 
the local level and then transporting them to federal facilities for deportation proceedings 
via immigration detainer issuances, and deportation of noncitizens based on enforcement 
priorities - is continuing.
79
 Under the current situation, it is still unclear how a new 
program - sometimes called the “Priority Enforcement Program” (PEP) - will be 
implemented to replace S-Comm, and whether we can create more meaningful routes for 
overcoming previous serious policy failures from S-Comm. From an empirical analysis 
of longitudinal noncitizen deportation outcomes, the message of this study is clear: It is 
essential to set clear enforcement priorities, clearly define what categories of noncitizens 
are really dangerous and pose a serious threat to public safety and security, and minimize 
enforcement for noncitizens with minor charges or immigration violations. This will be 
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 In spite of the termination of S-Comm and a proclamation of an alternative immigration 
intergovernmental enforcement program (tentatively called the Priority Enforcement Program, or “PEP”), 
ICE’s interoperability system between different levels of government for enforcement actions is continuing. 
This is nicely shown in ICE’s deportation outcomes after S-Comm. Since DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson’s 
Nov. 2014 policy memo on the discontinuation of S-Comm, three monthly IDENT-IAFIS Interoperability 
statistics showing immigration enforcement actions in the post-S-Comm period were released from ICE’s 
FOIA library (Dec. 2014, Jan. 2015, and Feb. 2015). ICE no longer uses the name “Secure Communities 
program” in these statistics, but almost everything else - including biometric data sharing and related 
monthly fingerprint submissions between the federal immigration agency (ICE) and LEAs, monthly 
IDENT matches in terms of three levels of criminality, and monthly noncitizen deportation numbers in 
terms of three levels of criminality - remains the same. Ironically but interestingly, these post-S-Comm data 
appear to show a continuation of the enforcement structure, outcome, and data format seen during the 6 
years of S-Comm (2008 - 2014). However, detainer issuances, according to a policy memo from the 
secretary, will be changed from “the request for detention” to “the request for notification” (Department of 
Homeland Security, 2014b). Few follow-up guidelines and procedures for PEP have been released from 
DHS/ICE, so it is still unclear whether this alternative program will be positively carried out according to 
the policy goal and with the prevention of several problems seen under S-Comm - such as too many 
noncitizen deportations with minor charges and noncriminal violations. The National Immigration Law 
Center (2015) follows a pessimistic viewpoint on the direction of PEP, arguing that “PEP is more of the 
same old, failed detention and deportation system and suffers the same fatal flaws identified with the S-
Comm program.”        
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the first step toward fair and effective immigration enforcement policy at the national and 
local level.       
  
7.3. Limitations 
In spite of empirical data-driven analyses on the implementation of S-Comm in 
terms of longitudinal perspecitves, two limitations should be recognized. The first 
limitation is related to the data I used for analysis. As I already pointed out, I had no 
choice but to select some proxy data, specifically regarding monthly immigration detainer 
issuance, due to ICE’s strong resistance to the data release. ICE barely responded to 
multiple FOIA requests during the last 3 years, and finally rejected  some requests with 
multiple reasons, including lack of public interests, the decision that my data requests 
were possible “commercial” requests, and nonexistence of the data or information 
requested. Under such circumstances, I used proxy data, which could not control the 
possibility of biased results.  
ICE’s IDENT-IAFIS Interoperability statistics including deportation numbers 
under the implementation of S-Comm, which I used for analysis, was the by-product of 
long legal litigations from human rights and migrant rights groups, such as the National 
Day Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON) and the Center for Constitutional Rights 
(CCR). However, these statistics still have a very limited range of information on 
noncitizen deportations under S-Comm because they include deportation numbers at the 
national and local level in terms of level of criminality, and total numbers of fingerprint 
submissions and IDENT mathces at the national and local level. In spite of these data, the 
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public cannot know more concretely about noncitizens deported through this program, 
specifically in terms of which noncitizen groups as defined by nationality, race, and 
ethnicity have mainly been deported and why; noncitizens’ age level, gender, and law 
violation categories related to their deportation orders; how long they have been detained 
and where (what federal or local jails or detention facilities); how they have been dealt 
with in these facilities; and whether they can get any minimum level of legal advice or 
help. For analyzing whether S-Comm has been carried out with the program goal, more 
in-depth research is needed with these data and information.        
This series of data limitations for more in-depth research is connected with the 
lack of full understanding about how the current enforcement machines for maximizing 
enforcement numbers have been worked with what mechanisms, incentives, and 
interactions. For understanding current immigration enforcement policy under S-Comm, I 
created a conceptual framework focusing on interactions between and among related 
policy actors, as in Figure 6.1, but this represents a simplified working mechanism with 
limited information. With valid and reliable data and qualitative backup - from interviews 
of ICE’s local field agents and LESC agents, as well as local law enforcement agents, or 
participation observations in immigration courts and administrative processing of 
individual cases under the implementation of S-Comm - the public could come a little 
closer to understanding how each case on immigration enforcement actions has been 
dealt with in the federal-local interaction framework.       
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7.4. Future Research 
Based on this study, various follow-up research and academic communications on 
the implementation of current immigration enforcement policy, specifically S-Comm, can 
be made in future scholarship. The first extension is a more in-depth analysis of working 
mechanisms of the current enforcement machines with longitudinal data. For this study, I 
analyzed enforcement trajectories under the S-Comm framework in 541 counties with 
five time points, covering a 13-month period (Dec. 2011 - Jan. 2013). I expect follow-up 
studies about such enforcement outcomes and trajectories with different research units 
(e.g., states or cities) and multiple time points will be made, with comparisons made 
between their outcomes and mine. Analysis of different but closely connected 
enforcement outcomes under the Obama administration, such as 287(g) partnerships and 
the Criminal Alien Program, will be another desirable research area for deeper 
understanding of current immigration control policy. 
The second extension is to understand intergovernmental relations on immigration 
issues with more critical viewpoints and methods. As I discussed in this dissertation, 
different levels of government have dynamically interacted with each other under a 
multilayerd jurisdictional patchwork trend on immigration issues. They have cooperative 
enforcement systems and programs administratively, but different local perspectives on 
immigration caused such intergovernmental enforcement programs to have considerable 
local variations on the implementation of immigration enforcement policy. However, as 
in the case of Arizona’s local experiment from SB1070 in 2010 and its copycat laws 
across several states, there are serious legal conflicts on the role and rights of 
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immigration policy and its implementation, which brought about much legal litigation 
during the last few years. With the understanding of such administratively-cooperative-
but-legally-conflicting intergovernmental relations on immigration issues, future 
scholarship will need to study how different levels of governments interact and increase 
their political and policy voices in the process of immigration policy. For example, how 
do federal immigration agencies (DHS/ICE) get local (non)compliance in their 
interrelation of enforcment actions? When and under what conditions can localities 
cooperate or resist federal enforcement requests? Have federal financial supports for local 
law enforcement agencies’ immigration enforcement involvement, such as via the 
implementation of the State Criminal Alien Assistnace Program (SCAAP), made 
localities become more involved in the current intergovernmental immigration 
enforcement policy?  
Finally, more understanding about the usage of discretionary power in the 
implementation of immigration enforcement policy is also needed. As I pointed out in 
this study, there are multiple administrative points or stages when different levels of 
government agents, specficially front-line bureuacrats, have no choice but to use their 
discretionary authority in their everyday enforcement work. For example, local law 
enforcement agents decide what suspected noncitizens’ fingerpints should (not) be 
submitted to ICE for immigration status checks. At the federal level, ICE agents should 
decide what noncitizens are administratively set as Level 1 criminal noncitizens or as a 
different level of criminals (or noncriminals), which is inescapably involved in agents’ 
discretionary power usage. There are still murky areas on this use of discretionary power 
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by immigration agents in the process of immigration enforcement policy, so future 
studies will need to undertake this research topic in-depth via case studies and interviews 
of federal agents and local law enforcement agents dealing with immigration enforcement 
issues. 
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APPENDIX A  
STAGGERED ROLLOUT SCHEME OF S-COMM:  
ACTIVATION DATE (MONTH) OF LOCALITY   
  
2
6
1 
Local (County) Participation in the Secure Communities Program: Based on a Staggered Rollout Scheme 
Time 
(Month) 
Monthly # 
of Counties 
activating S-
Comm 
 
State (Name of county/city) activating S-Comm 
Oct. 2008 1 TX (Harris) 
Nov. 2008 6 MA (Suffolk), NC (Buncombe, Gaston, Henderson & Wake), TX (Dallas) 
Dec. 2008 7 AZ (Pinal), PA (Bucks & Montgomery), TX (Kinney, Maverick, Real & Val Verde) 
Jan. 2009 15 AZ (Maricopa, Yavapai & Yuma), FL (Duval & Marion), NC (Cabarrus, Catawba, Duplin, 
Harnett, New Hanover & Orange), TX (Collin, Denton, Uvalde & Zavala)  
Feb. 2009 13 FL (Charlotte, Clay, Collier, Hillsborough, Miami-Dade, St. Johns & St. Lucie), NC 
(Cumberland & Durham), TX (Grayson, Hunt, Johnson & Kaufman) 
May 2009 2 CA (San Diego), VA (Fairfax) 
Jun. 2009 20 NM (Dona Ana), TX (Bexar, Brewster, Brooks, Dimmit, El Paso, Hidalgo, Jeff Davis, Jim Wells, 
Kennedy, Kleberg, Nueces, Pecos, Presidio, Starr, Terrell, Travis, Webb, Willacy & Zapata)  
Jul. 2009 7 CA (Ventura), NM (Grant, Hidalgo & Luna), PA (Philadelphia), TX (Culberson & Hudspeth) 
Aug. 2009 3 CA (Los Angeles), FL (Broward), TX (Tarrant) 
Sep. 2009 8 CA (Imperial), NM (Bernalillo), TX (Brazoria, Fort Bend, Galveston, Jefferson & 
Montgomery), VA (Prince William) 
Oct. 2009 4 FL (Brevard & Manatee), MI (Wayne), NC (Mecklenburg) 
Nov. 2009 13 AZ (Cochise, Pima & Santa Cruz), FL (Monroe & Pinellas), GA (Clayton, DeKalb & 
Gwinnett), IL (DuPage & Kane), LA (Jefferson Parish), OK (Oklahoma & Tulsa)  
Dec. 2009 3 FL (Highlands & Lake), MD (Prince George’s) 
Jan. 2010 8 CA (Sacramento, Santa Barbara, San Luis Obispo & Solano), OH (Cuyahoga & Franklin), 
TX (McLennan & Williamson) 
Feb. 2010 2 CA (San Joaquin & Stanislaus) 
Mar. 2010 17 CA (Fresno, Sonoma & Orange), NC (Brunswick, Columbus, Dare, Halifax, Jackson, Lee, 
  
2
6
2 
Transylvania & Union), UT (Davis, Utah & Salk Lake), VA (Alexandria City, Fauquier & 
Loudoun) 
Apr. 2010 34 CA (Alameda, Contra Costa, Monterey & San Bernardino), DE (Kent, New Castle & Sussex), 
FL (Escambia, Leon, Orange, Osceola, Palm Beach, Polk, Sarasota & Volusia), HI (Oahu), IL 
(Lake, Madison, McHenry, St. Clair, Will & Winnebago), MD (Frederick, Queen Anne’s & St. 
Mary’s), OR (Clackamas), UT (Box Elder & Weber), VA (Arlington, Henrico, Norfolk City, 
Rappahannock, Richmond City, Virginia Beach City)    
May. 2010 28 CA (Riverside, San Mateo & Santa Clara), LA (Orleans Parish), OR (Marion & Multnomah), 
TX (Bell, Hemphill, Lubbock, Potter & Randall), UT (Cache), VA (Brunswick, Caroline, 
Chesterfield, Colonial Heights City, Dinwiddie, Falls Church City, Greensville, Hanover, 
Hopewell City, Newport News City, Nottoway, Petersburg City, Prince Edward, Prince George, 
Richmond & Stafford)   
Jun. 2010 205 CA (San Francisco), CT (Fairfield), FL (Alachua, Baker, Bay, Bradford, Calhoun, Citrus, 
Columbia, DeSoto, Dixie, Flagler, Franklin, Gadsden, Gilchrist, Glades, Gulf, Hamilton, Hardee, 
Hendry, Hernando, Holmes, Indian River, Jackson, Jefferson, Lafayette, Lee, Levy, Liberty, 
Madison, Martin, Nassau, Okaloosa, Okeechobee, Pasco, Putnam, Santa Rosa, Seminole, 
Sumter, Suwannee, Taylor, Union, Wakulla, Walton & Washington), ID (Ada & Canyon), LA 
(East Baton Rouge), SD (Minnehaha & Pennington), TN (Hamilton, Knox & Shelby), TX 
(Aransas, Atascosa, Bandera, Bastrop, Bee, Blanco, Bosque, Burnet, Caldwell, Calhoun, Comal, 
Coryell, Duval, Edwards, Falls, Fayette, Freestone, Frio, Gillespie, Gonzales, Guadalupe, 
Hamilton, Hays, Hill, Jackson, Jim Hogg, Karnes, Kendall, Kerr, Kimble, Lampasas, Lavaca, 
Limestone, Llano, La Salle, Live Oak, Mason, Matagorda, McCulloch, McMullen, Medina, San 
Patricio, San Saba, Somervell, Victoria, Wharton & Wilson), UT (Beaver, Sevier & 
Washington), VA (Alleghany, Amelia, Amherst, Appomattox, Bath, Bedford, Bedford City, 
Bland, Botetourt, Bristol City, Buchanan, Buckingham, Buena Vista City, Campbell, Carroll, 
Charles City, Charlotte, Covington City, Craig, Cumberland, Danville City, Dickenson, Essex, 
Floyd, Franklin City, Galax City, Giles, Goochland, Grayson, Halifax, Henry, King and Queen, 
King William, Lancaster, Lee, Lexington City, Lunenburg, Lynchburg City, Martinsville City, 
Mathews, Mecklenburg, Middlesex, Montgomery, New Kent, Northumberland, Norton City, 
Powhatan, Surry, Sussex, Westmoreland, Accomack, Albemarle, Augusta, Charlottesville City, 
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Chesapeake City, Clarke, Culpeper, Fluvanna, Franklin, Frederick, Fredericksburg City, 
Gloucester, Greene, Hampton City, Harrisonburg City, Highland, Isle of Wight, James City, King 
George, Louisa, Madison, Nelson, Northampton, Orange, Page, Patrick, Pittsylvania, Portsmouth 
City, Pulaski, Redford City, Roanoke, Roanoke City, Rockingham, Russell, Salem City, Scott, 
Shenandoah, Smyth, Southampton, Spotsylvania, Staunton City, Suffolk City, Tazewell, Warren, 
Washington, Waynesboro City, Williamsburg City, Winchester City, Wise, Wythe & York)            
Jul. 2010 78 AZ (Mohave & Apache), CA (Butte, El Dorado, Placer, Shasta, Tulare, Yolo & Yuba), MI 
(Oakland), MS (Warren), MT (Lewis and Clark & Missoula), NV (Clark & Washoe), NC 
(Cherokee, Clay, Graham, Haywood, Macon, Madison, Swain, Yancey), OH (Butler, Hamilton & 
Montgomery), TX (Anderson, Andrews, Angelina, Bowie, Cameron, Camp, Cass, Chambers, 
Cherokee, Colorado, Crane, Delta, DeWitt, Ector, Fannin, Franklin, Goliad, Gregg, Hardin, 
Harrison, Henderson, Hopkins, Jasper, Lamar, Liberty,  Loving, Marion, Martin, Midland, 
Morris, Nacogdoches, Newton, Orange, Panola, Polk, Rains, Red River, Reeves, Refugio, Rusk, 
San Augustine, Shelby, Smith, Titus, Tyler, Upshur, Upton, Van Zandt, Ward, Winkler & Wood), 
UT (Iron & Millard)    
Aug. 2010 93 AZ (Navajo & Coconino), AR (Benton, Pulaski, & Washington), CA (Humboldt, Lake, Marin, 
Mendocino, Merced, Napa & Santa Cruz), IA (Polk), LA (Lafourche & Terrebonne), MI 
(Macomb), MS (Harrison, Lowndes & Rankin), MT (Yellowstone), NE (Douglas & Lancaster), 
NC (Burke, Caldwell, Cleveland, Davidson, Forsyth, Iredell, Lincoln, McDowell, Polk & 
Rutherford), OH (Summit), OR (Washington), SD (Custer, Fall River & Jackson), TN 
(Davidson), TX (Archer, Baylor, Borden, Brown, Callahan, Clay, Coleman, Comanche, Coke, 
Concho, Cooke, Crockett, Dawson, Eastland, Ellis, Erath, Fisher, Foard, Gaines, Glasscock, 
Hardeman, Haskell, Hood, Howard, Iron, Jack, Jones, Kent, King, Knox, Menard, Mitchell, Mills, 
Montague, Navarro, Palo Pinto, Parker, Reagan, Rockwall, Runnels, Sabine, Schleicher, Scurry, 
Shackelford, Stephens, Sterling, Stonewall, Sutton, Taylor, Throckmorton, Tom Green, Wichita, 
Wilbarger, Wise & Young)  
Sep. 2010 85 CA (Kern, Kings & Madera), GA (Cobb, Fulton & Muscogee), HI (Hawaii, Kauai & Maui), IL 
(Alexander, Clinton, Franklin, Jackson, Massac, Pulaski & Washington), MI (Kent), MS (DeSoto), 
MO (St. Louis City & St. Louis), NC (Alamance, Bladen, Chatham, Edgecombe, Granville, 
Hoke, Johnston, Moore & Nash), SC (Charleston, Greenville & Horry), TX (Armstrong, Austin, 
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Bailey, Brazos, Briscoe, Burleson, Carson, Castro, Childress, Cochran, Collingsworth, Cottle, 
Crosby, Dallam, Dear Smith, Dickens, Donley, Floyd, Garza, Gray, Grimes, Hale, Hall, 
Hansford, Hartley, Hockley, Houston, Hutchinson, Lamb, Lee, Leon, Lipscomb, Lynn, Madison, 
Milam, Moore, Motley, Nolan, Ochiltree, Oldham, Parmer, Roberts, Robertson, San Jacinto, 
Sherman, Swisher, Terry, Trinity, Walker, Waller, Washington, Wheeler & Yoakum)  
Oct. 2010 87 AZ (Gila, Graham, Greenlee, & La Paz), GA (Hall & Whitfield), IL (Champaign, Christian, 
Effingham, Marion, Stephenson, Vermillion & Williamson), KY (Fayette), NV (Carson City, 
Churchill, Douglas &  Lyon), NC (Alexander, Alleghany, Ashe, Avery, Mitchell, Rockingham, 
Stokes, Surry, Watauga, Wilkes & Yadkin), SC (Beaufort, Berkley, Dorchester & York), WV 
(Barbour, Berkeley, Boone, Braxton, Brooke, Cabell, Calhoun, Clay, Fayette, Gilmer, Grant, 
Greenbrier, Hampshire, Hancock, Hardy, Harrison, Jackson, Jefferson, Kanawha, Lewis, Lincoln, 
Logan, Marion, Marshall, Mason, McDowell, Mercer, Mineral, Mingo, Monongalia, Monroe, 
Morgan, Nicholas, Ohio, Pendleton, Pleasants, Pocahontas, Preston, Putnam, Raleigh, Randolph, 
Ritchie, Roane, Summers, Taylor, Tucker, Tyler, Upshur, Wayne, Webster, Wetzel, Wirt, Wood & 
Wyoming)    
Nov. 2010 55 GA (Cherokee), IL (Crawford, De Witt, Ford & Piatt), LA (Caddo Parish & St. Tammany 
Parish), MO (Clay, Jackson & Platte), NE (Adams, Buffalo, Hall, Hamilton, Howard, Madison & 
Merrick), NV (Lincoln & Nye), NM (Catron, Chaves, Cibola, Curry, Eddy, Lea, McKinley, Mora, 
Otero, Sandoval, Sierra, Socorro, Torrance & Valencia), NC (Anson, Davie, Guilford, 
Montgomery, Randolph, Richmond, Rowan, Scotland &Stanly), OH (Clark & Warren), OK 
(Canadian, Cleveland, Garfield, Grady, Lincoln, Logan, McClain & Pottawatomie), SC 
(Allendale, Bamberg & Bamwell)   
Dec. 2010 91 AR (Crawford, Garland, Jefferson, Miller, Saline, Sebastian, Union & White), CA (Mariposa, 
Mono & Tuolumne), GA (Forsyth), IA (Pottawattamie), KS (Sedgwick), LA (Washington), MD 
(Baltimore, Carroll & Anne Arundel), MS (Forrest, Hancock, Jackson, Jones & Pearl River), NE 
(Sarpy), NM (Colfax, DeBaca, Guadalupe, Harding, Lincoln, Los Alamos, Quay, Rio Arriba, 
Roosevelt, San Juan, San Miguel, Taos & Union), NC (Bertie, Caswell, Martin, Pender, Person, 
Pitt, Sampson, Vance & Wayne), OH (Champaign, Logan, Madison, Muskingum & Union), OK 
(Bryan, Carter, Cherokee, Comanche, Creek, Kay, McIntosh, Muskogee, Okfuskee, Okmulgee, 
Osage, Pawnee, Payne, Pittsburg, Pontotoc, Rogers, Sequoyah, Stephens, Wagoner & Washington), 
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SC (Colleton, Hampton & Jasper), TN (Anderson, Bedford, Blount, Bradley, Carter, Coffee, 
Greene, Hamblen, Jefferson, Madison, McMinn, Obion, Roane, Sevier, Sullivan, Warren & 
Washington)       
Jan. 2011 107 CA (Colusa, Nevada, Plumas, Sutter & Tehama), GA (Henry, Rockdale & Spalding), IA 
(Hardin), KS (Saline), MO (Pettis, Adair, Buchanan, Clark, Montgomery, Perry, Scott), NV 
(Storey), NY (Putnam & Rockland), NC (Franklin, Greene, Jones, Lenoir, Onslow, Robeson, 
Warren & Wilson), OH (Athens & Licking), SC (Cherokee, Greenwood, Laurens & Oconees), WI 
(Adams, Ashland, Barron, Bayfield, Brown, Buffalo, Burnett, Calumet, Chippewa, Clark, 
Columbia, Crawford, Dane, Dodge, Door, Douglas, Dunn, Eau Claire, Florence, Fond du Lac, 
Forest, Grant, Green, Green Lake, Iowa, Iron, Jackson, Jefferson, Juneau, Kenosha, Kewaunee, La 
Crosse, Lafayette, Langlade, Lincoln, Manitowoc, Marathon, Marinette, Marquette, Menominee, 
Milwaukee, Monroe, Oconto, Oneida, Outagamie, Ozaukee, Pepin, Pierce, Polk, Portage, Price, 
Racine, Richland, Rock, Rusk, Saint Croix, Sauk, Sawyer, Shawano, Sheboygan, Taylor, 
Trempealeau, Vernon, Vilas, Walworth, Washburn, Washington, Waukesha, Waupaca, 
Waushara, Winnebago & Wood), WY (Laramie)          
Feb. 2011 69 CA (Alpine, Amador, Calaveras, Del Norte, Glenn, Inyo, Lassen, Modoc, San Benito, Sierra, 
Siskiyou & Trinity), CO (Arapahoe, Denver & El Paso), GA (Barrow, Newton & Walton), MD 
(Caroline, Dorchester, Kent, Somerset, Talbot & Worcester), MO (Boone, Cape Girardeau, Cass, 
Cole, Dunklin, Jasper, Marion & Saint Charles), NE (Dodge), NV (Mineral), NM (Santa Fe), 
NY (Dutchess, Genesee, Nassau, Orange, Orleans, Suffolk, Sullivan, Ulster & Westchester), NC 
(Beaufort, Carteret, Craven, Hyde, Pamlico, Tyrrell & Washington), OH (Ashtabula, Belmont, 
Coshocton, Fairfield, Fayette, Guernsey, Hocking, Jefferson, Lake, Monroe, Morgan, Morrow, 
Noble, Perry, Vinton & Washington), SC (Abbeville & Spartanburg)     
Mar. 2011 76 GA (Chatham, Coweta, Fayette, Glynn, Houston & Troup), IA (Benton, Black Hawk, Johnson, 
Linn & Woodbury), KS (Douglas, Finney, Johnson, Leavenworth, Miami, Shawnee & 
Wyandotte), MD (Calvert, Cecil, Charles, Harford & Howard), MI (Genesee, Monroe & 
Washtenaw), MO (Camden, Christian, Greene, McDonald, Newton, Stone & Taney), NV 
(Pershing), NY (Monroe, Schuyler & Wyoming), NC (Camden, Chowan, Currituck, Gates, 
Hertford, Northampton, Pasquotank & Perquimans), OH (Allen, Ashland, Delaware, Geauga, 
Harrison, Hancock, Hardin, Huron, Knox, Lorain, Marion, Ottawa, Paulding, Pickaway, Portage, 
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Sandusky, Seneca, Trumbull, Williams, Wood & Wyandot), RI (Bristol, Kent, Newport, 
Providence & Washington), SC (Chester, McCormick & Union), UT (Summit & Tooele)   
Apr. 2011 110 AL (Autauga, Baldwin, Blount, Chilton, Elmore, Escambia, Etowah, Jefferson, Lee, Limestone, 
Marshall, Mobile, Morgan, Tallapoosa, & Tuscaloosa), GA (Carroll, Colquitt, Douglas,  
Lowndes & Paulding), ID (Kootenai), IN (Benton, Boone, Cass, Carroll, Clark, Clinton, Fountain, 
Fulton, Jasper, Miami, Newton, Pulaski, Starke, Steuben, Wabash, Warren, Warrick & White), IA 
(Clinton, Dubuque, Muscatine & Scott), KS (Ford), MD (Allegany, Garrett, Washington & 
Wicomico), MI (Allegan, Barry, Calhoun, Clinton, Eaton, Ingham, Ionia,  Jackson, Kalamazoo, 
Livingston, Muskegon, Ottawa, Saint Clair & Shiawassee), MO (Daviess, Douglas, Howell, 
Laclede, Oregon, Ozark, Pulaski, Texas & Webster), NV (Humboldt), NY (Cayuga, Chautauqua, 
Fulton, Livingston, Niagara, Ontario, Otsego, Senaca, Steuben & Yates), OH (Adams, Brown, 
Clermont, Clinton, Crawford, Darke, Gallia, Greene, Henry, Highland, Jackson, Lawrence, Lucas, 
Miami, Meigs, Pike, Preble, Putnam, Ross, Scioto, Shelby, Van Wert & Wayne), OR (Columbia), 
SC (Kershaw, Lancaster, Orangeburg & Richland)          
May 2011 66 AL (Calhoun, Cherokee, Clay, Colbert, Coosa, Cullman, Franklin, Jackson, Shelby, Talladega), 
GA (Bartow, Floyd & Polk), ID (Bannock, Bonner, Bonneville & Twin Falls), IN (Elkhart, 
Grant, Hendricks, Henry, Howard, Huntington, Madison, Marion, Montgomery, Noble, Parke & 
Tippecanoe), IA (Story), MO (Barton, Cedar, Putnam, Saint Clair, Sullivan & Vernon), NE 
(Saunders), NV (Elko), NY (Allegany, Clinton & Warren), OH (Stark & Tuscarawas), OK (Adair, 
Beckham, Choctaw, Cotton, Custer, Delaware, Ellis, Jackson, Haskell, Jefferson, Le Flore, 
Marshall, Mayes, Noble, Ottawa, Roger Mills, Texas & Woodward), OR (Clatsop), SC (Calhoun, 
Chesterfield & Sumter), UT (Uintah)  
Jun. 2011 100 AL (DeKalb, Lamar, Lawrence, Marengo, Marion, Monroe), GA (Clarke, Coffee, Dougherty, 
Habersham, Grady, Jackson, Jeff Davis & Pickens), IN (Bartholomew, Brown, Clay, Crawford, 
Davies, Delaware, Gibson, Green, Johnson, Knox, Lawrence, Morgan, Orange, Pike, Posey, 
Ripley, Shelby, Switzerland, Vermillion, Union, Wayne, Wells), KS (Harvey & Reno), MI (Bay, 
Berrien, Lapeer, Midland, Saginaw & Van Buren), MO (Ray), NV (Lander), NY (Cattaraugus, 
Essex, Montgomery & Schoharle), OH (Auglaize, Carroll, Columbiana, Erie, Holmes, Medina & 
Mercer), OR (Jackson & Josephine), SC (Clarendon, Fairfield & Lee), WA (Yakima), PR 
(Aguadilla, Aibonito, Arecibo, Braceloneta, Barranquitas, Bayamon, Cabo Rojo, Caguas, Camuy, 
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Carolina, Catano, Cayey, Ceiba, Cidra, Corozal, Fajardo, Guayama, Guaynabo, Gurabo, Humacao, 
Jayuya, Juncos, Lajas, Luquillo, Mayaguez, Moca, Orocovis, Ponce, Rincon, Rio Grande, San 
Juan, San Lorenzo, San Sebastian, Toa Alta, Trujillo Alto, Utuado & Villalba)      
Jul. 2011 83 AL (Choctaw, Conecuh, Dallas, Hale, Perry, Washington), AR (Boone, Carroll, Faulkner, 
Hempstead, Johnson, Pope, Sevier & Yell), GA (Catoosa, Gordon, Monroe, Murray & Walker), 
IN (Jackson), KS (Geary & Pottawatomie), LA (Ascension, Iberia, Lafayette, Livingston, St. 
Bernard, St. Charles & St. John the Baptist), MI (Huron, Sanilac & Tuscola), MS (Attala, 
Claiborne, Copiah, Covington, Franklin, George, Greene, Hinds, Jefferson Davis, Lamar, 
Lauderdale, Lawrence, Leake, Lincoln, Madison, Marion, Montgomery, Neshoba, Noxubee, Perry, 
Pike, Quitman, Scott, Sharkey, Stone, Sunflower, Tallahatchie, Walthall, Wayne, Wilkinson & 
Yalobusha), MO (Callaway, Jefferson, Johnson, Miller, Moniteau & Saint Francois), OH 
(Defiance, Fulton, Mahoning & Richland), SC (Aiken, Anderson, Darlington, Florence & 
Georgetown), WA (Benton, Franklin, Grays Harbor, Lewis & Pacific)        
Aug. 2011 6 MI (Chippewa, Gogebic, Houghton & Mackinac), MO (Sainte Genevieve & Washington) 
Sep. 2011 86 MI (Alcona, Alger, Alpena, Antrim, Arenac, Baraga, Benzie, Branch, Cass, Charlevoix, 
Cheboygan, Clare, Crawford, Delta, Dickinson, Emmet, Gladwin, Grand Traverse, Gratiot, 
Hillsdale, Iosco, Iron, Isabella, Kalkaska, Keweenaw, Lake, Leelanau, Lenawee, Luce, Manistee, 
Marquette, Mason, Mecosta, Menominee, Missaukee, Montcalm, Montmorency, Newaygo, 
Oceana, Ogemaw, Ontonagon, Osceola, Oscoda, Otsego, Presque Isle, Roscommon, Saint Joseph, 
Schoolcraft & Wexford), OR (Baker, Benton, Coos, Crook, Curry, Deschutes, Douglas, Gilliam, 
Grant, Harney, Hood River, Jefferson, Klamath, Lake, Lane, Lincoln, Linn, Malheur, Morrow, 
Polk, Sherman, Tillamook, Umatilla, Union, Wallowa, Wasco, Wheeler & Yamhill), SC (Dillon, 
Edgefield, Lexington, Marion, Marlboro, Newberry, Pickens, Saluda & Williamsburg)         
Nov. 2011 171 ID (Adams, Bear Lake, Benewah, Bingham, Blaine, Boise, Boundary, Butte, Camas, Caribou, 
Cassia, Clark, Clearwater, Custer, Elmore, Franklin, Fremont, Gem, Gooding, Idaho, Jefferson, 
Jerome, Latah, Lemhi, Lewis, Lincoln, Madison, Minidoka, Nez Perce, Oneida, Owyhee, Payette, 
Power, Shoshone, Teton, Valley & Washington), MS (Adams, Alcorn, Amite, Benton, Bolivar, 
Calhoun, Carroll, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Clarke, Clay, Coahoma, Grenada, Holmes, Humphreys, 
Issaquena, Itawamba, Jasper, Jefferson, Kemper, Lafayette, Lee, Leflore, Marshall, Monroe, 
Newton, Oktibbeha, Panola, Pontotoc, Prentiss, Simpson, Smith, Tate, Tippah, Tishomingo, 
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Tunica, Union, Washington, Webster, Winston & Yazoo), MO (Andrew, Atchison, Audrain, Barry, 
Bates, Benton, Bollinger, Butler, Caldwell, Carroll, Carter, Chariton, Clinton, Cooper, Crawford, 
Dade, Dallas, DeKalb, Dent, Franklin, Gasconade, Gentry, Grundy, Harrison, Henry, Hickory, 
Holt, Howard, Iron, Knox, Lafayette, Lawrence, Lewis, Lincoln, Linn, Livingston, Macon, 
Madison, Maries, Mercer, Mississippi, Monroe, Morgan, New Madrid, Nodaway, Osage, Pemiscot, 
Phelps, Pike, Polk, Ralls, Randolph, Reynolds, Ripley, Saline, Schuyler, Scotland, Shannon, 
Shelby, Stoddard, Warren, Wayne, Worth & Wright), OK (Alfalfa, Atoka, Beaver, Blaine, Caddo, 
Cimarron, Coal, Craig, Dewey, Garvin, Grant, Greer, Harmon, Harper, Hughes, Johnston, 
Kingfisher, Kiowa, Latimer, Love, Major, McCurtain, Murray, Nowata, Pushmataha, Seminole, 
Tillman, Washita & Woods)        
Dec. 2011 261 GA (Appling, Atkinson, Bacon, Baker, Baldwin, Banks, Ben Hill, Berrien, Bibb, Bleckley, 
Brantley, Brooks, Bryan, Bulloch, Burke, Butts, Calhoun, Camden, Candler, Charlton, 
Chattahoochee, Chattooga, Clay, Clinch, Columbia, Cook, Crawford, Crisp, Dade, Dawson, 
Decatur, Dodge, Dooly, Early, Echols, Effingham, Elbert, Emanuel, Evans, Fannin, Franklin, 
Gilmer, Glascock, Greene, Hancock, Haralson, Harris, Hart, Heard, Irwin, Jasper, Jefferson, 
Jenkins, Johnson, Jones, Lamar, Lanier, Laurens, Lee, Liberty, Lincoln, Long, Lumpkin, Macon, 
Madison, Marion, McDuffie, McIntosh, Meriwether, Miller, Mitchell, Montgomery, Morgan, 
Oconee, Oglethorpe, Peach, Pierce, Pike, Pulaski, Putnam, Quitman, Rabun, Randolph, Richmond, 
Schley, Screven, Seminole, Stephens, Stewart, Sumter, Talbot, Taliaferro, Tattnall, Taylor, Telfair, 
Terrell, Thomas, Tift, Toombs, Towns, Treutlen, Turner, Twiggs, Union, Upson, Ware, Warren, 
Washington, Wayne, Webster, Wheeler, White, Wilcox, Wilkes, Wilkinson & Worth), IN (Adams, 
Allen, Blackford, De Kalb, Dearborn, Decatur, Dubois, Fayette, Floyd, Franklin, Hamilton, 
Hancock, Harrison, Jay, Jefferson, Jennings, Kosciusko, La Porte, Lagrange, Lake, Marshall, 
Martin, Monroe, Ohio, Owen, Perry, Porter, Putnam, Randolph, Rush, Saint Joseph, Scott, Spencer, 
Sullivan, Tipton, Vanderburgh, Vigo, Washington & Whitley), KS (Allen, Anderson, Atchison, 
Barber, Barton, Bourbon, Brown, Butler, Chase, Chautauqua, Cherokee, Cheyenne, Clark, Clay, 
Cloud, Coffey, Comanche, Cowley, Crawford, Decatur, Dickson, Doniphan, Edwards, Elk, Ellis, 
Ellsworth, Franklin, Gove, Graham, Grant, Gray, Greeley, Greenwood, Hamilton, Harper, Haskell, 
Hodgeman, Jackson, Jefferson, Jewell, Kearny, Kingman, Kiowa, Labette, Lane, Lincoln, Linn, 
Logan, Lyon, Marion, Marshall, McPherson, Meade, Mitchell, Montgomery, Morris, Morton, 
Nemaha, Neosho, Ness, Norton, Osage, Osborne, Ottawa, Pawnee, Phillips, Pratt, Rawlins, 
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Republic, Rice, Riley, Rooks, Rush, Russell, Scott, Seward, Sheridan, Sherman, Smith, Stafford, 
Stanton, Stevens, Sumner, Thomas, Trego, Wabaunsee, Wallace, Washington, Wichita, Wilson & 
Woodson), UT (Carbon, Daggett, Duchesne, Emery, Garfield, Grand, Juab, Kane, Morgan, Piute, 
Rich, San Juan, Sanpete, Wasatch & Wayne)               
Jan. 2012 160 IA (Adair, Adams, Allamakee, Appanoose, Audubon, Boone, Bremer, Buchanan, Buena Vista, 
Butler, Calhoun, Carroll, Cass, Cedar, Cerro Gordo, Cherokee, Chickasaw, Clarke, Clay, Clayton, 
Crawford, Dallas, Davis, Decatur, Delaware, Des Moines, Dickinson, Emmet, Fayette, Floyd, 
Franklin, Fremont, Greene, Grundy, Guthrie, Hamilton, Hancock, Harrison, Henry, Howard, 
Humboldt, Ida, Iowa, Jackson, Jasper, Jefferson, Jones, Keokuk, Kossuth, Lee, Louisa, Lucas, 
Lyon, Madison, Mahaska, Marion, Marshall, Mills, Mitchell, Monona, Monroe, Montgomery, 
OBrien, Osceola, Page, Palo Alto, Plymouth, Pocahontas, Poweshiek, Ringgold, Sac, Shelby, 
Sioux, Tama, Taylor, Union, Van Buren, Wapello, Warren, Washington, Wayne, Webster, 
Winnebago, Winneshiek, Worth & Wright), TN (Benton, Bledsoe, Campbell, Canon, Carroll, 
Cheatham, Chester, Claiborne, Clay, Cocke, Crockett, Cumberland, Decatur, DeKalb, Dickson, 
Dyer, Fayette, Fentress, Franklin, Gibson, Giles, Grainger, Grundy, Hancock, Hardeman, Hardin, 
Hawkins, Haywood, Henderson, Henry, Hickman, Houston, Humphreys, Jackson, Johnson, Lake, 
Lauderdale, Lawrence, Lewis, Lincoln, Loudon, Macon, Marion, Marshall, Maury, McNairy, 
Meigs, Monroe, Montgomery, Moore, Morgan, Overton, Perry, Pickett, Polk, Putnam, Rhea, 
Robertson, Rutherford, Scott, Sequatchie, Smith, Stewart, Sumner, Tipton, Trousdale, Unicoi, 
Union, Van Buren, Wayne, Weakley, White, Williamson & Wilson)       
Feb. 2012 117 CT (Hartford, Litchfield, Middlesex, New Haven, New London, Tolland & Windham), MD 
(Baltimore City & Montgomery), MN (Aitkin, Anoka, Becker, Beltrami, Benton, Big Stone, 
Blue Earth, Brown, Carlton, Carver, Cass, Chippewa, Chisago, Clay, Clearwater, Cook, 
Cottonwood, Crow Wing, Dakota, Dodge, Douglas, Faribault, Fillmore, Freeborn, Goodhue, 
Grant, Hennepin, Houston, Hubbard, Isanti, Itasca, Jackson, Kanabec, Kandiyohi, Kittson, 
Koochiching, Lac Qui Parle, Lake, Lake of the Woods, Le Sueur, Lincoln, Lyon, Mahnomen, 
Marshall, Martin, McLeod, Meeker, Mille Lacs, Morrison, Mower, Murray, Nicollet, Nobles, 
Norman, Olmsted, Otter Tail, Pennington, Pine, Pipestone, Polk, Pope, Ramsey, Red Lake, 
Redwood, Renville, Rice, Rock, Roseau, Saint Louis, Scott, Sherburne, Sibley, Stearns, Steele, 
Stevens, Swift, Todd, Traverse, Wabasha, Wadena, Waseca, Washington, Watonwan, Wilkin, 
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Winona, Wright & Yellow Medicine), NJ (Atlantic, Bergen, Burlington, Camden, Cape May, 
Cumberland, Essex, Gloucester, Hudson, Hunterdon, Mercer, Middlesex, Monmouth, Morris, 
Ocean, Passaic, Salem, Somerset, Sussex, Union & Warren)         
Mar. 2012 200 KY (Adair, Allen, Anderson, Ballard, Barren, Bath, Bell, Boone, Bourbon, Boyd, Bracken, 
Breathitt, Breckinridge, Bullitt, Butler, Caldwell, Calloway, Campbell, Carlisle, Carroll, Carter, 
Casey, Christian, Clark, Clay, Clinton, Crittenden, Cumberland, Daviess, Edmonson, Elliott, Estill, 
Fleming, Floyd, Franklin, Fulton, Gallatin, Garrard, Grant, Graves, Grayson, Green, Greenup, 
Hancock, Hardin, Harlan, Harrison, Hart, Henderson, Henry, Hickman, Hopkins, Jackson, 
Jefferson, Jessamine, Johnson, Kenton, Knott, Knox, Larue, Laurel, Lawrence, Lee, Leslie, 
Letcher, Lewis, Lincoln, Livingston, Logan, Lyon, Madison, Magoffin, Marion, Marshall, Marin, 
Mason, McCracken, McCreary, McLean, Meade, Menifee, Mercer, Metcalfe, Monroe, 
Montgomery, Morgan, Muhlenberg, Nelson, Nicholas, Ohio, Oldham, Owen, Owsley, Pendleton, 
Perry, Pike, Powell, Pulaski, Robertson, Rockcastle, Rowan, Russell, Scott, Shelby, Simpson, 
Taylor, Todd, Trigg, Trimble, Union, Warren, Washington, Wayne, Webster, Whitley, Wolfe & 
Woodford), NE (Antelope, Arthur, Banner, Blaine, Boone, Box Butte, Boyd, Brown, Burt, Butler, 
Cass, Cedar, Chase, Cherry, Cheyenne, Clay, Colfax, Cuming, Custer, Dakota, Dawes, Dawson, 
Deuel, Dixon, Dundy, Fillmore, Franklin, Frontier, Furnas, Gage, Garden, Garfield, Gosper, Grant, 
Greeley, Harlan, Hayes, Hitchcock, Holt, Hooker, Jefferson, Johnson, Kearney, Keith, Keya Paha, 
Kimball, Knox, Lincoln, Logan, Loup, McPherson, Morrill, Nance, Nemaha, Nuckolls, Otoe, 
Pawnee, Pawnee, Perkins, Phelps, Pierce, Platte, Polk, Red Willow, Richardson, Rock, Saline, 
Scotts Bluff, Seward, Sheridan, Sherman, Sioux, Stanton, Thayer, Thomas, Thurston, Valley, 
Washington, Wayne, Webster, Wheeler & York)               
Apr. 2012 227 AK (Aleutians East Borough, Aleutians West Borough Census Area, Anchorage Borough, Bethel 
Census Area, Bristol Bay Borough, Denali Borough, Dillingham Census Area, Fairbanks North 
Star Borough, Haines Borough, Juneau Borough, Kenai Peninsula Borough, Ketchikan Gateway 
Borough, Kodiak Island Borough, Lake and Peninsula Borough, Matanuska-Susitna Borough, 
Nome Census Area, North Slope Borough, Northwest Arctic Borough, Petersburg  Census Area, 
Prince of Wales-Outer Ketchikan Census Area, Sitka City and Borough, Skagway-Hoonah-Angoon 
Census Area, Southeast Fairbanks Census Area, Valdez-Cordova Census Area, Wade Hampton 
Census Area, Wrangell-Petersburg Census Area, Yakutat City and Borough, & Yukon-koyukuk 
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Census Area), MT (Beaverhead, Big Horn, Blaine, Broadwater, Carbon, Carter, Cascade, 
Chouteau, Custer, Daniels, Dawson, Deer Lodge, Fallon, Fergus, Flathead, Gallatin, Garfield, 
Glacier, Golden Valley, Granite, Hill, Jefferson, Judith Basin, Lake, Liberty, Lincoln, Madison, 
McCone, Meagher, Mineral, Musselshell, Park, Petroleum, Phillips, Pondera, Powder River, 
Powell, Prairie, Ravalli, Richland, Roosevelt, Rosebud, Sanders, Sheridan, Silver Bow, Stillwater, 
Sweet Grass, Teton, Toole, Treasure, Valley, Wheatland & Wibaux), ND (Adams, Barnes, Benson, 
Billings, Bottineau, Bowman, Burke, Burleigh, Cass, Cavalier, Dickey, Divide, Dunn, Eddy, 
Emmons, Foster, Golden Valley, Grand Forks, Grant, Griggs, Hettinger, Kidder, LaMoure, Logan, 
McHenry, McIntosh, McKenzie, McLean, Mercer, Morton, Mountrail, Nelson, Oliver, Pembina, 
Pierce, Ramsey, Ransom, Renville, Richland, Rolette, Sargent, Sheridan, Sioux, Slope, Stark, 
Steele, Stutsman, Towner, Trail, Walsh, Ward, Wells & Williams), SD (Aurora, Beadle, Bennett, 
Bon Homme, Brookings, Brown, Brule, Buffalo, Butte, Campbell, Charles Mix, Clark, Clay, 
Codington, Corson, Davidson, Day, Deuel, Dewey, Douglas, Edmunds, Faulk, Grant, Gregory, 
Haakon, Hamlin, Hand, Hanson, Harding, Hughes, Hutchinson, Hyde, Jerauld, Jones, Kingsbury, 
Lake, Lawrence, Lincoln, Lyman, Marshall, McCook, McPherson, Meade, Mellette, Miner, 
Moody, Perkins, Potter, Roberts, Sanborn, Spink, Stanley, Sully, Todd, Tripp, Turner, Union, 
Walworth, Yankton & Ziebach), WA (Adams, Asotin, Chelan, Clallam, Clark, Columbia, 
Cowlitz, Douglas, Ferry, Garfield, Grant, Island, Jefferson, King, Kitsap, Kittitas, Klickitat, 
Lincoln, Mason, Okanogan, Pend Oreille, Pierce, San Juan, Skagit, Skamania, Snohomish, 
Spokane, Stevens, Thurston, Wahkiakum, Walla Walla, Whatcom & Whitman)                 
May 2012 340 AR (Arkansas, Ashley, Baxter, Bradley, Calhoun, Chicot, Clark, Clay, Cleburne, Cleveland, 
Columbia, Conway, Craighead, Crittenden, Cross, Dallas, Desha, Drew, Franklin, Fulton, Grant, 
Greene, Hot Spring, Howard, Independence, Izard, Jackson, Lafayette, Lawrence, Lee, Lincoln, 
Little River, Logan, Lonoke, Madison, Marion, Mississippi, Monroe, Montgomery, Nevada, 
Newton, Ouachita, Perry, Phillips, Pike, Poinsett, Polk, Prairie, Randolph, Saint Francis, Scott, 
Searcy, Sharp, Stone, Van Buren, & Woodruff), CO (Adams, Alamosa, Archuleta, Baca, Bent, 
Boulder, Broomfield, Chaffee, Cheyenne, Clear Creek, Conejos, Costilla, Crowley, Custer, Delta, 
Dolores, Douglas, Eagle, Elbert, Fremont, Garfield, Gilpin, Grand, Gunnison, Hinsdale, 
Huerfano, Jackson, Jefferson, Kiowa, Kit Carson, La Plata, Lake, Larimer, Las Animas, Lincoln, 
Logan, Mesa, Mineral, Moffat, Montezuma, Montrose, Morgan, Otero, Ouray, Park, Phillips, 
Pitkin, Prowers, Pueblo, Rio Blanco, Rio Grande, Routt, Saguache, San Juan, San Miguel, 
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Sedgwick, Summit, Teller, Washington, Weld & Yuma ), LA (Acadia Parish, Allen Parish, 
Assumption Parish, Avoyelles  Parish, Beauregard Parish, Bienville Parish, Bossier Parish, 
Calcasieu Parish, Caldwell Parish, Cameron Parish, Catahoula Parish, Claiborne Parish, 
Concordia Parish, De Soto Parish, East Carroll Parish, East Feliciana Parish, Evangeline Parish, 
Franklin Parish, Grant Parish, Iberville Parish, Jackson Parish, Jefferson Davis Parish, La Salle 
Parish, Lincoln Parish, Madison Parish, Morehouse Parish, Natchitoches Parish, Ouachita Parish, 
Plaquemines Parish, Pointe Coupee Parish, Rapides Parish, Red River Parish, Richland Parish, 
Sabine Parish, Saint Helena Parish, Saint James Parish, Saint Landry Parish, Saint Martin Parish, 
Saint Mary Parish, Tangipahoa Parish, Tensas Parish, Union Parish, Vermillion Parish, Vernon 
Parish, Webster Parish, West Baton Rouge Parish, West Carroll Parish & West Feliciana Parish & 
Winn Parish), ME (Androscoggin, Aroostook, Cumberland, Franklin, Hancock, Kennebec, Knox, 
Lincoln, Oxford, Penobscot, Piscataquis, Sagadahoc, Somerset, Waldo, Washington & York), MA 
(Barnstable, Berkshire, Bristol, Dukes, Essex, Franklin, Hampden, Hampton, Hampshire, 
Middlesex, Nantucket, Norfolk, Plymouth & Worcester), NV (Esmeralda, Eureka & White Pine), 
NH (Belknap, Carroll, Cheshire, Coos, Grafton, Hillsborough, Merrimack, Rockingham, Strafford 
& Sullivan), NY (Albany, Bronx, Broome, Chemung, Chenango, Columbia, Cortland, Delaware, 
Erie, Franklin, Greene, Hamilton, Herkimer, Jefferson, Kings, Lewis, Madison, New York City, 
Oneida, Onondaga, Oswego, Queens, Rensselaer, Richmond, Saint Lawrence, Saratoga, 
Schenectady, Tioga, Tompkins, Washington & Wayne), PA (Adams, Allegheny, Armstrong, 
Beaver, Bedford, Berks, Blair, Bradford, Butler, Cambria, Cameron, Carbon, Centre, Chester, 
Clarion, Clearfield, Clinton, Columbia, Crawford, Cumberland, Dauphin, Delaware, Elk, Erie, 
Fayette, Forest, Franklin, Fulton, Greene, Huntington, Indiana, Jefferson, Juniata, Lackawanna, 
Lancaster, Lawrence, Lebanon, Lehigh, Luzerne, Lycoming, McKean, Mercer, Mifflin, Monroe, 
Montour, Northampton, Northumberland, Perry, Pike, Potter, Schuylkill, Snyder, Somerset, 
Sullivan, Susquehanna, Tioga, Union, Venango, Warren, Washington, Wayne, Westmoreland, 
Wyoming & York), VT (Addison, Bennington, Caledonia, Chittenden, Essex, Franklin, Grand Isle, 
Lamoille, Orange, Orleans, Rutland, Washington, Windham & Windsor), WY (Albany, Big Horn, 
Campbell, Carbon, Converse, Crook, Fremont, Goshen, Hot Springs, Johnson, Lincoln, Natrona, 
Niobrara, Park, Platte, Sheridan, Sublette, Sweetwater, Teton, Uinta, Washakie & Weston)                        
Jun. 2012 4 American Samoa, District of Columbia (DC), Guam & U.S. Virgin Islands 
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Jan. 2013 107 AL (Barbour, Bibb, Bullock, Butler, Chambers, Clarke, Cleburne, Coffee, Covington, Crenshaw, 
Dale, Fayette, Geneva, Greene, Henry, Houston, Lauderdale, Lowndes, Macon, Madison, 
Montgomery, Pickens, Pike, Randolph, Russell, Saint Clair, Sumter, Walker, Wilcox, & Winston), 
IL (Adams, Bond, Boone, Brown, Bureau, Calhoun, Carroll, Cass, Clark, Clay, Coles, Cook, 
Cumberland, DeKalb, Douglas, Edgar, Edwards, Fayette, Fulton, Gallatin, Greene, Grundy, 
Hamilton, Hancock, Hardin, Henderson, Henry, Iroquois, Jasper, Jefferson, Jersey, Jo Daviess, 
Johnson, Kankakee, Kendall, Knox, La Salle, Lawrence, Lee, Livingston, Logan, Macon, 
Macoupin, Marshall, Mason, McDonough, McLean, Menard, Mercer, Monroe, Montgomery, 
Morgan, Moultrie, Ogle, Peoria, Perry, Pike, Pope, Putnam, Randolph, Richland, Rock Island, 
Saline, Sangamon, Schuyler, Scott, Shelby, Stark, Tazewell, Union, Wabash, Warren, Wayne, 
White, Whiteside & Woodford), N. Mariana      
Total  3,175  
Note: Words in bold refer to the 541 localities (counties/cities) that this dissertation used for analysis, which have at least one monthly noncitizen 
deportation at the county level during 61 months (Oct. 2008 - Nov. 2013).   
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DEPORTATION RESULTS UNDER SECURE COMMUNITIES:  
IN TERMS OF LOCAL CLASSIFICATIONS 
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Descriptive Statistics: Deportation Outcomes under S-Comm in Terms of Three Local 
Subclasses (Time covered: 61-month period, from Oct. 2008 to Nov. 2013) 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
Total: 541 counties     
Monthly # of fingerprint submissions 
Monthly # of IDENT matches 
Monthly deportation number (raw) 
Per capita deportation rate (100,000 pop.) 
Per capita deportation rate (1,000 Hispanic pop.) 
Activation length of S-Comm (as of Nov. 2013) 
Deportation rate (%) with Level 1 convictions 
Deportation rate (%) with Level 2 convictions 
Deportation rate (%) with Level 3 convictions 
Deportation rate (%) with Noncriminal convictions 
Deportation rate (%) with Level 3 + 
noncriminal convictions 
19.80 
2.64 
1.00 
.19 
.01 
11 
.00 
.04 
.00 
.00 
.00 
31,618.68 
3,702.05 
635.39 
347.22 
6.40 
61 
.96 
.80 
.64 
.67 
.86 
1,267.79 
73.81 
12.23 
5.07 
.31 
37.01 
.27 
.22 
.30 
.21 
.51 
2,505.62 
250.19 
41.90 
21.11 
.63 
10.91 
.12 
.09 
.10 
.14 
.14 
Class 1: 88 counties     
Monthly # of fingerprint submissions 
Monthly # of IDENT matches 
Monthly deportation number (raw) 
Per capita deportation rate (100,000 pop.) 
Per capita deportation rate (1,000 Hispanic pop.) 
Activation length of S-Comm (as of Nov. 2013) 
Deportation rate (%) with Level 1 convictions 
Deportation rate (%) with Level 2 convictions 
Deportation rate (%) with Level 3 convictions 
Deportation rate (%) with Noncriminal convictions 
Deportation rate (%) with Level 3 + 
noncriminal convictions 
86.78 
3.05 
1.04 
.27 
.02 
11 
.00 
.04 
.14 
.00 
.19 
4,959.58 
211.79 
22.87 
41.73 
3.96 
61 
.67 
.43 
.59 
.63 
.85 
829.84 
29.41 
4.04 
2.92 
.36 
33.84 
.25 
.23 
.33 
.19 
.52 
785.79 
39.00 
4.20 
5.68 
.54 
8.81 
.12 
.09 
.10 
.13 
.15 
Class 2: 34 counties     
Monthly # of fingerprint submissions 
Monthly # of IDENT matches 
Monthly deportation number (raw) 
Per capita deportation rate (100,000 pop.) 
Per capita deportation rate (1,000 Hispanic pop.) 
Activation length of S-Comm (as of Nov. 2013) 
Deportation rate (%) with Level 1 convictions 
Deportation rate (%) with Level 2 convictions 
Deportation rate (%) with Level 3 convictions 
Deportation rate (%) with Noncriminal convictions 
Deportation rate (%) with Level 3 + 
noncriminal convictions 
312.52 
10.81 
2.34 
.64 
.07 
38 
.09 
.08 
.19 
.07 
.26 
29,745.45 
3,031.61 
635.39 
10.23 
1.75 
61 
.51 
.36 
.49 
.58 
.79 
4,224.63 
339.39 
78.85 
4.53 
.28 
47.32 
.28 
.20 
.30 
.23 
.52 
6,240.78 
622.43 
141.97 
2.66 
.28 
8.18 
.11 
.06 
.08 
.12 
.12 
Class 3: 419 counties     
Monthly # of fingerprint submissions 
Monthly # of IDENT matches 
19.80 
2.64 
31,618.68 
3,702.05 
1,119.84 
61.58 
2,033.17 
208.95 
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Monthly deportation number (raw) 
Per capita deportation rate (100,000 pop.) 
Per capita deportation rate (1,000 Hispanic pop.) 
Activation length of S-Comm (as of Nov. 2013) 
Deportation rate (%) with Level 1 convictions 
Deportation rate (%) with Level 2 convictions 
Deportation rate (%) with Level 3 convictions 
Deportation rate (%) with Noncriminal convictions 
Deportation rate (%) with Level 3 + 
noncriminal convictions 
1.00 
.19 
.01 
11 
.00 
.04 
.00 
.00 
.00 
169.69 
347.22 
6.40 
61 
.96 
.80 
.64 
.67 
.86 
8.55 
5.56 
.30 
36.84 
.27 
.22 
.29 
.22 
.51 
16.87 
23.82 
.66 
11.03 
.12 
.09 
.10 
.14 
.15 
Note:  Per capita deportation rate weighting 100,000 population per county was calculated as follows: 
(monthly noncitizen deportation/total population)*100,000; Per capita deportation rate weighting 1,000 
Hispanic population per county was calculated as follows: (monthly noncitizen deportation/total Hispanic 
population)*1,000; deportation rates per level of criminality under S-Comm (Levels 1 - 3 and noncriminal 
convictions) were based on cumulative data (61-month period).       
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APPENDIX C  
PROBABILITY OF EACH OF FOUR ITEMS FOR LATENT CLASS ANALYSIS 
(BASED ON THE THREE-CLASS SOLUTION) 
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Class 1: 88 counties (16.3%)  
 
Class 2: 34 counties (6.3%) 
 
Class 3: 419 counties, (77.4%)   
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Figure C-1. Three-class solution for latent class analysis based on four immigration 
policy indicators (items) reflecting the extent of current local immigration enforcement 
policy involvement.  
Note: Each of the four items per class is based on a binary scale, coded as 0 (= no) and as 1 (= yes). Latent 
class proportions are shown in parenthesis above each barplot. Based on the local classifications, Class 1 
counties are operationalized as those with administrative-inactive-but-legally-punitive-leaning immigration 
enforcement policy participation; Class 2 counties are those with active immigration enforcement policy 
participation; Class 3 counties are those with inactive-but-mixed immigration enforcement policy 
participation. The x-axis refers to probability of each of four items, ranging from 0 to 1.      
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APPENDIX D  
SPECIFICATIONS (THROUGH CHI-SQUARE DIFFERENCE TESTS) OF LATENT 
GROWTH CURVE MODELINGS FOR TWO IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
ACTIONS UNDER SECURE COMMUNITIES: IMMIGRATION DETAINER 
ISSUANCES AND NONCITIZEN DEPORTATIONS
  
2
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1 
Model Fit and Estimates of Two Immigration Enforcement Actions under S-Comm 
Measure Model -2LL df AIC df  p RMSEA RMSEA 
90% CI 
CFI 
Immigration 
detainer 
issuance 
trajectory 
Linear LGM with R1 (1) 
Linear LGM with R2 (2) 
Quadratic LGM with R1 (3) 
Quadratic LGM with R2 (4) 
Cubic LGM with R1* (5) 
Cubic LGM with R2* (6) 
-2,695.49 
-2,694.92 
-2,664.59 
-2,665.40 
-2,661.83 
-2,660.29 
9 
12 
6 
10 
5 
1 
5,412.98 
5,405.83 
5,357.18 
5,350.81 
5,353.65 
5,358.57 
- 
3 (= 2-1) 
6 (= 2-3) 
4 (= 4-3) 
 
- 
-1.14 
45.81 
1.63 
 
- 
ns 
<.001 
ns 
.113 
.094 
.031 
.012 
.000 
.000 
.09 -.14 
.07 -.12 
.00 -.07 
.00 -.05 
.00 -.10 
.00 -.05 
.983 
.984 
.999 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
Noncitizen 
deportation 
trajectory 
Linear LGM with R1 (1) 
Linear LGM with R2 (2) 
Quadratic LGM with R1 (3) 
Quadratic LGM with R2 (4) 
Cubic LGM with R1* (5) 
Cubic LGM with R2 (6) 
-2,545.49 
-2,568.14 
-2,544.63 
-2,566.59 
-2,539.83 
-2,550.87 
10 
12 
9 
9 
1 
4 
5,110.98 
5,152.27 
5,111.26 
5,155.18 
5,117.67 
5,133.74 
- 
2 (= 2-1) 
1 (= 1-3) 
1 (= 1-4) 
 
6 (=1-6) 
- 
45.29 
1.72 
-42.20 
 
-10.77 
- 
<.001 
ns 
ns 
 
ns 
.075 
.106 
.078 
.123 
.227 
.147 
.05 -.10 
.09 -.13 
.05 -.10 
.10 -.15 
.16 -.30 
.11 -.19 
.990 
.976 
.990 
.976 
.991 
.984 
Note: LGM = latent growth curve modeling based on SEM framework; R1 = Residuals freely estimating; R2 = Residuals constrained; -2LL = -2 time the 
log likelihood; df = degree of freedom; AIC = Akaike’s information criterion; df = change in degrees of freedom;  = change in chi-square value 
from the full model to reduced (nested) model; p = p value of  difference between two models; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; 
CFI = comparative fit index; ns = nonsignificant at the conventional level; * refers to a model with an error message (regarding negative variance), so it 
could not be selected as the best fit model. One model in bold in each of two measures on immigration enforcement actions under S-Comm was finally 
selected as the best model fit based on  difference test. 
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APPENDIX E  
CONTACT (INCLUDING WEB SEARCH) LISTS OF STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AGENCIES FOR CRIME STATISTICS AT THE COUNTY LEVEL 
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List of State Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) Releasing County-level Crime Statistics   
State Name of contact agency (LEA) and related web link 
AL Alabama Law Enforcement Agency 
http://dps.alabama.gov/home/wfContent.aspx?PLH1=plhACJIC-CrimeInAlabama 
AR Arkansas Crime Information Center 
http://acic.org/crimeStatistics/Pages/default.aspx 
AZ - Arizona Department of Administration 
http://www.workforce.az.gov/population-estimates.aspx 
- Department of Public Safety 
http://www.azdps.gov/about/reports/crime_in_arizona/ 
CA - California Department of Finance 
http://www.dof.ca.gov/research/demographic/reports/estimates/e-2/view.php 
- California Department of Justice 
http://oag.ca.gov/crime/cjsc/stats/crimes-clearances 
CO Colorado Crime Information Center 
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/cbi/crime-colorado1  
CT Department of Public Safety 
http://www.dpsdata.ct.gov/dps/ucr/ucr.aspx 
DC DC Metropolitan Police Department 
http://mpdc.dc.gov/page/statistics-and-data 
DE State of Delaware - Criminal Justice Council 
http://cjc.delaware.gov/sac/sac_pubs_crime.shtml 
FL Florida Department of Law Enforcement 
http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/Content/FSAC/Menu/Data---Statistics-(1)/UCR-
Offense-Data.aspx 
GA Georgia Bureau of Investigation 
http://gbi.georgia.gov/crime-statistics 
HI Hawaii Crime Prevention and Justice Assistance Division 
http://ag.hawaii.gov/cpja/rs/ 
ID Idaho State Police 
https://www.isp.idaho.gov/BCI/ucr/crimeinidaho2013.html 
IL Illinois State Police 
http://www.isp.state.il.us/crime/ucrhome.cfm#anlrpts 
IN - No data were publicly released on the web site, so on Jan. 26, 2015, I contacted 
the Indiana State Police (ISP) and requested state data on county-level crime 
statistics during 4 years. 
- ISP first responded on Feb. 13, 2015, that ISP has no crime statistics collection 
at the county level, and recommended that I should contact another LEA in that 
state, the Indiana Criminal Justice Institute (ICJI).  
- I contacted ICJI on Feb. 15, 2015, but there was no response. Therefore, I 
finally dealt with it as missing data. 
KS Kansas Bureau of Investigation 
http://www.accesskansas.org/kbi/stats/stats_crime2013.shtml 
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KY Kentucky State Police 
http://www.kentuckystatepolice.org/data.html 
LA Lousiana Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Criminal 
Justice 
http://www.lcle.la.gov/programs/sac.asp 
MA - No data were publicly released on the web site, so on Nov. 2014 I contacted the 
Massachusetts Police Department (MPD) and requested state data on county-level 
crime statistics during 4 years (2010 - 2013). 
- MPD responded and released county-level crime statistics in the state, but the 
data covers 3 years (2010 - 2012), not including 2013 data. So I used 3 years’ 
crime statistics from MA for analysis.  
MD Governor’s Office of Crime Control & Prevention 
http://www.goccp.maryland.gov/msac/crime-statistics.php 
MI Michigan State Police 
http://www.michigan.gov/msp/0,1607,7-123-1645_3501_4621---,00.html 
MN Minnesota Department of Public Safety 
https://dps.mn.gov/divisions/bca/bca-divisions/mnjis/Pages/uniform-crime-
reports.aspx 
MO Missouri State Highway Patrol 
http://www.mshp.dps.missouri.gov/MSHPWeb/SAC/data_and_statistics_ucr_que
ry_backup.html 
MS - No data were publicly released on the web site, so on Jan. 27, 2015 I contacted 
the Mississippi Department of Public Safety (MDPS) and requested state data on 
county-level crime statistics during 4 years (2010 - 2013). 
- MDPS did not respond, so I dealt with it as missing data. 
NC North Carolina Department of Justice 
http://crimereporting.ncdoj.gov/Reports.aspx 
NE Nebraska Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice 
http://www.ncc.nebraska.gov/statistics/data_search/arrest/offense_crosstab.html 
NH New Hampshire Department of Safety 
http://www.nh.gov/safety/divisions/nhsp/ssb/crimrecords/ 
NJ New Jersey State Police 
http://www.njsp.org/info/ucr_currentdata1.html?agree=0 
NM New Mexico Department of Public Safety 
http://www.dps.state.nm.us/index.php/uniform-crime-reports/ 
NV Nevada Department of Public Safety 
http://nvrepository.state.nv.us/crimejustice.shtml 
OK Oklahoma Bureau of Investigation 
http://www.ok.gov/osbi/Publications/Crime_Statistics.html 
OR Oregon State Police 
http://www.oregon.gov/osp/CJIS/Pages/annual_reports.aspx 
PA Pennsylvania Uniform Crime Reporting System 
http://www.paucrs.pa.gov/UCR/ComMain.asp 
RI Rhode Island State Police 
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http://www.risp.ri.gov/stats/ 
SC South Carolina Law Enforcement Division 
http://www.sled.sc.gov/SCCrimeBooks.aspx?MenuID=CrimeReporting 
TN Tennessee Bureau of Investigation 
http://www.tbi.state.tn.us/tn_crime_stats/crime_stats_online.shtml 
TX Texas Department of Public Safety 
http://www.txdps.state.tx.us/administration/crime_records/pages/crimestatistics.ht
m 
UT Utah Department of Public Safety 
http://publicsafety.utah.gov/bci/crimestatistics.html 
VA Virginia State Police 
http://www.vsp.state.va.us/Crime_in_Virginia.shtm 
WA Washington Statistical Analysis Center 
http://wa-state-ofm.us/UniformCrimeReport/ 
WI Wisconsin Department of Justice 
http://www.doj.state.wi.us/office-justice-assistance 
WY Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation 
http://wyomingdci.wyo.gov/dci-criminal-justice-information-systems-
section/uniform-crime-reporting 
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APPENDIX F  
LIST OF 541 COUNTIES IN TERMS OF THREE CLASSIFICATIONS
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List of Localities (Counties) in Terms of Three Classifications: 541 Counties (Including Some Cities) Under Analysis 
Class 1: Localities with Administratively-Inactive-but-Legally-Punitive-Leaning Immigration Enforcement Policy Participation  
(88 counties)  
Baldwin, AL Coconino, AZ Clayton, GA Telfair, GA Saint Bernard, LA Greenville, SC 
Chilton, AL Mohave, AZ Colquitt, GA Troup, GA Worcester, MA Horry, SC 
DeKalb, AL Navajo, AZ Coweta, GA Kane, IL Anne Arundel, MD Lexington, SC 
Jefferson, AL Santa Cruz, AZ Douglas, GA Allen, IN Montgomery, MD Orangeburg, SC 
Limestone, AL Adams, CO Fayette, GA Bartholomew, IN St. Charles, MO Richland, SC 
Madison, AL Highland, FL Floyd, GA Clark, IN Buncombe, NC Spartanburg, SC 
Marshall, AL Lee, FL Forsyth, GA Elkhart, IN Forsyth, NC Montgomery, TN 
Mobile, AL Walton, FL Glynn, GA Hendricks, IN Dodge, NE Denton, TX 
Montgomery, AL Barrow, GA Gordon, GA Jackson, IN Suffolk, NY Galveston, TX 
Morgan, AL Bartow, GA Henry, GA Johnson, IN Warren, OH Iron, UT 
Shelby, AL Carroll, GA Houston, GA Lake, IN Montgomery, PA Summit, UT 
Tuscaloosa, AL Charlton, GA Lowndes, GA Marion, IN Aiken, SC Utah, UT 
Sebastian, AR Chatham, GA Muscogee, GA Shelby, IN Berkeley, SC Brown, WI 
Apache, AZ Cherokee, GA Richmond, GA Vanderburgh, IN Chester, SC  
Cochise, AZ Clarke, GA Rockdale, GA Shawnee, IN Florence, SC  
Class 2: Localities with Active Immigration Enforcement Policy Participation (34 counties) 
Benton, AR Yuma, AZ DeKalb, GA Oakland, MI Charleston, SC Washington, UT 
Washington, AR Los Angeles, CA Fulton, GA St. Louis, MO York, SC Weber, UT  
Maricopa, AZ Orange, CA Gwinnett, GA Gaston, NC Davidson, TN Fairfax, VA 
Pima, AZ San Bernardino, 
CA 
Hall, GA Mecklenburg, NC Dallas, TX Prince William, 
VA 
Pinal, AZ San Diego, CA Whitfield, GA Tulsa, OK Harris, TX  
Yavapai, AZ Cobb, GA Frederick, MD Beaufort, SC Salt Lake, UT  
Class 3: Localities with Inactive-But-Mixed Immigration Enforcement Policy Participation (419 counties)  
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Craighead, AR Charlotte, FL Lafayette Parish, LA Sampson, NC Yamhill, OR Montgomery, TX 
Faulkner, AR Clay, FL Lafourche Parish, LA  Union, NC Berks, PA Moore, TX 
Garland, AR Collier, FL Livingston Parish, 
LA  
Wake, NC Bucks, PA Nacogdoches, TX 
Pulaski, AR Desoto, FL Orleans Parish, LA Dawson, NE Centre, PA Navarro, TX 
Saline, AR Duval, FL Ouachita Parish, LA Douglas, NE Chester, PA Nueces, TX 
Alameda, CA Escambia, FL St. Mary Parish, LA Hall, NE Dauphin, PA Ochiltree, TX 
Butte, CA Glades, FL St. Tammany 
Parish, LA 
Lancaster, NE Delaware, PA Parker, TX 
Colusa, CA Hardee, FL Terrebonne 
Parish, LA 
Madison, NE Lackawanna, PA Potter, TX 
Contra Costa, CA Hendry, FL West Baton 
Rouge Parish, LA 
Sarpy, NE Philadelphia, PA Reeves, TX 
El Dorado, CA Hillsborough, FL Bristol, MA Hillsborough, NH York, PA Rockwall, TX 
Fresno, CA Indian River, FL Essex, MA Atlantic, NJ Providence, RI Smith, TX 
Glenn, CA Lake, FL Middlesex, MA Bergen, NJ Minnehaha, SD Starr, TX 
Humboldt, CA Leon, FL Norfolk, MA Camden, NJ Bedford, TN Tarrant, TX 
Imperial, CA Manatee, FL Suffolk, MA Cumberland, NJ Blount, TN Taylor, TX 
Kern, CA Marion, FL Baltimore, MD Essex, NJ Bradley, TN Titus, TX 
Kings, CA Martin, FL Baltimore City, MD Hudson, NJ Hamblen, TN Travis, TX 
Lake, CA Miami-Dade, FL Howard, MD Mercer, NJ Hamilton, TN Val Verde, TX 
Lassen, CA Monroe, FL Prince George’s, 
MD 
Middlesex, NJ Knox, TN Victoria, TX  
Madera, CA Okaloosa, FL Allegan, MI Monmouth, NJ Madison, TN Walker, TX 
Marin, CA Okeechobee, FL Berrien, MI Morris, NJ Putnam, TN Waller, TX 
Mendocino, CA Orange, FL Calhoun, MI Ocean, NJ Robertson, TN Washington, TX 
Merced, CA Osceola, FL Ingham, MI Passaic, NJ Rutherford, TN Webb, TX 
Monterey, CA  Palm Beach, FL Kent, MI Somerset, NJ Sevier, TN Wharton, TX 
Napa, CA Pasco, FL Macomb, MI Union, NJ Shelby, TN Wichita, TX 
Nevada, CA Pinellas, FL Oceana, MI Bernalillo, NM Sumner, TN Willacy, TX 
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Placer, CA Polk, FL Ottawa, MI Cibola, NM Warren, TN Williamson, TX 
Riverside, CA Sarasota, FL Van Buren, MI Dona Ana, NM  Washington, TN Wise, TX 
Sacramento, CA Seminole, FL Washtenaw, MI Lea, NM Williamson, TN Zapata, TX 
San Benito, CA St. Lucie, FL Wayne, MI San Juan, NM Angelina, TX Davis, UT 
San Francisco, CA Suwannee, FL Anoka, MN Santa Fe, NM Atascosa, TX Albemarle, VA 
San Joaquin, CA Volusia, FL Dakota, MN Clark, NV Bastrop, TX Alexandria City, VA 
San Luis Obispo, CA Hawaii, HI Hennepin, MN Washoe, NV Bell, TX Arlington, VA 
San Mateo, CA Honolulu, HI Mower, MN Albany, NY Bexar, TX Chesapeake City, VA 
Santa Barbara, CA Maui, HI Nobles, MN Allegany, NY Brazoria, TX Chesterfield, VA 
Santa Clara, CA Johnson, IA Olmstead, MN Cayuga, NY Brazos, TX Hanover, VA 
Santa Cruz, CA Polk, IA Ramsey, MN Chautauqua, NY Burnet, TX Henrico, VA 
Shasta, CA Sioux, IA Scott, MN Dutchess, NY Cameron, TX Loudoun, VA 
Solano, CA Woodbury, IA Sherburne, MN Essex, NY Cherokee, TX Newport News 
City, VA 
Sonoma, CA Ada, ID Stearns, MN Nassau, NY Collin, TX Norfolk City, VA 
Stanislaus, CA Bonneville, ID Washington, MN New York City, NY Colorado, TX Richmond City, VA 
Sutter, CA Canyon, ID Cass, MO Onondaga, NY Comal, TX Roanoke City, VA 
Tehama, CA Cassia, ID Greene, MO Ontario, NY Concho, TX Spotsylvania, VA 
Tulare, CA Gooding, ID Jackson, MO Orange, NY Deaf Smith, TX Stafford, VA 
Ventura, CA Jerome, ID Jasper, MO Putnam, NY Ector, TX Virginia Beach 
City, VA 
Yolo, CA Twin Falls, ID St. Louis City, MO Rockland, NY El Paso, TX Winchester City, VA 
Yuba, CA Champaign, IL Adams, MS Steuben, NY Ellis, TX Benton, WA 
Arapahoe, CO Cook, IL Desoto, MS Westchester, NY Fort Bend, TX Chelan, WA 
Boulder, CO DuPage, IL Forrest, MS Butler, OH Garza, TX Clark, WA 
Denver, CO Lake, IL Harrison, MS Clark, OH Gillespie, TX Franklin, WA 
Douglas, CO Madison, IL Hinds, MS Cuyahoga, OH Gonzales, TX Grant, WA 
Eagle, CO McHenry, IL Jones, MS Franklin, OH Grayson, TX Grays Harbor, WA 
El Paso, CO Will, IL Madison, MS Hamilton, OH Gregg, TX King, WA 
Fremont, CO Winnebago, IL Rankin, MS Lake, OH Guadalupe, TX Kitsap, WA 
Garfield, CO Douglas, KS Scott, MS Mahoning, OH Harrison, TX Lewis, WA 
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Jefferson, CO Finney, KS Alamance, NC Montgomery, OH Hays, TX Mason, WA 
Larimer, CO Ford, KS Cabarrus, NC Cleveland, OK Hidalgo, TX Okanogan, WA 
Mesa, CO Johnson, KS Catawba, NC Garfield, OK Hood, TX Pierce, WA 
Montrose, CO Saline, KS Cumberland, NC Muskogee, OK Howard, TX Skagit, WA 
Pueblo, CO Sedgwick, KS Duplin, NC Oklahoma, OK Hunt, TX Snohomish, WA 
Weld, CO Seward, KS Durham, NC Texas, OK Jefferson, TX Spokane, WA 
Fairfield, CT Wyandotte, KS Guilford, NC Clackamas, OR Johnson, TX Whatcom, WA 
Hartford, CT Daviess, KY  Harnett, NC Deschutes, OR Kaufman, TX Yakima, WA 
New Haven, CT Fayette, KY Henderson, NC Hood River, OR Kendall, TX Dane, WI 
District of Columbia Jefferson, KY Hoke, NC Jackson, OR Kerr, TX Kenosha, WI 
New Castle, DE Bossier Parish, LA Iredell, NC Lane, OR Liberty, TX Milwaukee, WI 
Sussex, DE Caddo Parish, LA Johnston, NC Linn, OR Limestone, TX Trempealeau, WI 
Alachua, FL 
Bay, FL 
Calcasieu Parish, LA  
East Baton Rouge 
Parish, LA 
Lee, NC 
New Hanover, 
NC 
Marion, OR 
Multnomah, OR 
 
Live Oak, TX 
Lubbock, TX 
Walworth, WI 
Waukesha, WI 
Laramie, WY 
Brevard, FL Grant Parish, LA Orange, NC Umatilla, OR McLennan,  TX  
Broward, FL Jefferson Parish, LA Pitt, NC Washington, OR Midland, TX  
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APPENDIX G  
SCATTERPLOTS SHOWING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN  
ACTIVATION LENGTH OF SECURE COMMUNITIES AND TOTAL CRIME RATE 
CHANGES (2010 - 2013) BY LOCAL CLASSIFICATIONS 
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(a): All 541 localities activating Secure Communties Program 
   
(b): Class 1 counties (with administratively-inactive-but-legally-punitive-leaning immigration enforcement policy participation) 
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(c): Class 2 counties (with active immigration enforcement policy participation) 
      
(d): Class 3 counties (with inactive-but-mixed immigration enforcement policy participation) 
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Figure G-1. Graphical analysis on the relationship between crime rate changes (2010 - 2013) and activation length of Secure 
Communities program (month) by class. The x-axis refers to activation length (month, ranging from a minimum of 11 months to 
a maximum of 61 months), and the y-axis refers to crime rate changes during 4 years (2010 - 2013). Each scatterplot has two 
lines: one for the regression fit line and the other for LOWESS (locally weighted scatterplot smoothing). Each row has three 
scatterplots: the left one shows total crime rate change during 4 years, the middle shows violent crime rate change during the 
same period, and the right shows property crime rate change during the same period.
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APPENDIX H  
THE LIST OF COUNTIES AND PRIVATE PRISON COMPANIES IN THEIR 
JURISDICTIONS FOR IMMIGRATION DETAINMENT 
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Involvement of Private Prison Companies on Immigration Detainment at the County 
Level and Types of Public-Private Contracts 
State County Facility name Private prison company 
involved & type of contract  
AZ Pinal Central Arizona Correctional Center IGSA* + CCA** 
AZ Pinal Eloy Detenton Center IGSA + CCA 
AZ Pinal Florence Correctional Center IGSA + CCA 
AZ Pinal Florence Service Processing Center IGSA + CCA 
AZ Yuma San Luis Regional Detention Center IGSA + Emerald Corretional 
Management 
CA Imperial El Centro Service Processing Center ICE SPC *** + Asset Protection 
and Security Services, Inc 
CA Kern California City Correctional Center IGSA + CCA 
CA Los Angeles Alhambra City Jail Geo Group, Inc. 
CA San 
Bernadino 
Adelanto Detention Facility Geo Group, Inc. 
CA San Diego Otay Detention Facilty IGSA + CCA 
CA San Diego San Diego Correctional Facility CCA 
CO Arapahoe Denver Contract Detention Facility Geo Group, Inc. 
CO Arapahoe Aurora Detention Facility Geo Group, Inc. 
FL Broward Broward Transitional Center Geo Group, Inc. 
FL Miami-Dade Krome Service Processing Center ICE SPC + Akal Security 
GA Hall North Georgia Detention Center CCA 
GA Irwin Irwin County Detention Center Detention Management, LLC 
GA Stewart Stewart Detention Center IGSA + CCA 
IL Pulaski Tri-County Detention Center IGSA + Paladin Eastside 
Psychological Service, Inc. 
LA Acadia South Lousiana Correctional Center Geo Group, Inc. 
LA La Salle La Salle Detention Facility IGSA + Geo Group, Inc. 
NJ Essex Delany Hall Detention Facility IGSA + Community Education 
Center 
NJ Union Elizabeth Contract Detention Facility CCA 
NM Dona Ana Otero County Prison Facility IGSA + Management and 
Training Corportation 
NM Monmouth Monmouth County Correctional 
Facility 
IGSA + Management and 
Training Corportation 
NM Torrence Torrance County Detention Facility CCA 
NY Batavia Buffalo Service Processing Center Valley-Metro Barbosa Group  
TN Tipton West Tennessee Detention Facility  CCA 
TX Bexar Central Texas Detention Facility IGSA + Geo Group, Inc. 
TX Burnet Burnet County Jail IGSA + LaSalle Southwest 
Correctional 
TX Cameron Port Isabel Service Processing Center ICE SPC + Ahtna Technical 
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Services 
TX Ector Odessa Detention Center IGSA + Community Education 
Center 
TX El Paso El Paso Processing Center ICE SPC + Akal Security 
TX Frio South Texas Detention Facility Geo Group, Inc. 
TX Harris Houston Processing Center CCA 
TX Haskell Rolling Plains Correctional Facility IGSA + Emerald 
TX Hidalgo East Hidalgo Detention Center IGSA + LCS Corrections 
TX Hudspeth West Texas Detention Facility IGSA + Emerald Correctional 
Management 
TX Johnson Johnson County Law Enforcement 
Center 
ICE SPC + LaSalle Southwest 
Correctional 
TX Karnes Karnes County Residential Center IGSA + Geo Group, Inc. 
TX La Salle La Salle Regional Detention Center IGSA + Emerald 
TX Limestone Limestone County Detention Center IGSA + Management and 
Training Corportation 
TX McLennan McLennan County Detention Center IGSA + Community Education 
Center 
TX Montgomery Joe Corley Detention Center IGSA + Geo Group, Inc. 
TX Nueces Coastal Bend Detention Center IGSA + LCS Corrections 
TX Polk Polk County Adult Detention Center IGSA + Community Education 
Centers 
TX Webb Laredo Processing Center IGSA + CCA 
TX Williamson T. Don Hutto Residential Center ICE Juvenile Facility + CCA 
TX Val Verde Val Verde Correctional Facility and 
County Jail 
IGSA + Geo Group, Inc. 
WA Pierce Tacoma Northwest Detention Center Geo Group, Inc. 
*IGSA: Intergovernmental Service Agreement between the federal immigration agency (ICE) and a state or 
local government; ** CCA: Corrections Corporation of America; ***ICE SPC: ICE Service Processing 
Center.  
Note: The lists in this table do not include all private prison companies detaining noncitizens for 
deportation proceedings across the country, but include private prison companies that contract directly with 
federal immigration agencies (DHS/ICE) for immigrant detainment. In policy reality, however, many 
noncitizens across the country, specifically those detained with criminal charges, have been detained in 
local jails that do not have direct contracts with ICE, and some of which were operated by private prison 
companies. For example, noncitizens are held in Arizona State Prison - Phoenix West (within Maricopa 
County) for criminal violations, and this detention facility is operated and managed by Geo Group, Inc. 
under a contract with the Arizona Department of Corrections. Although this facility has not directly make 
any contracts with ICE, it has detained criminal noncitizens who are then transferred into ICE custody after 
completing their criminal charges for immigration enforcement actions.   
The “type contract” in the right column in this table refers to the way private prison companies under the 
current immigration enforcement policy are involved. According to TRAC data on immigrant detention 
trajectories (http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/222/), private prison complexes can be involved in 
immigration detention business in one of four ways: (1) detention facilities are owned and run by private 
prison companies , (2) detention facilities are owned by ICE but operated and managed by private prison 
companies, (3) facilities are owned by mutual agreements between federal or local governments (IGSA), 
and are operated by state or local governments or private prison companies, and (4) facilities are created 
and run for specific categories of noncitizens (juveniles or  family residential centers for noncitizens 
seeking asylum), and federal/local or private prison companies can be involved in their management and 
operation. Many counties in this table follow a third option, in which immigrant detainments are done 
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through an IGSA between different levels of government, but actual operation and management is done by 
the private sector. In cases where only private prison companies are listed, this indicates that detention 
facilities are owned and run by private prison companies.     
The list of private prisons in this table was collected from the American Civil Liberties Union of New 
Mexico (2011), Mason (2012), using website search tools provided by Texas Prison Bid’ness 
(http://www.texasprisonbidness.org/map), TRAC’s Detention Facility Reports 
(http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/detention/exit.shtml), Community Initiatives for Visiting Immigrants in 
Confinement (http://www.endisolation.org/about/immigration-detention/), using detention facility locator 
searches from  Geo Group’s facility locator (http://www.geogroup.com/maps/) and CCA 
(http://www.cca.com/locations), and referring to Detention Watch Network’s Expose and Close series on 
uncovering conditions of immigrant detention facilites across the country 
(http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/exposeandclose2014).  
 
